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 Three years and four countries after beginning research for this dissertation, it is 
finally completed and I would be remiss not to thank some of the multitude of people 
that have helped to make it possible. Firstly, I would like to thank my committee for 
challenging me to explore the fascinating story of the Carolina Corps to a much greater 
extent, truly ensuring that the remarkable story of these men could be given full justice. 
In particular, Woody Holton has helped me to develop my scholarship in a more 
meaningful way than anyone ever has. It has been an honor to work with him, and I am 
truly in his debt. Similarly, I began this project as an Americanist, with no precedent for 
studying the history of the broader Atlantic world. I therefore wish to thank Matt Childs, 
not only for his friendship but also for his patience in introducing me to the vast 
scholarship on Caribbean history.  
 As I have alluded, the research for this project has led me to repositories in four 
countries, and this would not have been possible without the financial and scholarly 
assistance of certain groups and individuals. From the University of South Carolina, this 
included grants from the Office of the Vice President of Research (SPARC Grant), and from 
the Institute for African American Research. While these grants allowed me to visit Britain 
and Barbados, individual grants from the Clements Library in Ann Arbor, and the Society 
of the Cincinnati Library in Washington, DC, allowed me to research this topic in much 
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greater depth.  Indeed, I am deeply indebted to the staff at all of the repositories I visited, 
without whom this dissertation would have been a shell of its current form.  
 Three years is an awfully long time to work on a project, and through it all I have 
been surrounded by brilliant minds and friendly faces that have helped me to not only 
formulate ideas, but also dealt with a myriad of different types of griping. I would 
therefore like to thank: Alyssa Constad, Lewis Eliot, Bob Karachuk, Anthony Keane-
Dawes, Andrew Kettler, Freddie Laughton, Ellen Robertson, Mary Sherrer, Connie 
Schulz, Blake and Dana Sox, Katherine Wakely Laughton, Cane West, Caleb Wittum, my 
colleagues on the staff of both the Papers of the Revolutionary Era Pinckney Statesmen 
in Columbia, and Papers of Thomas Jefferson: Retirement Series at Monticello, and all of 
my friends back in England who have spiritually joined me on this journey. For her 
technical expertise, Susan Spengler deserves extra recognition. In addition, the brilliant 
advice of the Atlantic History Reading Group at the University of South Carolina helped 
form at least two of the chapters contained herein. The love and strength given to me 
from my family on both sides of the Atlantic have helped me to complete this project, 
and to you all I am eternally grateful. This is particularly true of my patient and 
wonderful wife Alyssa, and our little girl Darcy. Both of you have kept me focused even 
at the hardest of moments in this process, and have filled my non-working hours with a 
joy that gave impetus to the completion of this work. I simply could not have done it 
without you.  
 Final acknowledgements must of course be given to the men who form the focus 
of this project. Three years ago, I, like most scholars, had no true understanding of what 
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the Carolina Corps was or the tremendous impact it had on British imperial history. It 
has been truly humbling to embark on this journey to discover the important, yet often 
tragic, history of the men of the unit. It has been my honor to learn of their lives, and 









The Carolina Corps were both a product and driver of British military zeal during 
the Age of Revolution. Created in South Carolina in the final years of the American 
Revolutionary War, the unit was the only black fighting force that survived the conflict on 
the British side. Evacuated at the end of the conflict as free men, the Carolina Corps 
straddled the boundaries of military–civil society in the highly racialized eighteenth 
century British Caribbean. Although former slaves, the men of the Corps were 
nonetheless crucial to the defense of the region. This gave the men opportunities and 
legal standing that was unattainable to most other blacks in the British West Indies. The 
Carolina Corps leveraged their position to ensure they achieved the greatest possible level 
of social advancement. In addition, these black troops helped to change the racial 
perceptions of many white commanders, laying the groundwork for the later expansion 
of black units within the British Caribbean.  
This dissertation looks at the career of this revolutionary regiment, from its initial 
inception to its incorporation in the brand new West India Regiments in 1797. The study 
looks at the ways that the Carolina Corps interacted with the diverse populations they 
encountered, and dealt with complex societal issues such as ethnicity and nationalism. It 
will also show how the unit was successful in using a unique set of temporal circumstances 
and their own understanding of their military worth to attain a unique, liminal situation 
in the British Caribbean. White attitudes and perceptions towards the soldiers will also be 
viii 
assessed. Overall, this dissertation will show how a relatively-unstudied group of 300 
former slaves were critical to the evolution of the British military establishment in the 
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On December 14, 1782, the British Army evacuated their final major post in South 
Carolina. The flotilla of ships that tacked their way to sea from Charlestown Harbor that 
December day contained the flotsam and jetsam of the losing side in the American 
Revolutionary War. British regulars and Hessian mercenaries stood on decks of ships next 
to loyalist refugees, all trying to find a safe port in the shrinking territory of British North 
America. Below decks, thousands of loyalist-owned slaves fled Charlestown the same way 
so many had arrived, in the dank, crowded hold of a ship, their status in bondage much 
more certain than the futures of their owners.  
 Aboard the HMS Symmetry, a unique group of men watched as the South Carolina 
mainland faded into the distance. The men of the Black Pioneers had earned their 
freedom from bondage during the Revolutionary War and now stood on the deck of the 
ship as provincial soldiers in the British Army.1 It must have been with supreme irony that 
the freemen watched the shadow of Sullivan’s Island, the “Ellis Island of African 
                                                          
1 The HMS Symmetry, a 333-ton Royal Navy supply ship, was the largest of five British ships bound for the 
island of Saint Lucia. Most the Charlestown evacuation fleet sailed to either East Florida or Jamaica. Only 
military personnel of the Carolina Corps, and parts of the 19th and 30th Regiments, along with their equipage, 
sailed for Saint Lucia. No Loyalists from South Carolina evacuated to that island. List of Ships bound to St 
Lucia, under Convoy of the Hornet, ca. 12 December 1782, WO 36-2, National Archives. 
2 
Americans,” fade into the distant twilight.2 The men of the pioneer unit, and of the 
famous Black Dragoons, were bound to continue service in the British Caribbean. Indeed, 
the horses of the dragoons sailed from Charlestown in the same naval convoy as their 
riders. Upon Saint Lucia, the island where the Symmetry was sailing, the men would form 
part of a unique black unit in the British Caribbean. Their geographical heritage meant 
that this revolutionary British regiment would become known as the Carolina Corps.  
 The men of the Carolina Corps hold a unique position in the history of the British 
Caribbean. While black troops were a colonial fixture throughout the Atlantic during times 
of war, the Carolina Corps became the first free all-black peacetime unit in the British 
Army.3 As such, the unit recorded many historic firsts for black troops in the British 
military. The soldiers of the Carolina Corps became the first black troops in the British 
military to receive regular pensions upon their retirement, starting in 1793. As well as this, 
the unit supplied some of the original companies of the First West India Regiment in 1798. 
                                                          
2 The term “Ellis Island of African-Americans,” coined by Peter H. Wood, is on the South Carolina historical 
marker presently located on Sullivan’s Island. It is estimated that 40 percent of African Americans today can 
trace their lineage through the island, which acted as a quarantine facility for slaves imported into the port 
of Charlestown from Africa. At least 89,000 slaves spent time in quarantine at Sullivan’s Island during 
colonial British rule in South Carolina. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 
through the Stono Rebellion (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975), xiv; Peter McCandless, Slavery, 
Disease and Suffering in the Southern Lowcountry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6.  
3 As early as the 1770s, the British had used a force of some 1000 men, known as the “King’s Negroes,” in 
the Caribbean. This fatigue unit, unlike the Carolina Corps, were slaves owned by the Crown, and thus 
remained in bondage throughout their service. The unit was officially freed, and disbanded, in 1831 – some 
24 years after the slaves of the West India Regiments were freed. Roger N. Buckley, “The British Army’s 
African Recruitment Policy, 1790-1807,” Contributions in Slave Studies 5 (September 2008): 6.  
3 
Despite their unique position in the history of the British Caribbean, the Carolina Corps 
have mostly fallen through the pages of history.4 
 The Carolina Corps were not the first black unit that the British employed in a 
military capacity, but their position was nonetheless unique. While the British had 
employed slaves as soldiers in the siege of Havana during the Seven Years War, and in 
various other conflicts, none of these units were considered a true part of the military 
establishment, considered auxiliary troops that were utilized at times of need. The British 
had also dealt with the maroons on Jamaica, giving them land in exchange for loyalty and 
peace at the end of the First Maroon War in 1739.5 However, all of these relationships 
were made in an exclusionary imperial context, as none of the black troops previously 
used were considered truly British subjects with all the rights that this concept entailed.  
 The Carolina Corps, as free men and troops in the British Army, came to be 
considered British subjects and encountered a shift in thinking regarding blacks in the 
wake of the Revolutionary War. The moral and structural changes wrought by this conflict 
among both military and political figures within the British Empire meant that the men of 
the unit were among the first to benefit from a more inclusive imperial model. Before the 
war, the British only used black troops in times of desperation, often treating those it 
                                                          
4 Despite many passing references in works relating to the British military in the Post-Revolutionary War 
Caribbean, only one published work has been dedicated to the Carolina Corps as a unit. George F. Tyson, 
Jr., “The Carolina Black Corps: Legacy of Revolution, 1782-1798,” Revista/Review Interamericana 5 (Winter 
1975/76): 648-64.  
5Michael Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1982), 89-90.  
4 
freed from slavery or those members of black autonomous groups they encountered as 
outside of the imperial model. Throughout the pre-Revolutionary War period, the slave 
trade continued largely unchallenged, and groups such as the Maroons on Jamaica and 
the Caribs on Saint Vincent were dealt with as separate entities, rather than within the 
imperial British model. The Revolutionary War created a schism in feelings towards the 
slave trade, with moral arguments being used against it in ever increasing numbers. As 
well as this, slaves freed during the war became British subjects, both in Nova Scotia and, 
in the case of the Carolina Corps, in other parts of the British Empire. This new inclusion 
of blacks within the imperial fold was not simply socio-political, but also military, as shown 
by the Carolina Corps’ retention in the decade of peace that followed the Treaty of Paris. 
This change in imperial thinking between the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 and 
the creation of the West India Regiments, beginning in 1795, underrides this entire 
dissertation, and the Carolina Corps were one of the transformative groups that provide 
an insight into this major imperial moment in British history.  
 There have been excellent books written on the British military establishment in 
the West Indies in the past several decades, and it is these works that this study adds to. 
These previous works have often looked in detail at specific regiments in the British 
Caribbean, particularly the West India Regiments.6 While this makes sense, as the units 
                                                          
6 The most detailed histories of the British military in the West Indies were both written by Roger Norman 
Buckley. His first work on the region focused exclusively on the West India Regiments during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The second, more recent work focuses on the wider British military in 
the region, including the black soldiers of the West India Regiments. The Carolina Corps are referred to in 
passing in both works. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats: The British West India Regiments, 1795-1815 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) and The British Army in the West Indies: Society and the Military in the 
Revolutionary Age (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1998). 
5 
are much better known and lasted longer, a focus on the West India Regiments exclusively 
leaves a broad gap in British military historiography when it comes to the recruitment of 
black soldiers. In Slaves in Red Coats, one of the few books to look exclusively at the black 
regiments in the British Caribbean during the Revolutionary Era, Roger Buckley comments 
on the Carolina Corps that “The importance of this contingent, which was under the 
command of regular army officers, was recognized all over the West Indies.”7 Despite this, 
Buckley simply uses the Carolina Corps as a foundation block upon which to rest his 
subsequent study of the West India Regiments. In a chapter of Arming Slaves, a 
compilation of essays that looks at the arming of enslaved persons throughout history, 
David Geggus explains of the British recruitment of blacks during the Revolutionary era: 
“Given the numbers involved and the survival of at least the Carolina Corps, transferred 
in 1783 to the West Indies, they constitute another step forward in the developing use of 
slaves as soldiers.”8 It seems that while many historians use the unit as a touchstone, 
there remain a lack of detailed studies of the men of the Carolina Corps and their position 
within the British Caribbean.  
 There is good reason for this neglect of the Carolina Corps in some modern 
histories of the British Atlantic. Firstly, while critics could be dismissive of Buckley, Geggus, 
et al. for their casual mentions of the unit in their wider works, this should certainly not 
                                                          
7 Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 6.   
8 David Geggus, “The Arming of Slaves in the Haitian Revolution,” in Arming Slaves: From Classical Times to 
the Modern Age, Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan, eds. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2006), 211. 
6 
be the case. Indeed, it is testament to the scholarship of these historians that, while 
working on broader projects with different chronological and geographic focuses, they 
have discovered the unit and used the Corps as an example to mention. The archival 
situation in Grenada, the headquarters of the Carolina Corps during their tenure in the 
West Indies, has meant that many rich sources regarding the unit were lost to historians 
in recent years.9 This has encouraged scholars to turn their attention to other military 
units, and race relations within the wider Caribbean region.10 While this study is indebted 
to these works, which have created a historiographical space in which to situate it, certain 
regions of the British Caribbean have suffered neglect at a time when others are 
thriving.11 
 Unfortunately, as with many of the works on the British Caribbean, those that 
mention the soon-to-be Carolina Corps only do so in passing, and often these references 
are sloppy. In his otherwise excellent book, Death or Liberty, Douglas Egerton suggests 
the black pioneers in New York and those in South Carolina, the latter becoming the 
                                                          
9  Various hurricanes, flooding, and a lack of funds have meant that many documents in the Grenadian 
National Archives have been destroyed or are inaccessible to historians. This includes all the governor’s 
messages, and those of the Grenada Assembly.  
10 Many historians have found great success looking at civil-military relations, and wider race relations 
relating to nationalism and ethnicity, in Latin American nations around the Caribbean rim. Ben Vinson III, 
Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The Free-Colored Militia in Colonial Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2001); Maria Elena Diaz, The Virgin, the King, and the Royal Slaves of El Cobre: Negotiating Freedom 
in Colonial Cuba, 1670-1780 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the 
New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); James H. 
Sweet, Domingos Àlvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlantic World (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011).  
11 Barbados and Jamaica, due to their wealth of easily accessible archival sources, are the main points of 
focus for studies of the British Caribbean during the Colonial and Revolutionary Eras.  
7 
largest part of the Carolina Corps, were one and the same unit.12 This simply is not the 
case. Likewise, Todd Braisted suggests erroneously that “The Black Dragoons, a part of 
the South Carolina militia establishment, would soon pass into history, disbanded along 
with all Loyalist militia in the province upon its evacuation.”13 While it may seem pedantic 
to bring up these small points in what are larger works, it is this jigsaw of misconceptions 
in these larger publications that have resulted in so many misconceptions about some of 
the black units in the Revolutionary War. “Black Men, Red Coats” intends to correct some 
of these fallacies relating to the units that would later comprise the Carolina Corps. 
This study uses the history of the Carolina Corps in both North America and the 
West Indies as a prism through which to analyze the intersection of race, society and the 
military in the Revolutionary Era British Atlantic world. It will show that Grenada, 
Dominica, Saint Vincent and the other Windward Islands were the center of British civil-
military interactions based on race but are often overshadowed by the revolutions in the 
American colonies and Haiti that bookend the era. Such analysis allows for an insight into 
the ways that the men of the Carolina Corps, as the only black provincial unit in the British 
                                                          
12 Douglas R. Egerton suggests that Harry Washington, a slave of the famous general, fought in South 
Carolina against Francis Marion after the black pioneers from New York who went south in 1780, and that 
he was evacuated from Charlestown in 1782. This is not true, as it was the locally-raised black dragoons 
who fought Marion in South Carolina, and it was from New York City that Washington sailed to Nova Scotia. 
Such errors are not solely Egerton’s but pervade works that reference the men of the Carolina Corps during 
their initial service with the British in North America. Egerton, Death or Liberty: African Americans and 
Revolutionary America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 195. 
13 Of course, this was not the case, with the entire unit and their horses evacuating to Saint Lucia and 
becoming a part of the Carolina Corps after the fall of Charlestown in 1782. Todd W. Braisted, “The Black 
Pioneers and Others: The Military Role of Black Loyalists in the American War for Independence,” in Moving 
On: Black Loyalists in the Afro-Atlantic World, John W. Pulis, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999), 
23.   
8 
Caribbean military during the peacetime, advanced their position within a highly 
racialized society.  This study seeks to place the experiences of the Carolina Corps 
alongside those of more oft-written about units in the Atlantic region, to give a more 
holistic view of the role of black troops in civil-military relations in the West Indies during 
the Revolutionary Era. It shows that the Carolina Corps were more than simply a black 
unit within the West Indies. The unit was fundamental to the wider British use of black 
troops during the French Revolutionary Wars and later, a conclusion that both expands 
and better explains the current historiography on the British military in the Caribbean 
region.  
 Unlike many works on Latin American nations, which focus heavily on society, 
most studies that focus on civil-military relations in the British Caribbean adopt a 
traditional military history style. This style, heavy on military jargon, troop movements, 
maps, and battles, is a top-down approach that often misses the experience of individual 
soldiers on the ground. While “Black Men, Red Coats” is indebted to Norman Buckley, 
whose work on the West Indian Regiments is heavily cited hereafter, his approach 
borrows heavily from the traditional military history approach.14 The present work forms 
part of the “new military history,” using a methodology that focuses less on the tactical 
movements and deployments of the Carolina Corps, although these will still be included 
                                                          
14 Peter Voelz’s unpublished dissertation is another fantastic source of information, but, like Buckley, Voelz 
uses the traditional approach regularly adopted by military historians in the years before the cultural turn 
in History. Therefore, while containing interesting information regarding the units within it, there is scant 
analysis of civil-military relations. Peter Michael Voelz, “Slave and Soldier: The Military Impact of Blacks in 
the Colonial Americas” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1978). 
9 
where necessary, and more on the socio-cultural impact of the unit.15 In this way, “Black 
Men, Red Coats” is not simply a unit history in the traditional sense, but a work that uses 
a unique regiment to give insight into the intersection between the military, race, and 
society that is currently lacking for the British Windward Islands.   
Three main arguments will be advanced throughout the course of the study, while 
each chapter will also have its own arguments dealing with the Carolina Corps and its 
effect on the British Atlantic world. The first major argument chain seeks to understand 
the impact that the Corps had on white attitudes towards the arming of the blacks 
throughout their service in the Revolutionary era. This study will show how the men of 
the unit substantially changed the perspective of many whites in the British military 
through their interactions with officers. This change in perception is best seen in the 
evolving positive arguments of whites towards the unit, which was one of the reasons 
that the Corps survived for such a long time. It will also show that the white men they 
interacted with, particularly their officers, felt honor-bound and compelled by 
paternalistic racism to protect the unit, while ironically driving it to the brink of 
                                                          
15 The break from traditional military history has been heralded by scholars who have engaged more 
effectively with historical fields. These new military history works, prevalent since the 1970s, have covered 
every major global conflict and most new military histories written for an academic audience fall within its 
remit. Such works include: James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The American Civil War Era (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988); John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the 
Somme (New York: Viking Press, 1976); Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976). For military history works more pertinent to this study, and not otherwise cited 
within the main body of this study, include: John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the 
Military Struggle for American Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); Holger Hoock, Scars 
of Independence: America’s Violent Birth (New York: Crown Books, 2017); Daniel J. Tortora, Carolina in 
Crisis: Cherokees, Colonists and Slaves in the American Southeast, 1756-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2015); John Whiteclay Chambers, “The New Military History: Myth and Reality,” 
Journal of Military History 55, no. 3 (July 1991): 395-406.  
10 
destruction due to their biological misconceptions regarding black bodies. Ultimately, 
however, the influence of the Corps on their white commanders helped to change the 
entire makeup of the British Army in the Caribbean.  
 The second major argument looks at how the men of the Corps interacted with 
the people of the West Indies. The unique status enjoyed by the Corps meant that they 
negotiated relationships with not only whites in the British Caribbean, but also blacks, 
both free and enslaved. This study will show that through their actions and behavior, the 
men of the Corps were adept at portraying Britishness in order to advance in white 
society. Through their understanding and cultural flexibility, the soldiers also formed 
intimate relationships with blacks from various groups throughout the Caribbean region. 
Also, it will show how the men of the Corps used their positions within the British Army 
to enhance their own social position, and to gain whatever spoils they could from the 
establishment for their service, including pensions and enhanced legal standing. Due to 
the fluidity of identity within the Caribbean, the men of the unit carved a unique niche for 
themselves that allowed them to keep a foot in both black and white society, flourishing 
in both as far as their race and status would allow. This position was exceptional in the 
British controlled areas of the region prior to the creation of the West India Regiments.  
 The final argumentative thread looks at the specific impact that the Corps had on 
the British military establishment, and particularly their role in the creation of the West 
India Regiments. The first two arguments, looking at the attitudes of whites and the 
negotiation of identity, converge here, with both combining to create a prevailing attitude 
towards the further arming of blacks. The perceived loyalty of the Corps during their long 
11 
service, and the change in attitudes of whites, meant the creation of a strong faction 
advocating the arming of blacks occurred at precisely the time that the British needed 
men in the Caribbean region during the French Revolutionary Wars. This study will show 
that the Corps were critical to convincing the British high command in London to recruit 
further black troops, and that without the unit the creation of the West India Regiments 
would have been delayed or might never have taken place. Overall, this study will show 
that despite their limited appearance in Caribbean historiography, the men of the 
Carolina Corps played a pivotal role as the foundational black unit in a new era of 
multiracial soldiering in the British Caribbean.   
 The component parts that would create the Carolina Corps are frequently 
characters in the extensive works on black Loyalists in the American Revolutionary War 
released in recent years. While more prevalent in works that focus explicitly on South 
Carolina during the war, especially Jim Piecuch’s Three Peoples, One King, the men 
evacuated to the Caribbean as the Carolina Corps also make passing appearances in many 
other works on the wider black experience in the Revolutionary War.16 As with many 
similar works that cover vast topics, the contributions of the various black units are often 
amalgamated into a larger synthesis of the black struggle for freedom during the conflict. 
By specifically looking at the single regiment that survived the war as a fighting force on 
                                                          
16 Jim Piecuch, Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775-1782 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2008); Alan Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting 
for Emancipation in the War for Independence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Sylvia Frey, 
Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).  
12 
the British side, this work seeks to show how the war affected black emancipation on a 
more individualized level.17  
 Arguments rage throughout the historiography of black participation in the 
American Revolution about the reasons why the British emancipated slaves during the 
Revolutionary War. Some argue that blacks manipulated British commanders to gain their 
freedom, speaking with their feet by fleeing to British lines and forcing the situation on 
otherwise unwilling British officers. Other historians have seen the recruitment of blacks 
as being born out of basic military expediency, the blacks obviously providing the British 
with much-needed manpower during the war.18 Both are likely true in different situations 
during the Revolutionary War, and certainly affected the history of the Carolina Corps.  
 The Carolina Corps existed in a truly liminal position within the British Caribbean. 
Being the first black peacetime unit in the British Army made them essential for the 
                                                          
17 While the personal histories unearthed by Cassandra Pybus and Maya Jasanoff are amazing to read, it is 
important to note that neither track the men of the Corps or the reverse black diaspora that led free people 
of color into the Caribbean. Instead, most of their black migrant subjects travel to Sierra Leone, Nova Scotia, 
and Great Britain. Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles, American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2012); Pybus, Epic Journeys of Freedom: Runaway Slaves of the American Revolution and Their 
Global Quest for Liberty (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2006).  
18 The different perspectives are largely born out of the individual focus of historians. The largest 
proponents of the theory that slaves used the Revolutionary War as a mass slave rebellion and thus 
manipulated their own freedom are Gary Nash and Sylvia Frey, who specifically looked at the conflict from 
the black viewpoint. Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy and Philip D. Morgan in their essay in Arming Slaves 
look at the situation from the British standpoint and thus see the recruitment as a purely military move 
born out of desperation. Nash, The Forgotten Fifth: African Americans in the Age of Revolutions (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); O’Shaughnessy and Morgan, “Arming Slaves in the American 
Revolution,” in Brown and Morgan, eds., Arming Slaves; Edward Countryman, Enjoy the Same Liberty: Black 
Americans and the Revolutionary War (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012); Simon Schama, Rough 
Crossings: Britain, the Slaves and the American Revolution (London: BBC Books, 2005).  
13 
defense of the Windward Islands from enemies, both foreign and domestic.19 This role 
gave them an elevated position within black society in the eyes of whites, but it also 
created levels of difference between the unit and their fellow black islanders. Such a 
societal position could only exist in the unique conditions provided by the hybridity of 
cultures caused by the geographic isolation of the region from the metropole. Put bluntly, 
while the white population needed them for protection in the Caribbean, the same unit 
would not have survived in any other regions within the British Atlantic. The Carolina 
Corps helped ingratiate themselves with white colonists by performing acts of Britishness, 
while simultaneously using African survivals to keep from entirely alienating the much 
larger black populations on the island. It was also the unique timing of the arrival of the 
Carolina Corps, as the first peacetime black unit, before the creation of the much larger 
West India Regiments, and during the first major Parliamentary debates on abolition, that 
allowed this unique position to occur. Richard White argues that his concept of a “Middle 
Ground” could only occur in the pays d’en haut for a short period in the eighteenth 
century.20 This study will show that the unique form of social liminality experienced by 
                                                          
19 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969). 
Turner argued that there were three liminal periods: the first stage (separation) requires a group to break 
from an earlier fixed point in a social structure. In the case of the Carolina Corps, this break came after their 
emancipation from their previous position in bondage. The second stage (liminality), is the one that is the 
focus of this project. In this position, the group becomes ambiguous, “passing through a cultural realm that 
has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state.”  It was this position which the men of the 
Carolina Corps found themselves in upon their arrival in the British Caribbean, differentiated from their 
fellow blacks, but not yet viewed as true members of British society. This admission into British society 
represents the third phase of Turner’s theory (reincorporation), wherein readmission to society, albeit at a 
different level, occurs. 
20 In The Middle Ground, Richard White argues that there was a relatively brief period of time during the 
seventeenth century when a system of mutual accommodation existed between the Indians of the region 
and the French settlers, both living side-by-side with neither powerful enough to assert total dominance. In 
White’s work, the system is destroyed by the encroachment of the land-hungry British settlers after the 
Seven Year’s War. While a totally different scenario, a similar process occurred when the Carolina Corps 
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the Carolina Corps could only exist in the Windward Islands during the limited period that 
the unit existed, based on conditions created by their own entrance into the West Indies. 
This unique position could only exist because of the white colonists need for protection, 
which trumped their racial biases when judging the men of the Corps. Also, the limited 
size of the Corps (roughly 300 men) meant that they were easily hidden from sight by the 
British authorities when this was required. Their race, however, did limit their inclusion 
into British society, hence creating a liminal space which they were forced to occupy. The 
same was also true with the black inhabitants on the various islands. This temporal period 
was ended in 1795, when the creation of the West India Regiments meant thousands of 
black soldiers entered the British Army. This forced white colonists, and the British 
authorities, to make a space for this group of men in society, an accommodation they did 
not necessarily need to make previously for the much smaller Carolina Corps. 
 Due to the lack of sources available in Grenada, this analysis of the Carolina Corps 
is largely told using documents written by military officers and the staff of the Colonial 
Office at Whitehall. Reading against the grain of the sources, however, allows for an 
analysis of the men of the unit itself as many of these official government documents 
provide insights into the life and times of the men of the Carolina Corps. Consequently, 
while using top-down sources, this work will incorporate the methodologies of most 
current cultural histories to view the Carolina Corps from the bottom up. Thus, while few 
                                                          
entered the British Caribbean. Thus, while over a much shorter period, the Carolina Corps found themselves 
in a liminal position based on a series of unique factors just as geographically unique societal factors allowed 
for the creation of White’s “middle ground.” White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in 
the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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words put on paper by members of the Corps survive, those who observed the men, 
including their officers, produced more than sufficient documentation to allow for a deep 
analysis of the actions and interactions of the men. As well as this, there has been a real 
focus on the men of the West India Regiments, with several books written on these units. 
While later than the Carolina Corps, it is possible to use some of the experiences of the 
West India troops to better understand those of the Corps by using an anthropological 
technique known as “upstreaming,” which allows historians to use better documented 
periods to cast light on those more difficult to access.21 In this case, the well-documented 
history of the West India Regiments will be used to analyze the earlier, but superficially 
similar, experiences of the Carolina Corps.  
 While recent historiographies bring long-neglected subalterns into academic 
focus, it is critical to remember that the agency of whites, particularly white men, is also 
important. As in this study, it is often only through the writings of these men that the 
stories of subalterns may be told. However, they are also often important members of 
the story in their own right. This study analyzes the intersection of race by looking at the 
                                                          
21 “Upstreaming” can be used to assess the ways in which the lives of the later West India Regiments 
reflected those of the Carolina Corps. As the regiments were in many ways the cultural survivals of the 
Corps, and have a much wider literature about them, it is useful to use the later units as a lens through 
which to fill in some of the gaps present in the historical record regarding the Carolina Corps. The technique, 
coined by William N. Fenton, has been used extensively by anthropologists to study less-documented 
groups in history, including many American Indian and African groups. While broadly conceived as using the 
present to understand the past, and thus working in the opposite direction to most historians, this study 
uses the concepts of “upstreaming,” when used, more narrowly by starting at the West India Regiment era 
and working backwards into the Carolina Corps period. A selection of the many studies that use 
“upstreaming,” include: William N. Fenton, American Indian and White Relations to 1830: Needs and 
Opportunities for Study (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957); John K. Chance, 
“Mesoamerica’s Ethnographic Past,” Ethnohistory 43, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 379-403; Kathryn M. de Luna, 
Jeffrey B. Fleisher and Susan Keech McIntosh, “Thinking Across the African Past: Interdisciplinarity and Early 
History,” African Archaeological Review 29, no. 2,3 (Sept. 2012): 75-94.  
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ways that both races interacted with each other, thus not neglecting the agency of either 
party. In this way, this project will emulate John Shy’s A People Numerous and Armed, 
which was one of the first works on the Revolutionary War to look at the conflict from a 
social, cultural and political angle.22 This dissertation will emulate Shy’s focus on the 
entangled societies that the Carolina Corps entered and influenced, revealing the impact 
that this unique unit had on a wide swathe of the British Atlantic world.  
This dissertation will also draw on the impressive scholarship of Julius S. Scott, 
whose dissertation identified the ways that cultural ideas spread throughout the enslaved 
spaces of the Caribbean.23 Using Scott, this study will show how the men of the Carolina 
Corps were both the facilitators and receivers of ideas regarding British society in the 
Revolutionary Caribbean. The Corps used these ideas to develop complex understandings 
of their unique situation and to navigate their existence in the region. 
 Throughout this study, I will be referring to the main regiment studied as the 
Carolina Corps. Edward Mathew, Commander in Chief of the Windward Islands, 
designated the unit as such several years after their arrival in the Caribbean, in the early 
1790s. It was not, however, the only moniker attached to the unit by other officers, or the 
politicians in London. As such, the historical record refers to the same unit 
interchangeably as the Black Corps, the American Negroes, the Carolina Black Corps, the 
Carolina Negroes, in addition to the Carolina Corps. Before the unit’s evacuation to the 
                                                          
22 Shy, A People Numerous and Armed. 
23 Julius S. Scott, “The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American Communication in the Era of the Haitian 
Revolution” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1986). 
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Caribbean from Charlestown and their amalgamation into a single regiment, they were 
known as the American Dragoons and the Black Pioneers. These were two separate units, 
and their treatment in chapters looking at the Revolutionary War in South Carolina 
reflects this. However, in later chapters, the nom de guerre Carolina Corps refers to the 
Caribbean unit, as it was the one most frequently used by General Mathew and because 
it shows the more liminal racialized status that the group achieved during its service in 
the region.  
 Additionally, some other terms in “Black Men, Red Coats” also warrant definition. 
In certain sections, particularly when discussing ethnicity, both the terms whiteness and 
blackness will be used.  In this context, whiteness is a catch-all term for the societal norms 
normally reserved for white people in colonial society. While the lines between racial 
groups in the British Caribbean were often ambiguous, as will be seen throughout this 
work, there were certain cultural and societal positions, particularly legal ones, which 
were largely reserved for the white population. For this essay, it is these positions that 
will fall under the umbrella of whiteness, or being white. This is different, however, from 
the definition of Britishness, found at the beginning of chapter two, as there was a large 
white population in the British Caribbean who were non-British. Like whiteness, blackness 
in this case refers to the cultural and societal positions held by the black populations of 
the Greater British Caribbean, inclusive of South Carolina. Many African survivals 
continued to flourish in the region. Creolization, the mixing of these two cultures, is 
featured throughout “Black Men, Red Coats”.  
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 This dissertation is organized chronologically, with two clear chronological 
bookends in 1782 and 1798. The first chapter looks at the creation of the units that would 
become the Carolina Corps during the Revolutionary War. Particularly, it will look at the 
unique factors at play in the final years of the conflict in South Carolina that led to the 
creation of the units. This chapter will show that it was pure desperation on the part of 
the British commanders that led to the arming of black troops. It will also contend that a 
combination of foresight on the part of the British, and excellent military performance on 
the part of the black troops, was equally responsible for the evacuation of the black units 
from Charlestown. This chapter also shows how disease, or at least British perceptions of 
disease, both helped and hindered the unit throughout its years of service. Smallpox in 
South Carolina during the Revolutionary War almost destroyed the unit before its 
formation. Finally, this chapter will reveal how concepts of honor on the part of certain 
British leaders helped save the troops from a return to bondage.  
 The second chapter looks in greater detail at the men of the Corps, their ethnic 
background, and how they interacted with the local black population. The African 
retentions and creolization displayed by the soldiers of the unit will be analyzed to see 
how these factors impacted their relationships with other black islanders, both enslaved 
and free. The analysis in this chapter includes an exploration of the dynamic relationships 
between the men of the Corps and the Black Caribs on Saint Vincent. This chapter will 
show that the ethnicity of the Corps, as well as their role as soldiers in a peaceful period, 
placed the group in a position between racial groups during their Caribbean service. 
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 The third chapter focuses on how the men of the Carolina Corps, once 
amalgamated into a single unit in the Caribbean, knowingly performed acts of Britishness 
to advance in British colonial society. Using the British legal and political systems, the men 
of the Carolina Corps leveraged their unique position in colonial society to attain a 
position that was normally out of reach for blacks in the region. It also argues that in 
choosing to remain in the British military, and in the case of certain troops their 
willingness to join the service, the men of the Corps showed considerable agency in their 
choice of master. This chapter also looks at the perceptions of the white colonists and 
military officers towards the Carolina Corps, particularly in the case of loyalty to the British 
Crown. This chapter will show that irrespective of personal loyalty to the British cause, 
the unit was loyal, and this imbued the local white population, both civil and military, with 
a sense of faith in the unit’s abilities and worth.  
 The final chapter, the chronological bookend of this piece, shows how the Carolina 
Corps were instrumental to the forming of the West India Regiments in 1795. The 
significance of the unit on the future incorporation of the blacks within the British military 
was its most enduring imperial legacy.  Not only were members of the Corps among the 
first troops in these later units, but the unit’s excellent performance in the Caribbean 
provided the very basis for the West India Regiments. This chapter also challenges the 
current historiography of the West India Regiments, which suggests almost universally 
that the unit was a product of the French Revolutionary Wars, by showing that Edward 
Mathew attempted to enlarge the Carolina Corps into a full regiment before that conflict 
even began. With the Haitian Revolution in full flow by 1795, it is highly unlikely the British 
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would have adopted the wholesale arming of black units if it was not for the example set 
by earlier units, including the Carolina Corps.  
 The Carolina Corps were a groundbreaking unit in the British military during a 
revolutionary era in Atlantic History. This project reveals the complex intersection 
between race, the military, and society encapsulated within the experience of the unit. It 
will show how the unit helped to completely change British attitudes towards the arming 
of blacks in the Atlantic world. Also, “Black Men, Red Coats” shows the astute ways that 
the men of the Corps used their military status in the Caribbean to advance societally. In 










“It is surprising the proficiency they have already made”: 
The Creation of the Carolina Corps 
 
On June 11, 1782, Alexander Leslie received orders from Sir Guy Carleton, the 
British commander in chief in America, to evacuate the coastal enclaves that he still 
controlled in the southern mainland provinces of that continent.24 The American forces 
under Nathanael Greene had slowly but surely pushed the British from the colonial 
heartland to the port cities, where the most powerful navy in the world provided their 
only protection against the Patriot onslaught. Into the coastal safe havens poured a 
menagerie of British imperial subjects; red coated regulars, Hessian mercenaries, white 
Loyalists of every age and gender, and tens of thousands of runaway slaves who had 
risked everything for the chance of freedom offered by the British.25 Now, with the fall of 
Charlestown and Savannah imminent, the race to find safety on a British transport began.  
                                                          
24 Piecuch, Three Peoples, One King, 287.  
25 Henry Clinton’s Phillipsburg Proclamation in 1779 had been met with enthusiasm by the slave majorities 
present in the coastal areas which fell under British control during the southern campaign. Gary Sellick, 
“’Undistinguished Destruction’: The Effects of Smallpox on British Emancipation Policy in the Revolutionary 
War,” Journal of American Studies 51, no. 3 (August 2017): 865-85.  
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 The story of the final months of the Southern Campaign of the American 
Revolution is one of American success and British defeat. It is also one of new beginnings, 
not only for the tens of thousands of white Loyalists who sought new homes within a 
vastly diminished British Empire, but also for thousands of slaves. While many bondsmen 
confronted the possibility of transportation as the property of white Loyalists, to remain 
in perpetual bondage, thousands of others would find freedom in an evolving imperial 
experiment.26 Thousands more faced abandonment by their would-be saviors and re-
enslavement by their Patriot former masters. It was also this crucible of desperate 
humanity that led to the formation of the Carolina Corps. 
 Even more than a narrative of success, victory and new beginnings, however, the 
final months of the Southern Campaign is a survival story. This is particularly true for the 
runaway slaves, whose entire future seemed to depend on British success, now relied on 
the white officers’ sense of justice to survive. Despite their actions for the British cause in 
the preceding years, the plight of the formerly enslaved individuals at Charlestown 
depended entirely on whether the British would honor their wartime contract with them. 
Simply put, the British controlled the ships and in the grand hierarchy of evacuation, the 
runaways formed the bottom tier. In these critical months a shift in British policy, 
reinforced by the actions of armed slaves, helped change British perceptions towards the 
plight of some of the slaves within their enclaves. While thousands of fugitive slaves 
                                                          
26 Five to Six thousand loyalist-owned slaves were evacuated from Charleston in December 1782. A much 
smaller number of newly free men also sailed, the majority headed to Nova Scotia or Great Britain. Frey, 
Water from the Rock, 179. 
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would still face desertion by the royal army in December 1782, this shift allowed for some 
who served in the military to escape.27 This chapter will tell the story of this evolution, 
and how certain slaves managed to negotiate it successfully.  
 In his book, Moral Capital, Christopher Leslie Brown argues that, “For too long, 
the antislavery movement in Britain has been described as the consequence of shifts in 
moral perception, as if the mere recognition of a moral duty must have led men and 
women to act.”28 Brown sees an evolution in the minds of whites towards morality 
regarding abolition in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, yet it was precisely this 
process that developed during the conflict itself, particularly in the final stages of the 
British evacuation from Charlestown. White British officers, some of them plantation 
owners with large slave holdings, argued for the moral imperative to evacuate at least 
some of the slaves to freedom. One focus in this chapter will therefore be the white British 
commanders in Charlestown who, in the midst of organizing one of the largest 
evacuations in British history, began to have a shift in perception towards the evacuation 
of slaves. It is important to make clear from the outset that while this chapter will argue 
that certain British commanders began to feel morally compelled through a sense of 
contracturalism and honor to evacuate slaves, other motives, particularly military 
                                                          
27 In October 1782, Leslie ordered that all Patriot-owned slaves who had not served the British military were 
to be abandoned and returned to their former masters. This meant that nearly all of the slaves who had 
earned their freedom within the British lines by this late stage in the conflict would be returned to bondage, 
with only loyalist slaves and the small number of actively serving blacks in the military, including the Carolina 
Corps, being evacuated. Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles, 75; Piecuch, Three Peoples, One King, 321.  
28 Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006), 2. 
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expediency and their own paternal, egotistical worldview, also drove them. These were 
military men whose main goal was martial success, with humanitarianism a distant 
second relative to the plight of slaves, yet these enslaved individuals managed to exploit 
this area to ensure their survival after the end of the war.  
 Brown recognized the moral bind that many British officers felt at the end of the 
war towards the slaves they promised freedom too, but he solely casts his focus to Guy 
Carleton and the Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia. This chapter will show that while 
Carleton’s long shadow spread as far as South Carolina, the officers in the province faced 
similar moral dilemmas regarding black Loyalists. Brown argues persuasively that “once 
they (Britain) cast themselves as liberators, they became less willing to compromise self-
imposed commitments.”29 In this way, Brown shows how British emancipation policy 
during the Revolutionary War moved the ministry in London closer to abolitionism, an 
argument supported by several other scholars.30 However, by looking almost exclusively 
at the actions of the white officers and politicians, the close actions of the black 
population is largely hidden from view. This chapter therefore seeks to add to the 
excellent scholarship on black Loyalists in the American Revolution by showing how their 
actions, in addition to the moral compasses of their white commanders, ensured their 
perpetual freedom at the war’s end.  
                                                          
29 Brown, Moral Capital, 311. 
30 In addition to Brown, the foundations of British abolitionism being rooted in the Revolutionary War is 
supported by other scholars, including; Schama, Rough Crossings; David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery 
in the Age of Revolution (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975).  
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 Juxtaposed to the changing abolitionist perceptions of the British were the 
steadfast beliefs of the American conquerors. On the verge of gaining independence and 
retaking the colonies that had been under British military control for years, the Patriots 
in the south wanted their enslaved property returned to them. Their plan, above all else, 
was to retake as many of the slaves who had found refuge within British lines as possible. 
Therefore, amid the combat in the final weeks and months of the Southern Campaign, 
the focus of the Americans switched from their inevitable military victory, to the 
perpetuation of slavery in the new republic.  
 The final group that will be the focus of this chapter are the most important for 
this project, the slaves who would become the Carolina Corps. Caught between an ocean 
and a host of vengeful masters, the men relied on a thin red line of British troops to stand 
between them and oblivion. However, at this desperate stage of the conflict, as British 
defeat seemed unavoidable, the men who would become the Carolina Corps put their 
lives on the line to fight for a lost cause. This chapter, then, is truly the story of these men, 
their families, and their struggle to survive against ever increasing odds. It was the military 
actions of these men who changed the minds of many British commanders towards their 
evacuation, and in this mental evolution these formerly enslaved men were sowing the 
seeds that would grow into a new era of British military policy in the Greater Caribbean 
region.  
 In Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon suggested that once a black man entered 
the white colonial world outside of slavery, as the slaves who escaped to the British lines 
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did, “He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness.”31 While this entire project 
disagrees with Fanon’s premise that black people renounced their traditions to partake 
in white society, it does support the notion that this was how whites perceived them. 
Particularly in the slaveholding regions of the southern colonies, and later Caribbean, the 
men who made up the Carolina Corps began to appear less traditionally “black” by their 
very actions. As the war turned increasingly against them, the white Loyalists from South 
Carolina and Georgia were militarily desperate, and thus willing to overlook race when it 
came to those permitted to serve in the military. Indeed, with traditional plantation 
slavery impossible to continue for most loyalist planters in the final year of the 
Revolutionary War in South Carolina, the population intermingled with former slaves in a 
much more visible way than before the conflict. No longer was the separation between 
the house and field possible. All lived together, all trying to survive in the most trying of 
situations. In such a condition both groups could conform to certain racial models at 
different times to survive the extreme social situation they found themselves in. White 
Loyalists could overlook armed blacks because the fear of slave rebellion was much less 
real than the imminent threat of Patriot victory to their property and safety, while blacks 
could partake in white culture while still practicing their traditional beliefs out of the view 
of their white neighbors. The creolized nature of the southern lowcountry by 1782 would 
also have aided in this process. Out of the chaos of Charlestown, the black men who would 
                                                          
31 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles L. Markmann (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), 
18.  
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form the Carolina Corps got their first taste of the social liminality that they would use to 
negotiate their unique positions in the post-Revolutionary War British Caribbean.  
 This chapter will explore the chain of events that began in 1781, ultimately leading 
to the creation of the Carolina Corps. To keep the narrative focused on the men of the 
Carolina Corps, this chapter will look entirely at the events of the final year of the war in 
the final British bastions in South Carolina and Georgia, around the cities of Charlestown 
and Savannah. Thus, while there are references to the Phillipsburg Proclamation and 
Dunmore’s creation of the Ethiopian Regiment in 1775, these are narratives that require 
their own telling, and that would take away from the important story of the creation of 
the Carolina Corps.   
In this narrative, these white voices will show how opinion changed within the 
British ranks towards how officers viewed black soldiery, contrasting with the solidifying 
effect that occurred within the Patriot leadership. This narrative shows change over time, 
with the change very much driven by the actions of the black troops within the British 
lines. By their very actions during the final years of the war, these black men in red coats 
increased their odds of survival and convinced the British high command to create a new 
black military unit that would contribute significantly to the evolution of British military 
policy long after the final British ship had left Charlestown Harbor in 1782.  
 Following the chronology that allowed for the creation of the Carolina Corps, this 
chapter will begin by analyzing the creation of the Black Dragoons, a unit that was unique 
in British service during the Revolutionary War. It will also examine the Black Pioneers, 
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the name given to the unit of black laborers who fell under the command of the Royal 
Engineers during the war. Interspersed, the opinions, ideals and long-term goals of white 
men, on both sides of the conflict will show the mix of emotions that these units 
generated in the highly racialized society of the British Empire. These racialized concepts 
included ideas of disease, which will be discussed herein to show how important British 
understanding of black bodies and ailments played a pivotal role in the creation of the 
Carolina Corps. The chapter will end by detailing how and why the idea for the Corps came 
into existence.  
*** 
 South Carolina was the last place that Benjamin Thompson was meant to end up. 
Until the disastrous Yorktown campaign, Thompson was working as an aide to Lord 
George Germain, Secretary for the American Department in Whitehall. With the British 
facing defeat, Germain had decided to send Thompson back to the colonies from whence 
he had come as a loyalist in 1776. Granting him a commission as a Lieutenant Colonel of 
provincial troops, Germain ordered Thompson to New York to help in the defense of that 
British bastion in the northern colonies.32 Unfortunately, bad weather forced his ship into 
Charlestown, where Alexander Leslie capitalized on the situation, ordering Thompson to 
take command of the loyalist dragoons in the province. Thus it was that in December 
                                                          
32 C. Harrison Dwight, “Count Rumford: His Majesty’s Colonel in Carolina,” South Carolina Historical 
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29 
1781, Thompson took command of the hodgepodge unit, which counted amongst its 
number a unit that would come to be known as the “Black Dragoons.”  
 By December 1781, the British cavalry were the only mobile force of any size left 
in South Carolina. Nathanael Greene’s relentless assaults throughout the previous year 
had forced the British army from the interior of the colony, and into the defenses around 
Charlestown. Now, the cavalry almost exclusively struck out from Charlestown on raiding 
sorties to gain supplies or plunder for the Loyalists who sought refuge in the city. The unit 
that Thompson inherited was a mixed bag, which he described to Germain as; “Two 
strong Troops of Mounted Militia and a Sepoy Troop (Gens de Couleurs) that will act with 
us occasionally.”33 
 The “Black Dragoons” were raised by Leslie at a time when fighting men were in 
short supply. In contrast to Charles Cornwallis, who did everything in his power to keep 
weapons out of the hands of runaway slaves, Leslie was a man who was willing to throw 
caution to the wind. Despite white loyalist opposition to the arming of blacks, he decided 
it was necessary to make use of the manpower that he had left to defend Charlestown.34 
                                                          
33 Thompson’s use of foreign idioms is interesting here. Sepoy troops had been common in India for decades 
before the American Revolutionary War, and traditionally were native troops in India under British 
command (OED). In this case, it seems Thompson was using a broader usage to mean local troops, in this 
case black slaves, who were under British arms. Also, the use of the term “gens de couleurs” is very 
interesting. The term emanated from the French West Indian Colonies, where free blacks were known as 
“gens de couleurs libres,” but whose title was often shortened to simply “gens de couleurs.” This implies 
that Thompson recognized the dragoons as free men of color during his service with them. Benjamin 
Thompson to George Germain, 11 January 1781, G.S Clinton , Vol. 15, Clements Library; Jennifer M. Spear, 
Race, Sex and Social Order in Early New Orleans (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 108, 183.  
34 One example of opposition to the arming of blacks came from Georgia where, despite being serious 
outmanned and trapped in Savannah, the loyalist population still feared arming blacks. Writing to the royal 
30 
The unit was made up largely of South Carolinian slaves who knew the lowcountry region 
over which they rode. There is a possibility that some of the men had experience as 
horsemen in the colony, although some were likely to be novice equestrians at best.35 
Still, their apparent skill as horsemen, whether newly acquired or not, was quickly 
apparent to Thompson; “We are out twice a day for Exercise (when we are not obliged to 
be out in good earnest) and it is surprising the proficiency they have already made in 
Manoeuvring.”36 
 The men of the black dragoons were soon raiding the lowcountry properties 
owned by Patriots both with the larger cavalry force and independently. Many members 
of the unit specifically chose to return to their previous plantation homes to take 
vengeance on the masters at whose hands they had previously suffered so cruelly. While 
led superficially by a white officer, the unit was not a regular one, and thus often rode 
into the field with its own black leadership. The freedom felt by the men of the dragoons 
must have been euphoric, and within this euphoria the troops sometimes used their new 
position to exact revenge on those who had wronged them, or the British cause, in the 
past. For example, soon after their formation, in January 1782, the unit was led by another 
                                                          
governor, James Wright, they complained about the conduct of black troops who had been raised. Piecuch, 
Three Peoples, One King, 324. 
35 The enslaved population in South Carolina had a long history in the colony as horsemen. Some of the first 
slaves brought to the colony were used by whites as cattlemen, due to their experience doing the same job 
in Africa. While the age of black cowboys in South Carolina had largely passed by 1775 due to the onset of 
plantation agriculture, other occupations such as farrier, groom and coachman would have kept certain 
slaves close to horses. Walter Edgar, South Carolina: A History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1998), 133-34.  
36 Thompson to Germain, 15 January 1781, Germain Papers, Vol. 15.  
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runaway slave to the home of a known Patriot named William Mathews. Mathews lived 
on his plantation just outside of Charlestown, where they surrounded the building and 
threatened to take the life of the occupant. Realizing Mathews to be an invalid and thus 
no threat, they decided to let the man live, instead plundering his house for food and 
drink before returning to the British lines.37  
 As a part of the larger detachment under Thompson, the Black Dragoons often 
took part in the sorties that marked this stage of the conflict in South Carolina. While 
alone, as a troop of between 30 and 50 horsemen, the black dragoons were simply a large 
raiding party, as part of Thompson’s larger command they were a formidable foe to the 
Continental cavalry and Patriot partisans who roamed the lowcountry.38 In late January, 
Thompson took his force on a circuitous 40-mile raid that reached as far inland as the 
town of Dorchester. Coming across a Patriot outpost of five men, the British forces quickly 
overpowered them, killing or capturing the entire force without loss. During the raid, the 
Black Dragoons formed the rear-guard of Thompson’s force, one of the most important 
positions in the cavalry formation, showing the trust that he had already placed in the 
former slaves.39 It is also important to note that during the incursion into Patriot territory, 
Captain Smart, a white officer, took command of the Black Dragoons. It was Smart who 
often commanded the unit during their official maneuvers. The January raid was a 
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complete success for Thompson, who returned to Charlestown with forage and livestock 
for the undersupplied Loyalists. The expedition also proved the worthiness of the black 
dragoons as soldiers, as well as giving the unit invaluable combat experience within a 
month of their initial formation.  
 The men of the Black Dragoons had attained a position higher than any other black 
unit achieved in South Carolina during the entire Revolutionary War. By day, the men of 
the unit had worked as part of a larger cavalry force, ably demonstrating their ability as 
traditional horse soldiers. In the evenings, often without the consent of their white 
officers, but still well within the remit of their formation, the same men became a terrorist 
guerrilla force. No other unit of black men had been so well armed, trained and prepared 
for combat as the dragoons were under Thompson. When he left for New York in late 
February, however, the men of the Black Dragoons found even more freedom than they 
had previously. Well trained and armed, the former slaves gained a fearsome reputation 
as an irregular unit. 40  
 If there was one thing that white Americans feared more than a redcoated soldier, 
it was an armed black man. The repugnance felt by Patriots to the possibility of the British 
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arming runaway slaves had brought a hornet’s nest down upon Lord Dunmore in Virginia 
at the very start of the Revolutionary War.41 The same outrage was felt by the white 
planters of South Carolina as the Black Dragoons conducted raids on plantations 
throughout the lowcountry around Charlestown, where many of the wealthiest Patriots 
had homes. By summer, the unit had become such a threat to the property of white 
Patriots that Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a planter and Continental Army officer, wrote 
of them: “The black Dragoons which Leslie has around, are daily committing the most 
horrible depredations and murders in the defenseless parts of our Country.”42 For William 
Mathews, who had first-hand experience dealing with the unit, the fear of them returning 
was always at the back of his mind, so much so that he remarked that “I cannot think 
myself safe a single night.”43 Indeed, the unit must have had a seemingly immortal feel to 
it, for like Xerxes’s unit during the Greco-Persian Wars two millennia earlier, the Black 
Dragoons had a seemingly inexhaustible pool from where to replace their losses. By the 
time of their first official return in the Caribbean in 1784, the company of Black Dragoons 
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in the Carolina Corps numbered 45 men.44 Given that all of the men in the company had 
come from South Carolina and that attrition due to the alien climate of the West Indies 
killed on average one trooper a month, the return shows how large the unit was when it 
left Charlestown despite its wartime losses.   
  For the Patriot armed forces throughout the South Carolina, the destruction of the 
Black Dragoons, one of the few British units still active in combat operations by mid-1782, 
became a priority. The famed Patriot militia commander Francis Marion had frequent 
brushes with the Black Dragoons throughout the summer and fall of that year. In one 
engagement, Marion’s forces came upon a detachment of 26 Black Dragoons and cut 
them to pieces.45  
 Running afoul of Patriot blades was not the only thing that the men of the Black 
Dragoons had to be fearful of when it came to confrontation with Marion. In October, the 
“Swamp Fox” surprised another detachment of the unit and took several of them 
prisoners. It was clear from his response to the capture that Marion, himself a plantation 
owner whose slaves had fled to the British lines, saw the skin color of the men first, and 
their military rights as a distant second. Instead of treating the black prisoners as 
legitimate soldiers, he wrote to the Patriot governor of South Carolina, John Mathews, 
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and asked him what he should do with them. Mathews replied that as the men had been 
taken under arms “they must be tried by negro law; and if found guilty executed.”46   
 Despite the risks, the men of the Black Dragoons continued to venture away from 
the safety of the Charlestown defenses on a regular basis. In fact, their numbers grew in 
the months after their initial training, with presumably untrained men joining the ranks 
as replacements. While many joined to get a share of retribution against former masters, 
or at least the institution that had enabled their forced servitude, others joined for more 
practical reasons. Being part of the Black Dragoons elevated the position of the troopers 
within the black population in Charlestown, meaning a steady supply of food and shelter 
that most runaways within the enclave simply lacked. The British offer of freedom was 
solely that, and the slaves had to find their own ways to survive once within the redcoat 
lines. Many resorted to renewed servitude, this time to redcoats in need of certain 
services.47 It was freedom, however, which led most of the men of the Dragoons first to 
the British lines, and then onto a horse’s back.  
As the Patriots tightened the noose around Charlestown, Leslie began to reduce 
the number of raids to limit British casualties. The one unit that continued to raid Patriot 
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plantations until the very moment of evacuation were the Black Dragoons. The men of 
the unit found their raids becoming increasingly perilous as summer turned to autumn in 
1782. The dragoons continued to raid despite the threats that they faced from the 
increasing numbers of Patriot troops near Charlestown, and it was likely that the unit was 
following Leslie’s orders to capture rebel-owned slaves when ambushed by Marion’s men 
in October.48 It is unknown whether the men of the dragoons knew what would become 
of the slaves who they took to the British lines. Many who had found their own freedom 
by joining British raiding parties like their own perhaps believed they were harbingers of 
emancipation. On the other hand, as the evacuation got closer, and their own prospects 
of withdrawal from South Carolina diminished, they must have realized the British already 
had all the troops they needed to defend Charlestown and that any newcomers were part 
of an ulterior plan by the British. Even so, the men of the dragoons knew their best chance 
of survival rested on their usefulness for the British cause, and thus the raiding continued, 
whatever moral conflicts may have arisen within the unit.  
 As the final months of the British occupation of Charlestown neared, the men of 
the dragoons found that their targets also began to shift. The evacuation was one of the 
biggest that the British had ever attempted, and if it failed hundreds, if not thousands 
were in danger. While Loyalists, slaves, and British regulars had very little hope but for a 
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successful departure, one group of British troops felt a better option lay with joining the 
victorious American side. The Hessian mercenaries who had formed part of the British 
force in South Carolina since the start of the Southern Campaign began deserting in 
increasing numbers as fall turned into winter. To stop this exodus, which threatened to 
sap the morale of all those remaining in Charlestown, Leslie ordered the Black Dragoons 
to capture any Hessians who left the British enclave. Leslie’s resolve was such that he paid 
the men of the dragoons two guineas for any deserter they returned to the lines, dead or 
alive.49 The success of the dragoons was immediate, with the flow of deserters almost 
stopping by the end of October 1782 due to their vigilant, and supposedly ruthless, 
behavior. Thanks to the actions of the Black Dragoons, the remaining Hessians would see 
the chaotic end of the British occupation of Charlestown first hand.  
 Unfortunately, regardless of the best efforts of the Black Dragoons, the British 
were fighting a losing battle against Greene’s ever tightening noose around Charlestown 
throughout the summer of 1782. By the fall, the dragoons rarely ventured more than a 
few miles outside of the city, and even then, they ran afoul of Marion’s partisans in 
October. The signs were now all pointing to a British withdrawal, and the Black Dragoons 
found themselves in a perilous situation: to their front, the men of an army that had 
already proved merciless towards them, and to their rear the Atlantic Ocean. Any 
elevated position the Dragoons had achieved among their fellow slaves now diminished 
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as they dissolved into a black population desperately seeking to prolong their brief 
glimpse of freedom. 
*** 
 Formed even before the Black dragoons, the Black Pioneers were the first runaway 
slaves who the British incorporated into their military machine during the Southern 
Campaign. The commander throughout the entire period was the chief engineer attached 
to the British Army at Charlestown, Colonel James Moncrief. From a bystander’s 
viewpoint, James Moncrief would have seemed to be the last person to have championed 
the rights of black troops. Before the war, Moncrief resided in British East Florida, where 
he had settled after the end of the Seven Years War as chief engineer of the newly-
acquired post at Saint Augustine. While employed in Florida, Moncrief acquired a large 
plantation and slaves worth £10,000 in 1776.50 Yet, despite his interwar occupation as a 
plantation owner, Moncrief became the most vocal advocate for the evacuation of 
fugitive slaves within British service at the end of the Revolutionary War.  
 Moncrief’s experience commanding a large corps of black pioneers raised from 
the large number of slaves who had fled to the British lines during the early stages of the 
Southern Campaign in South Carolina and Georgia shaped his opinions. While this may 
superficially be similar to the experience of Alexander Leslie, who had also campaigned 
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for black evacuation due to his experience with armed blacks during the conflict, a deeper 
analysis proves this is not the case. Unlike Leslie, whose service in the Revolutionary War 
was his first active command and thus provided his first view of blacks as soldiers, 
Moncrief had used black troops before. During the British siege of Havana in 1762, 
Moncrief served as an engineer at a time when both the Spanish and British used slaves 
in a military capacity.51 However, at the end of that action, there was no major call by 
Moncrief or any of his fellow officers to free the Caribbean slaves who had fought on their 
side.  
It is also important to remember that Moncrief met with the black Loyalists in the 
southern colonies in a totally different context from those he had met in Cuba. In Cuba, 
the composition of the men that the British used were mainly Spanish slaves, to whom 
they did not promise freedom. This differed from the slaves who fled to the British during 
the Revolutionary War, who the British promised emancipation in return for leaving their 
rebellious masters.52 Moncrief therefore began to feel a deep moral obligation towards 
his corps of Black Pioneers who, “naturally look up to me for every protection and 
Support.”53 Moncrief’s paternalistic attitude towards the black men who served under 
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him was one he shared with most British officers with similar commands, and may have 
been honed on his Florida plantation even before the war began. 
 Also unlike Leslie, Moncrief had actively pursued the enslavement of blacks in the 
years after his service alongside members of the race at Havana. Therefore, his actions at 
the end of the Revolutionary War seem even more at odds with his previous character 
than those of Leslie.54 Leslie’s actions were prompted by a combination of moral 
convictions, based on contractualism, and military expediency in the wake of Carleton’s 
order to create a black unit for Caribbean service. There is no evidence Moncrief 
experienced any similar orders that led him to alter his views, and thus it was his 
experience with his black troops alone that shaped his actions as the evacuation 
approached.  
 One of the major differences between Moncrief’s experience with black troops in 
Cuba and later during the Revolutionary War was the length of time that he served with 
them during each conflict. In Cuba, Moncrief’s experience with black troops lasted only 
the few months that the siege of Havana took. In the Revolutionary War, Moncrief’s 
exposure to black troops through his biracial engineering units was much more extensive. 
After serving in the northern colonies at the start of the conflict, where the slave 
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population was relatively small, Moncrief was among the first officers sent to Georgia 
after the commencement of the Southern Campaign in 1778, becoming the chief engineer 
at Savannah. Here, he quickly enlisted blacks to bolster his forces. He recounted this to 
Leslie in 1782, remembering the “Negroes who have followed me on every service since 
the first period of my Arrival in the Province of Georgia.”55 As Moncrief described in his 
appeal to Leslie in September 1782, fugitive slaves became laborers for the engineering 
department of the army as soon as the British had arrived in Savannah. Indeed, during 
the famous siege of that city in the fall of 1779, the outnumbered British placed muskets 
in the hands of these pioneers to help repel the Franco-American assault.56 Despite their 
success as infantrymen, the pioneers soon found their muskets replaced by their standard 
laborers tools. Regardless of their lack of arms, however, the pioneers often found 
themselves on the front lines during the British campaign. For example, during the siege 
of Charlestown in 1780, some 154 blacks were members of the Royal Artillery.57 Most of 
these pioneers worked on the front lines, constructing the batteries from where the 
British heavy artillery could pound the city into submission, and thus often faced the fire 
of the Patriot defenders.  
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**** 
The British used the Black Pioneers in such important roles for two main reasons: 
necessity and their perceived natural attributes. The necessity to use black laborers came 
about due to the shortage of men that the British always seemed to have during the 
Southern Campaign. Using the Black Pioneers, particularly to perform fatigue duties such 
as the hauling of supplies or the construction of fortifications, freed up white troops for 
use on the battlefield or in the many inland garrisons the British established throughout 
the southern colonies. In addition to this, the British often found that the black men who 
joined them were more likely to survive the humid climate of the colonies due to their 
past lives in bondage in the region. This helped to prove British ideas of climatological 
racism, namely that blacks survived better in warmer climates than whites, especially 
when doing manual labor. Moncrief laid out this point of view in his post-war memorial: 
“it was absolutely necessary for the success of the War and for the preservation of the 
Lives of the Soldiers in that Climate, to employ a number of Slaves in the different Works 
necessary for the Operations and defence of the Army.”58 This idea of black bodies being 
different than white ones was not unique to the British, with slaveholders globally using 
racism based on emerging sciences to explain their subjection of the race at a time when 
moral arguments against slavery were beginning to surface.59  
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The British Army’s racialization of disease almost destroyed the Carolina Corps 
before its formation, ironically later becoming the unit’s salvation. Smallpox stalked not 
only the men of the future Carolina Corps in South Carolina and Georgia, but all runaway 
slaves who sought protection with the British. Killing thousands, the malady seriously 
disrupted British policy towards slaves particularly during 1780 to 1781, the crucial 
moment when the southern colonies were at their most susceptible to British control. 
Indeed, to certain British commanders, smallpox threw the entire slave policy into doubt. 
Later, it was the British belief in the immunity of black bodies to both fatigue and 
mosquito-borne ailments that led to the creation of the Carolina Corps for post-war 
service in the tropics.  
Unlike the British military, who had faced exposure to smallpox prior to their 
arrival in the Americas, the slaves who ran to their lines at Charlestown and Savannah had 
no such immunity to the disease. As such, many of those who ran to the British in search 
of freedom soon found themselves battling an invisible foe. David George, one of the few 
fugitive slaves to leave a written account of his ordeal, explained he ““caught the smallpox 
in the fall of the year and thought I should have died,” shortly after his arrival in Savannah 
in 1780.60 The British did not know how to respond to the epidemic among the slaves, 
which Charles Cornwallis, the commander of the Royal army, feared would spread among 
the vulnerable white Loyalists who made up a sizeable portion of his military force.  To 
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maintain a semblance of order in Charlestown, Cornwallis directed the runaways who 
made it to the British lines to a camp on the outskirts of the city. With no fresh water or 
adequate shelter, the conditions in the camp soon became squalid. To make matters 
worse, as more fugitives arrived, the confined conditions of the slave camp became even 
more cramped and pox-ridden. Soon the dead became too many to bury, and so corpses 
were moved into the nearby woods and left to nature’s disposition.61 The white 
inhabitants of the city, afraid to approach the camp for fear of contagion, watched and 
commented on the suffering of the blacks. Plantation mistress Eliza Lucas Pinckney 
lamented that “As the smallpox was in the British camp thousands of Negroes dyed 
miserably of it.”62   
It was into this maelstrom of disease and fear that the men of the future Carolina 
Corps entered during the chaotic first years of the Southern Campaign. Boston King, 
another slave who fled to the British lines and left a written testimony, provides an 
account of how black Loyalists who attached themselves to the army were treated upon 
encountering smallpox: “I was seized with the small-pox, and suffered great hardships; 
for all the Blacks affected with that disease, were ordered to be carried a mile from the 
camp, lest the (white) soldiers should be infected, and disabled from marching…We lay 
sometimes a whole day without any thing to eat or drink.”63 This was the kind of 
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treatment that befell the afflicted of the Black Pioneers, due to the value differences 
placed upon white and black lives by the officers of the British Army. It is important, 
however, to mention that King survived due to the benevolence of a white officer whom 
he had impressed in his short term of service at Charlestown.  
It is almost certain that men from the future Carolina Corps contracted smallpox 
at Charlestown. During the siege of the city in 1780, some of the pioneers found 
themselves attached to the Royal Artillery. A total of 154 blacks were placed into the Royal 
Artillery, yet by late April, less than a month into the siege, fewer than 100 remained fit 
for duty. Of these, thirty, or one-fifth of the total number, were suffering from smallpox 
specifically.64 It is hard to estimate how many slaves died within British lines due to 
smallpox during the southern campaign of the Revolutionary War, but Elizabeth Fenn 
suggests that at least 2000 black Loyalists succumbed around Charlestown alone.65 
The arrival of smallpox amongst the slaves threw the very policy of sheltering 
blacks within British lines into doubt due to the threats it posed to the white Loyalist 
population. Henry Clinton wrote Cornwallis a letter on the slave situation, assuring his 
subordinate that he would “leave such orders as I hope will prevent the Confusion that 
would arise from a further desertion of them to us, and I will consider of some Scheme 
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for placing those we have on Abandoned Plantations, on which they may subsist.”66 
Clinton’s negative attitude towards black refugees increased as more reached his lines. 
He even advised Cornwallis to “make such Arrangements as will discourage their joining 
us.”67 Going against his own Phillipsburg proclamation, which was less than a year old, 
Clinton now advocated a policy of dissuading slaves from escaping to the British lines.  
Cornwallis was just as clinical as Clinton when it came to removing the threat of 
smallpox from the white population. In addition to his quarantine procedure at 
Charlestown, during the Yorktown Campaign in Virginia, after thousands more slaves had 
attached themselves to his army, he engaged in a sinister exchange of letters with General 
Charles O’Hara.  Encouraging his friend O’Hara to desert a group of several hundred blacks 
suffering from smallpox, Cornwallis told him that “we cannot bring a number of sick & 
useless ones to this place; some flour must be left for them & some person of the County 
appointed to take charge of them.”68 O’Hara protested but was chided by an angry 
Cornwallis who described the black Loyalists as “an Evil which not only destroys a great 
quantity of Provisions, but will certainly produce some fatal distemper in the Army.”69  
It is highly unlikely that the formation of the Carolina Corps would have occurred 
had Cornwallis remained in Charlestown, but fate would deliver Alexander Leslie to the 
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city. Cornwallis’ early military successes meant that he did not believe he needed black 
men to fight, while Leslie later needed as many men as possible to help defend his ever-
shrinking perimeter at Charlestown. Leslie and his subordinates was not only more willing 
to use black Loyalists in a military capacity, but rather than see black bodies as a conduit 
for disease, as Cornwallis did, they saw black troops as vessels of immunity. Most of the 
arguments that surrounded the formation of the Carolina Corps in 1782 related to black 
immunity to malarial disease and ability to work in tropical climates. Moncrief, a veteran 
of Caribbean warfare, wrote to a fellow engineer that “Should any service be going 
forward, in America or the W. Indies, which may require the labour of those people, they 
will certainly prove a valuable acquisition to Government, by saving the (white) Troops.”70 
This statement reveals that Moncrief was not unbiased in his views of race and, while he 
felt a moral contractual obligation to the men under his command, he would much rather 
spare white lives at the expense of black ones if necessary. Indeed, mirroring Moncrief’s 
beliefs, the entire concept of the Corps had been formed in New York after Carleton 
received a letter from General Edward Mathew in the West Indies asking for a unit of 
black troops to engage in fatigue duties in the region to reduce mortality among white 
troops.71 
White officers based their ideas of the British Army on the scientific doctrine of 
the time. Dr. William Fergusson, the inspector-general of British hospitals and a veteran 
of campaigns in the West Indies, underlines basic British racial understanding towards 
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climatology and disease at the turn of the nineteenth century. He wrote of black soldiers 
serving in the Caribbean: “he is a child of the sun, the climate is his own, and he is capable 
of exertions in it of which we seem as yet to have had but little adequate idea.”72 In his 
memoir, published in 1846, well after his service in the West Indies, Fergusson makes the 
tacit acknowledgment that medicine had yet to determine a clinical difference between 
black and white bodies. It was, however, this racialized idea of disease and climatology 
that formed the basis for the creation of the Carolina Corps. Thus, British understanding 
of disease played a pivotal role in the early military careers of the men of the Black 
Pioneers and Dragoons who would later form the Carolina Corps. 
**** 
While the British paid the men of the Black Pioneers for their service, the fact is 
that there were not enough men in the unit to satisfy the full demands of the British 
engineering department at Charlestown. While hundreds did join the unit, thousands of 
other runaway slaves took up Clinton’s offer and followed whatever employment they 
wished within the British lines. This forced Moncrief to rent slaves from Loyalists in the 
enclave, likewise employing white overseers from this group, to ensure the construction 
of the extensive system of defensive works around Charlestown and their maintenance.73  
                                                          
72 William Fergusson, Notes and Recollections of a Personal Life (London: Longman, Brown, Green and 
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73 In June 1781, for example, as the tide of war turned against the British in South Carolina, Moncrief paid 
the loyalist James Robertson £710 for the hire of slaves to work in the engineering department. Moncrief 
paid similar bills beginning as early as June 1780. Moncrief, Bill for hire of slaves, Moncrief Papers, box 1, 
folder 22.  
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 The choices made by the black Loyalists under Moncrief’s command were critical 
to their commander’s decision making and show the power dynamic did not flow in a 
single direction at this stage of the war. The men who decided to take up arms for the 
British, or picks and shovels in the case of Moncrief, did so of their own choosing. The 
terms of the Phillipsburg Proclamation made it clear that slaves who made it to the British 
lines could perform any occupation they chose.74 It is likely that many benefitted from 
joining the unit as they were guaranteed clothing, food and a better quality of life than 
many of their fugitive counterparts. Self-emancipation was an incredibly dangerous, 
albeit courageous, decision even during a conflict where one side offered freedom. 
Talking with their feet, the men of the Black Pioneers joined thousands of others in what 
was the greatest slave rebellion in eighteenth-century North American history.  
The number of Black Pioneers attached to the British army measured in the 
hundreds almost from the beginning of the Southern Campaign. While the name of the 
unit may suggest that the sole purpose of the men was to only perform labor intensive 
pioneer duties, the knowledge and skills of some of the former slaves meant their white 
commanders began to use them to perform different tasks. The men who received this 
elevation formed a separate artificer unit with the Black Pioneers. As the commander of 
the Black Pioneers, one of Moncrief’s major responsibilities was to supply the unit 
throughout their service in Charlestown. From his meticulous records, it is clear that the 
artificer unit of the Black Pioneers numbered as many as seventy-eight men in the final 
                                                          
74 The slaves of North America heard about the proclamation through a variety of methods, from merchant 
sailors, to British soldiers, and from their fellow slaves. Scott, “Common Wind.” 
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months of the British occupation of Charlestown.75 Extrapolating from the numbers of 
men in the later Carolina Corps, this means that the number of laborers in the Black 
Pioneers numbered at least 250 by the evacuation of Charlestown.76 
 Moncrief’s ledger is also revealing for another reason. It notes within its audited 
columns not only men, but also women and children. For example, at the start of 
December the ledger shows that Moncrief ordered rations given to 11 women and 9 
children who were attached in some way to the Engineering department.77 While 
Moncrief does not list the occupations that these women and children had within the 
department it can be assumed that they served in support roles, perhaps as cooks, 
servants and laundresses for the rest of the unit.78 It is also important to note that unlike 
the black men in the artificer corps, the women and children served varying lengths of 
time with the engineering department. This possibly indicates that the women, children 
                                                          
75 The first records, from the summer of 1780, shortly after the fall of Charlestown, show the number of 
black artificers at 40, indicating that the British understood the use of such a unit quickly and then almost 
doubled its size during their occupation of the city. Moncrief, Ledger of rations for Black Artificers, August-
December 1782, Moncrief Papers, box 4.  
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he did the separate artificers, although the laborer numbers would have been considerably higher than 
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77 Moncrief, Ledger of rations for slaves attached to the Engineering Department, July-December 1782, 
Moncrief Papers, box 4.  
78 White camp followers during the Revolutionary War performed similar duties for white regiments, and 
thus provide a good example for the kind of work which the black women and children were doing for the 
Pioneers. White camp followers received half rations by the army, a similar subsistence to those shown in 
Moncrief’s ledger for their black counterparts. Carol Berkin, Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle 
for America’s Independence (New York: Random House, 2005), 52-53; Holly A. Mayer, Belonging to the 
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and men listed in this ledger were slaves who were hired by the Engineering department 
from local Loyalists. Otherwise, these part-time workers may simply have gained 
employment for short-term, specific jobs from the hordes of runaway slaves, and given 
subsistence rations rather than wages for their labor. Due to the lack of information given, 
it is impossible to tell whether there were any kinship ties either between the women and 
children, or with the men who served in the Black Pioneers. Whoever these women and 
children were, however, one thing is clear, none boarded the ships for evacuation to the 
Caribbean with the rest of the Black Pioneers when the British abandoned Charlestown 
in December 1782.79  
 The presence of women on the ration list brings into focus the kinship and familial 
ties that the men of the Black Dragoons and the Black Pioneers had before the 
Revolutionary War. While it is not possible to track the routes and circumstances of the 
specific men of these units to the British lines, it is known that slaves often fled their 
plantations in family groups. For example, David George escaped to the British lines at 
Savannah, Georgia with his entire family in tow.80 It would have been possible for those 
                                                          
79 While it is impossible to prove who the black camp followers due to lack of documentation, it is likely that 
many were family members of the men in the unit. As Mayer notes, there were so many family members 
attached to both British and American army units during the war that rules were created especially for them 
and rations provided. As subsistence within the British lines was hard to come by, it would hardly have been 
surprising if family members of the soldiers attached themselves to the pioneers, and their inclusion in the 
official army returns suggests that rations were provided to these camp followers. It is unknown what 
became of the group after December 1782. While it is most likely that they were returned to slavery 
alongside the thousands of other runaways who were recaptured when the city fell, it is possible some may 
have found a place on a ship and were simply not put on the official British register. Mayer, Camp Followers, 
128. 
80 George and his family were lucky enough to gain passage on a British ship before Savannah fell. He 
eventually made it to Nova Scotia, where he became a Baptist preacher and one of the leading black figures 
in the later Sierra Leone colony. George, “An Account of the Life,” 473-84.  
52 
runaways who joined the British military around Charlestown to have continued familial 
relationships within the city, with the black troops having free time, especially in the 
evenings, to spend with their loved ones. This possibility makes the omission of women 
from the manifests of the ships carrying the troops to the Caribbean, and from any 
documentation of the later Carolina Corps even more tragic. It may very well have been 
the case that in finding freedom for themselves in the Caribbean, the men of the Carolina 
Corps had to leave behind their families to the risk of re-enslavement.   
 Moncrief’s meticulously kept ledgers provide a rich insight into the lives of the 
black units he commanded at Charlestown during their active service for the crown. In 
December 1781, the men of the Black Pioneers received new blankets, shoes and clothing 
from Moncrief, which he paid local Charlestown merchants to furnish.81 The ledger 
reveals that the men of the unit received the same sorts of subsistence materials as white 
troops in the city, albeit without any uniforms or weapons. By calculating from the 
numbers of supplies bought, particularly new pairs of shoes (320), it is possible to 
estimate the size of the unit, including its artificer corps.  However, while the Black 
Pioneers did not receive a formal British Army uniform, the ledger does show that 
Moncrief purchased 126 yards of red stroud cloth, along with the coarse material 
oznaburgs and welsh plains wool more often associated with slave clothing at the 
                                                          
81 Moncrief paid £930 to the merchants for the various clothing and associated items. Presumably Moncrief 
made such purchases every six months, as there is a similar bill for the clothing of laborers in June 1781. 
Moncrief, Account of expenses for clothing of Black Laborers, 31 December 1781, Moncrief Papers, box 1, 
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period.82 This means that the men likely wore the same color tunics as their white 
counterparts, even if they were designed differently and made of far inferior material.83 
Simply by wearing a form of the red uniform of the British Army, the men of the Black 
Pioneers would have been visibly different than the thousands of other slaves in the 
Charlestown enclave, thus giving them a higher standing as evacuation neared (see Fig. 
1.1). The black soldiers of the unit wearing red coats thus began a continuous tradition 
that would continue in the British Army for over a century. 
 In addition to the subsistence supplies that the men of the Black Pioneers gained, 
the men of the unit also received wages as free men for the first time in their lives. 
Depending on the employment that the men had within the unit, the pay that they 
received was often similar to that of white laborers within the British lines. For example, 
Moncrief noted that the five black waggoneers within the unit received the exact same 
pay as the sole white worker within the same employment.84 Of course, such parity in 
                                                          
82 Moncrief, Account of expenses for clothing of Black Laborers, 31 December 1781, Moncrief Papers, box 
1, folder 30.  
83 Slave clothing varied between the various slave regions within the British Empire. All of the clothing, 
however, was designed in the European style, which would have been foreign to slaves recently arrived 
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to clothe the slaves without hitting the planter’s pocketbook too harshly. The British views on morality 
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84 Both the black waggoneers; named Tom, Peter, Mingo, Glasgow and Cudjo, and the single white worker, 
Thomas Jones, received £18, 8s for six months employment. Incidentally, due to their illiteracy, Jones signed 
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Fig. 1.1) A page from the ledger of James Moncrief. Note the ordering of oznaburgs, (Welsh) 
plains, and red stroud cloth. The former items were both usual items used to make slave clothing, 
but the latter was not. From these well-kept ledgers it is possible to understand much about the 
provisioning men of Black Pioneers with while in Charlestown. 
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wages was absent in most occupations, including the most critical, within the enclave. A 
prime example of this is the black boatmen and pilots who were crucial to safe navigation 
within the oft treacherous Charlestown Harbor, a haven notorious for its shifting 
sandbars. While the waggoneers received a wage equivalent to their white counterparts, 
white harbor pilots received more than black boatmen for doing the exact same 
job.85Even with pay discrepancies, during their term of service, the men of the Black 
Pioneers used their commander to leverage their position within the British lines at 
Charlestown. By ably performing their duty, and by showing loyalty to the British cause, 
the Pioneers showed Moncrief the worthiness of the unit. Moncrief became so enamored 
of his men that in early 1782 he wrote Sir Henry Clinton that “great advantages may be 
gained by Embodying a Brigade of Negros in this Country.”86 At this stage, while he had 
raised the Black Dragoons, Leslie still had not told Clinton that he had armed the black 
Loyalists, and it was still several months before Carleton’s forward-thinking proposal 
reached South Carolina.  While Carleton based his assessment on climatological racism, 
however, there is no hint in Moncrief’s suggestion to Clinton of arming the men for 
American service for any reason other than their worthiness as soldiers.  
 While there is no doubt that paternalistic ideas of race were influential to 
Moncrief, his close association with the men meant he felt the same sorts of moral 
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earned. While this sum was comparable, it is important to note that in the pre-decimal British system, this 
equaled several shillings more per day. Also of note, like the waggoneers, the white boatman collected the 
wages of the whole. Moncrief, Ledger for pay of Waggoneers, 31 December 1781, Moncrief Papers, box 1, 
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86 Moncrief to Clinton, 13 March 1782, Moncrief Papers, box 4, Letterbook. 
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obligations towards them that Leslie felt by the beginning of the evacuation.87 However, 
it was the actions of the men that most swayed his thinking, as he explained after the 
conflict ended: “At the close of the War it was intended to have restored the slaves to 
their former owners; but your Memorialist…had been a Witness to the exertions made by 
them in forwarding and Assisting the Operations of the Army, and…on that Account could 
not but object.”88 Further proof of Moncrief’s attachment to his unit is found in the fact 
that while he actively petitioned both Clinton and Leslie to evacuate them, he made no 
such remonstrations on behalf of the thousands of other black Loyalists who were soon 
to find themselves re-enslaved.89  
*** 
As soon as Leslie had received the orders to prepare for the evacuation of 
Charlestown, he began putting the complicated maneuver into motion. However, while 
his priority was the evacuation of his troops and the white loyalist population in the city, 
he was unable to escape the daily visuals that reminded him of the plight of the thousands 
                                                          
87 The language that Moncrief used in his letters show both his paternalism and moral emotions towards 
his black troops. In his letter to Clinton, he showed both as he explained; “The Number of Slaves, who have 
attached themselves to the Engineer Department, since my Arrival in this part of the Country, and who look 
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of runaway slaves within his lines. He wrote back to Guy Carleton within a month of 
receiving the orders to abandon Charlestown asking what should happen to the slaves 
that the British had offered to emancipate.90 Leslie certainly felt like he had some degree 
of moral obligation to the blacks within the Charlestown perimeter, and yet he still 
prioritized the white loyalist refugees within the enclave, even when considering the 
runaways.  
 As big a concern for the Loyalists as finding a place on a British ship to escape 
South Carolina, was the need to safeguard their property, a fact they made crystal clear 
to Leslie. Despite the best efforts of the British authorities in Charlestown to capture and 
re-enslave any loyalist-owned slaves that they found seeking freedom within their lines, 
this was a forlorn hope. As a result, slaves with owners on both sides of the conflict sought 
freedom in the city. Some Loyalists took it into their own hands to regain their property, 
sometimes stealing slaves from their fellow Loyalists. Leslie felt the pressure so much over 
this situation that he ordered all those who claimed to own slaves to submit lists of them 
to the British authorities, who would then resolve disputes among Loyalists.91 That Leslie 
was forced to issue such an order shows the sheer chaos that reigned within the British 
lines as the evacuation date approached. 
 Leslie’s attempts to appease his loyal subjects regarding slave property did not 
stop with the slaves within his own lines. As the Patriots advanced on Charlestown, they 
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seized all loyalist property, both static and moveable, including slaves. Leslie felt it was 
his within his mandated powers to get some of this property back for the refugee planters 
within Charlestown. Throughout 1782, he sent raiding parties out of the British perimeter 
to seize slaves to use as compensation for Loyalists.92 Francis Marion saw first-hand what 
the British were doing, and on March 29 he wrote that the British had been “taking all the 
negroes” from plantations throughout the lowcountry around Charlestown.93 
  The one factor that dominated the mind of Alexander Leslie at this stage of the 
conflict was the evacuation of his troops, white loyalist refugees and as much of their 
property as possible. Still, the free blacks already within his lines did occupy a central 
position in Leslie’s mind. He wrote to Carleton in August that he felt a moral obligation to 
protect at least some of the runaway slaves who had taken up arms, and could not leave 
them “to the merciless resentment of their former masters.”94 The statement to Carleton 
shows both that Leslie had begun to desire the evacuation of at least some of the blacks 
within the British lines by the later summer of 1782, but also that he was prioritizing those 
who had joined the British military.  
                                                          
92 At this stage in the war, with the British contemplating abandoning Charlestown, it is unlikely that Leslie 
was still attempting to free slaves, which he would then have to consider evacuating. Thus, while this is still 
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plantations were being given to Loyalists who had lost their own as the British retreated.  
93 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, 29 March 1782, in The Papers of Nathanael Greene, Vol. 10, Dennis 
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 Leslie’s prioritization of those armed blacks over the countless thousands of 
others who were laboring for the British in Charlestown is unsurprising. He would have 
heard reports about the atrocities that the Patriots were committing against his troops, 
including his Black Dragoons, and would therefore have been aware that a similar fate 
would likely befall all similarly armed blacks whom the Patriots recaptured. As well as this, 
the armed units were the ones that Leslie had had the most personal experience with, 
and thus he was more inclined to look favorably on their evacuation than the hundreds 
of nameless runaways who he saw daily.95  
 On the opposite side of the field of battle, the men of the Patriot forces closing in 
on Charlestown retained their racial feelings towards black slaves. Despite the 
experiments in the northern theatre of the war, where regiments openly recruited black 
troops, the southern theatre had no such biracial units. This was despite the open 
pleading of some officers, most famously John Laurens, who argued that blacks could 
serve in exchange for freedom to bring the conflict to a speedy resolution.96 Blacks did 
                                                          
95 It is unknown whether Leslie had any personal black servants working for him in Charlestown, but it is 
highly likely that he did. Most officers within Charlestown had at least one runaway working as a servant 
for them. Leslie himself admitted to Carleton that, “officers long in this country look on negroes as their 
property.” Leslie does not write of any slaves he had personally commandeered, and so it cannot be judged 
with certainty as to whether any such were evacuated in December 1782. Leslie to Carleton, 18 October 
1782, Alexander Leslie Letterbook.  
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elites to support the measure. John Rutledge, the Patriot governor of Carolina rebuffed the move, with the 
support by his legislature. Often, these opponents to black enlistment often used the atrocities committed 
by black Loyalists on the British side to justify their stances. Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists, 160-62. 
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serve in the Patriot forces during the southern campaign, but their limited number never 
came close to matching those of their loyalist counterparts.  
 With racism still trumping military expediency in the minds of most white Patriot 
planters throughout the southern colonies and victory seemingly imminent, the American 
military started to focus on how best to secure the institution of slavery in the region. 
Outraged by what they viewed as the theft of Patriot-owned slaves by the British forces, 
including the Black Dragoons, the Patriots began their own campaign to seize loyalist 
property. This was an easy task for the Patriots, who controlled almost all of the colony 
outside of the Charlestown enclave, and so could easily confiscate any loyalist property, 
human or other, from the region. Indeed, the number of slaves collected was such that 
by 1782 the Patriot legislatures of both Georgia and South Carolina offered new recruits 
a bounty paid not in cash, but in slaves.97  
 In the final months of the British occupation of Charlestown, the main objective 
of the Patriot governments of South Carolina and Georgia became the re-enslavement of 
all the slaves who had run to the British lines. While the Patriots were oblivious to the 
details of the British evacuation plan, they were aware that shipments of Patriot-owned 
slaves were leaving the harbor, either in British naval service or as compensation to 
loyalist slaveholders who had lost property through confiscation. The two sides began to 
treat with each other during the fall of 1782, and by October they had come to a tentative 
agreement on the issue of Patriot-owned slaves within the enclave. The British agreed to 
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return all the Patriot-owned slaves who had not served them in a military capacity, under 
the agreement that no harm would come to them for escaping. The Patriots allowed the 
vanquished loyalists to leave the colony with any property they had in the enclave, 
including chattel, and to collect American debts still owed to them after the conclusion of 
the war.98 Nowhere did Leslie attempt to deal with the thousands of non-military runaway 
slaves to whom the British had promised freedom. 99 The unfortunates in this group were 
forgotten by their would-be saviors, and forced to endure the horror of seeing their fragile 
freedom stripped away once the final British vessels left Charlestown Harbor at the end 
of 1782.  
In the final weeks before the evacuation, conditions in Charlestown became even 
more frantic. This prompted further pleas from James Moncrief to Alexander Leslie 
relating to the troops under his command. On 27 September, Moncrief wrote to Leslie 
that, “I must beg leave to mention, how anxious I am to know the fate of the Unfortunate 
Negroes.”100 It is safe to assume Moncrief, as one of the senior British commanders in 
South Carolina, had heard about the ongoing negotiations between the British and the 
Patriot politicians regarding the fate of the slaves in Charlestown. As such, he specifically 
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position in the preceding three years of war. 
100 Moncrief to Leslie, 27 September 1782, Moncrief Papers, box 4, Letterbook.  
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laid out his concerns by explaining, “Their present situation would not have given me so 
much uneasiness, had I not been Authorised…to offer them every Assurance of not being 
obliged to return to their former Masters and that they might depend upon me for a 
fulfilment of the promises that were made to them.”101 Only a matter of days later, Leslie 
stipulated that no slaves who had served the British in any military capacity during the 
war would be exempt from any agreement that would have resulted in their re-
enslavement.  
 Now that the men of the Black Pioneers were safe from the Patriots as the 
evacuation began, Moncrief actively began looking for ways to ensure that his men were 
the ones on the ships scheduled to leave Charlestown. In early October, he wrote to his 
subordinate, Lieutenant John Wilson, whom he had commanded while at Savannah. In 
his letter he specifically asked after the small unit of black pioneers who had been present 
in the city during its final evacuation by the British in July 1782. Moncrief enquired about 
reports that “a Considerable number of Negros have been sent away from Georgia, to 
East Florida at the Evacuation of Savannah, who were employed in the Engineer 
department,” before asking Wilson to “Enquire into this matter, and send an exact list of 
their number, names, and owners.”102 While Alexander Leslie may have used the list in 
his negotiations with the Patriots over compensation claims, it is also likely that Moncrief 
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was seeing if the reports on black evacuations were true to judge their feasibility for his 
men in Charlestown. In his memorial, written after the evacuation, he makes it clear that 
he considered his actions pivotal for the evacuation of the men.103  
 Whether or not Moncrief was vital to saving the Pioneers, their eventual 
evacuation and the subsequent creation of the Carolina Corps is attributable to one man: 
Guy Carleton. Carleton recommended in his September letter that Leslie raise a black 
regiment in South Carolina and send it to the British Caribbean at the end of the war. For 
this purpose, he asked Leslie to establish a unit of at least 200 men who were to serve in 
the British West Indies for an undefined period.104 Furthermore, he suggested in the letter 
that the men of the new unit would receive six pence a day, only slightly less than the pay 
of white regulars in the British West Indies.105 Carleton wanted such a unit due to the 
unforgiving climate of the region on white bodies, and because he had personally seen 
the usefulness of black laborers while commanding in New York. By authorizing Leslie to 
prioritize men capable of military service he saved a minute number of all those blacks in 
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Charlestown, while condemning the majority to continued servitude.106 By issuing his 
order, Carleton also laid the foundations for the creation of the Carolina Corps.  
 Alexander Leslie faced a difficult situation by the end of November, with the final 
evacuation of Charlestown imminent. While ships had been spiriting away Loyalists, 
troops, slaves, and animals from Charlestown for several weeks, he had not tried to 
remove his black troops to the Caribbean, as per Carleton’s order. Part of the issue was 
logistical; the black soldiers were not his main priority, and so space on ships was 
allocated to other people, particularly white Loyalist refugees. The other issue was that, 
when combined, the men of the Black Dragoons and the Black Pioneers, including their 
artificer arm, numbered well above the 200 men that Carleton authorized for 
evacuation.107  
 A final problem that faced Leslie was to keep his perimeter defended while the 
Loyalists and his white troops evacuated Charlestown. In the event, the Patriots were 
happy to sit back and have the British leave the city without further violence, but Leslie 
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wished to remove the risk of the Patriots striking the British mid-embarkation. He 
therefore placed guns in the hands of the Black Pioneers and had these troops provide 
the final defense of the city.108 The move to use these men in combat roles could be 
viewed as cynical by some, as Leslie may be seen to be using black lives to save white 
ones. However, the move also underscores Leslie’s trust in the martial abilities of his black 
troops, as their placement and steadfastness was crucial to the success of the evacuation.  
 The black dragoons and pioneers completed their evacuation in December 1782. 
From the list of ships created by the British during this final phase of evacuation, it is 
possible to detail some of the movements of the black units as they left Charlestown for 
the last time. The men of the Black Pioneers and the Black Dragoons found themselves 
combined for the first time as a cohesive unit and embarked to Saint Lucia on the HMS 
Symmetry, the second largest ship in the convoy.109 Even given the size of the vessel, the 
men lacked much space for a journey that would have taken weeks especially in the harsh 
heart of winter. Testament to the rough passage of the troops to their new home in the 
British West Indies is the fact that the mounts for the Black Dragoons, on a separate ship, 
were all killed or too injured upon their arrival in the Caribbean to be used by the unit.110 
Still, the first return of the troops taken after their arrival in Saint Lucia gave the number 
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of troops who disembarked as 240 Black Pioneers and 70 Black Dragoons.111 Some 56 
women and 20 children also appear on the return, although there is no evidence they 
were evacuated from Charlestown, and they fade from the subsequent documentary 
record of the unit. It is therefore likely that these were camp followers who attached 
themselves to the unit during their one year stay on Saint Lucia.  
 What the documentary record does not reveal is the emotions that the men of the 
Carolina Corps felt as they left South Carolina, for most of them the only home they had 
ever known. The lack of documentation makes it difficult to imagine the scenes of the 
night before the evacuation, or the fleeting farewells as the men left their friends and 
families knowing full well that the odds of ever seeing them again were next to none. It 
does not allow us to understand how the men must have felt as they stood aboard the 
Symmetry as it passed Sullivan’s Island, the so-called Ellis Island of African Americans, 
where their ancestors, and even some of the troops, had arrived in America in chains. The 
Carolina Corps may have had its foundations in American slavery, but its members would 
make their greatest societal and military contributions as free men. 
*** 
 By reliably performing their duty, the blacks who took up arms for the King during 
the final two years of the Revolutionary War did much more than gain freedom at the 
war’s conclusion. Throughout their period of service, the men of these units displayed so 
much martial skill that the commanders of the British Army sought for the continuation 
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of such units after the evacuation of Charlestown. From a grander military perspective, 
men like Carleton certainly saw such men as resources for use in the British Imperial 
machine, making plans to create a regiment without ever seeing the men involved in 
realizing such a plan. However, on the more intimate level experienced by the British 
officers in South Carolina and Georgia, who had daily interactions with such men, there 
was a perceptible shift in the way they viewed them. Indeed, by the end of the conflict, it 
was these white men who ensured that the troops of the Black Pioneers and Dragoons 
survived.  
 The men of the black units were not simply pawns in the British strategy in the 
southern colonies, however. Their critical usefulness to the British, particularly as the 
number of white troops and Loyalists dwindled, made the black troops crucial cogs in the 
redcoat machine in the final year of the Revolutionary War in South Carolina. The black 
Loyalists made use of this, both negotiating their eventual freedom while also advancing 
their position in British colonial society during the conflict. Their negotiation of the 
societal space that they carved for themselves in the slave regimes of South Carolina and 
Georgia, even during the crises of the final months in these British bastions, proved crucial 
to their success in the Caribbean when they formed the Carolina Corps. Just as in their 
future careers in the West Indies, the black troops in South Carolina saw how to 
manipulate their usefulness to a desperate white population to outweigh the fear that 
this group had towards armed black men, and their natural position in colonial slave 
society. The men of the Carolina Corps applied their previous experience in South Carolina 
to advance in the highly racialized society of the British West Indies.   
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 Throughout their short history, the men of the Carolina Corps had been both 
helped and hindered by the British Military’s understanding of disease. Smallpox had 
almost destroyed the unit before it had been created, ravaging the runaway slaves who 
reached the British lines around Savannah and Charlestown during the Revolutionary 
War. However, As British anxiety towards the disease abated, however, so British military 
policy towards slaves shifted. It was ironically disease, or at least the British 
understanding of it, which led to the creation of the Carolina Corps. Without the racial 
biases regarding tropical diseases and black bodies that pervaded British medical thought 
throughout the Revolutionary era, it is doubtful that the men of the Corps would ever 
have been evacuated to the Caribbean in 1782.  
 Ironically, just as the British high command were starting to toy with the idea of 
arming black units, even after the cessation of hostilities, the American forces were 
drifting even further in the opposite direction. The American political leadership in the 
southern colonies tried desperately to avoid schemes that upset the racial order of their 
slave regimes, including the arming of slaves and the British plans to grant freedom to 
those within their lines. Simultaneously, the armed forces and civilian population saw the 
supposed outrages committed by black Loyalists as proof of the vindictive nature of the 
race when weaponized, solidifying their own opinions on the future of the race. Indeed, 
while their martial prowess saved the black Loyalists who served the British cause, these 
exact same actions served to also condemn the majority who the British deserted at the 
end of the war to the ever-stricter confines of a racially conservative regime. 
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 Many studies on the experience of slaves during the Revolutionary War focus on 
specific aspects of the conflict and on how African Americans navigated it. This approach 
allows for greater depth of analysis on certain aspects, and is not a negative way to 
approach the topic. Nonetheless, by failing to see how these various topics align with each 
other, and how these effected blacks who sought their independence with the British, 
groups such as the Carolina Corps have been largely side-lined in Revolutionary War 
historiography. The Revolutionary War was both a slave insurrection and a conflict that 
forced the British to adopt measures towards arming blacks that they had seldom used 
before. These two concepts were not mutually exclusive; blacks both forced the hands of 
the white commanders, who in turn used the new resource they had to try and turn the 
tables on the revolting colonists. The black troops in South Carolina exemplify this 
situation perfectly, utilizing the unique position that the war created to ensure their 
survival.  
 The situation in South Carolina, especially in the final months of the Revolutionary 
War, remains one of the most under-developed areas of study relating to the conflict. 
Even those historians who have focused on this region, such as Jim Piecuch, stop their 
studies as the British troops sailed from Charlestown. This is understandable; most want 
to culminate their works within the confines of the war itself, or to follow the extensive 
paper trail left by the black Loyalists who made their way to Nova Scotia and beyond. 
However, by neglecting to look at the creation of the Carolina Corps, these scholars not 
fully explored how critical the southern campaign of the war was for the survival of the 
men who sailed south rather than north at war’s end. It is highly likely that without their 
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experiences in South Carolina, the men of the Carolina Corps would not have flourished 
as they did in the West Indies.  
 Likewise, it is easy to neglect the effects that these men had on the white 
population around them, in particular their commanders. While some argue that the 
results of the Revolutionary War led to the gradual British move towards the abolition of 
the slave trade, the planting of the seeds of the movement occurred within the conflict 
itself. Men such as Moncrief and Leslie were certainly not abolitionists, but their changing 
opinions towards the worth of black men as soldiers reveals an ideological shift in their 
perceptions of race, even if only on a small scale. Furthermore, their advocacy for the 
further integration of black troops within the British military certainly impacted abolition 
as greatly as revolutionary rhetoric and increasing religious opposition to slavery. 
Although it was white officers who experienced this evolution in thought, it was the words 
and actions of their black troops who guided it. This changing perception of whites 
towards blacks because of the arming of black troops did not end in South Carolina in 
1782, but continued throughout the tenure of the Carolina Corps in the British West 
Indies. This changing perception would ensure the survival of the men of the unit, and 












“They are particularly formidable to the Charibs and Slaves”: 
Racial Fluidity and the Carolina Corps 
 
In 1791, the British Governor of the Caribbean island of Dominica, Sir John Orde, 
wrote a desperate note to Edward Mathew, the Governor of Grenada and Commander in 
Chief of the British forces in the Windward Isles. In it, he warned that a slave insurrection 
could begin at any time and appealed for reinforcements to quell any such rebellion. 
Mathew received this letter and responded, both to Orde and to the Colonial Office in 
London. Orde no doubt expected to receive reinforcements from one of the white 
garrisons in the Windward Islands, yet Edward Mathew chose to send him a detachment 
of the Carolina Corps. 
 In detailing his decision to Lord William Grenville in Whitehall, Mathew explained 
the logic of sending the Carolina Corps to Orde’s aid.  “In case of an insurrection there or 
on any of the Islands, I should rely much on their services, as they are particularly 
formidable to the Charibs and Slaves, and much better qualified than Europeans for the 
fatiguing duty of searching out the fugitives.”112 Edward Mathew was very aware of the 
skills that the Carolina Corps had for hunting down runaway slaves as, by 1791, they had 
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been performing the role for the preceding eight years. At a time when slave revolts were 
occurring all over the Caribbean and the largest, in Saint Domingue, was only months from 
breaking out, it is telling that Mathew had such faith in the Corps that he would make it 
his first choice to deal with a slave uprising.  
 The Caribs that Mathew referred to were also the descendants of African slaves. 
He dispatched a group of the Carolina Corps from Grenada to the island of Saint Vincent 
to compel the Caribs, the indigenous group who had given the region its name, to obey 
British rule.113 Unlike the rest of the Caribs found in the Windward Islands of the 
Caribbean, those in Saint Vincent were a mixed-race group descended from relationships 
between the local indigenous population and African slaves stretching back for over a 
century. The “Black Caribs,” as they were known by the British, were a formidable 
adversary and partook in numerous rebellions against European rule, often using imperial 
wars to leverage their position with European powers.114 
 Mathew, who insisted that the Carolina Corps “are more inveterate against people 
of their colour, than any other troops,” celebrated the zeal and success that the unit 
showed in their adherence to duties such as hunting runaway slaves and policing 
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plantations to dissuade slaves from rebelling.115 Of course, further research, and some 
common sense reveal that the differences in culture between slaves rendered the men 
of the Carolina Corps as distinct from most Caribbean slaves as the British were from their 
colonial French adversaries.  
 This chapter will look at the cultural and ethnic makeup of the Carolina Corps, as 
well as the slave populations with whom they most commonly interacted: in South 
Carolina, Grenada and Saint Vincent. While individual identities of the men of the Carolina 
Corps have mostly disappeared into history, this chapter will show how it is possible to 
make deductions about the cultural backgrounds of the men based on well-known data 
from the colonies. This will help to explain the complicated position the men of the 
Carolina Corps had within British Caribbean society, and how they interacted with 
different racial and cultural groups within this society.  
 While creolization may have occurred to the men of the Carolina Corps in North 
America, the unit remained distinct from the creolized societies with whom they 
interacted in the Caribbean. Instead, the Corps performed an act of double consciousness: 
maintaining their African (or creole) heritage while simultaneously performing Britishness 
for their new masters. The Carolina Corps were a great example of the fluidity of identity 
that was present in the British Caribbean during this period. Accordingly, their creolization 
occurred in a much different way than those of their fellow black West Indians. As such, 
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they existed beyond the boundaries of the differing creolized cultures of the British 
Caribbean, holding a unique position in the British societies in which they resided.  
 The first part of the chapter will focus on the ethnic makeup of the men of the 
Carolina Corps. While their individual identities remain allusive to scholars, an analysis of 
the demographic work of certain historians of the American colonies, including Daniel 
Littlefield, Judith Carney, and Peter H. Wood, allows for the making of fact-based 
assumptions on the ethnic makeup of this group. A comparison of the known 
demographic nature of the British Caribbean will show how the Carolina Corps would 
have entered a quite alien world when arriving in the region. This section will thus 
examine whether it was the origin or destination that determined the cultural outlook of 
the unit.  
 Exploring the interactions between the Carolina Corps and their enslaved 
neighbors on Grenada, their main garrison, shows how the British establishment 
attempted to disrupt any interaction between the soldiers of the unit and the plantation 
slaves on the island. While this method of interaction control worked to breed animosity 
and resentment between the enslaved men of the island and the Corps, it had little effect 
in relation to enslaved women. The cultural sensibilities of the free people of color on 
Grenada, the majority of whom had migrated to the island from French possessions, 
largely kept the Carolina Corps separate from them. Still held outside of white society, the 
Carolina Corps thus became truly liminal on Grenada, fitting neatly into none of the legal 
or cultural frameworks of British society. While alienating in certain ways, liminality was 
not necessarily a bad thing for the soldiers, however, as it allowed them to move between 
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the rigid racial and societal structures that existed throughout the British Caribbean in 
this era.   
 The chapter ends by looking at the interactions between the black Caribs of Saint 
Vincent and detachment of the Carolina Corps sent there to police them. Within this 
dynamic, the Carolina Corps found one of the most similar groups of people to themselves 
that the men encountered in the Windward Islands. The Caribs were legally autonomous, 
martial, and black. Ethnic mistrust suffused the complex interactions between the Caribs, 
the British colonial government on Saint Vincent, and the Carolina Corps. Many of the 
later actions of the Carolina Corps drew inspiration from the political maneuvering they 
witnessed on Saint Vincent, demonstrating the influence of the Caribs on the unit.  
**** 
 South Carolina was the most Caribbean of the mainland American colonies. Not 
only was the geography of the colony like that of the Caribbean, but its first permanent 
British settlers had arrived from Barbados. The influence of Barbados on South Carolina 
was present throughout the early years of the colony’s development.116 Nowhere was 
this more evident than in the adoption of its Barbadian economic model, including the 
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Barbadian slave code. The rice and indigo plantations that flourished in pre-Revolutionary 
South Carolina meant that very quickly the colony had a black majority.117 
 Evidence suggests that during the colonial era, South Carolina planters were adept 
at understanding the ethnicities of the Africans they were purchasing and the skills that 
these slaves would possess. Daniel Littlefield was one of the first historians to look in 
detail at how South Carolinian planters and thus slave merchants privileged certain 
ethnicities of Africans over others. As such, Littlefield noted that certain regions of Africa 
were more desirable for slave merchants and their clients than others, based upon 
perceptions of passiveness to bondage and physical prowess among others. Littlefield 
argued that planters specifically sought slaves familiar with the Carolina staple crops, as 
they were eager to increase their yields by using experienced workers. Slaves imported 
from Senegambia and the Windward Coast of Africa were the most prized, in both regions 
the cultivation of rice was prevalent and performed by those recently enslaved individuals 
purchased by merchants for the Carolina market.118  
 It is thus unsurprising that the largest number of slaves transported from Africa to 
South Carolina and Georgia in the twenty years before the start of the Revolutionary War 
were from Senegambia, followed by Sierra Leone, with the Windward Coast third on the 
list. In fact, almost a third of the slaves imported to these colonies came from Senegambia 
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(see Table 2.1). While merchants captured many slaves in the African hinterland, the high 
percentage shipped from one region suggests that a large proportion of the cultural 
practices retained by the slaves in South Carolina and Georgia would have developed from 
a single African region.119 
 The retention of African culture occurred on the plantations of South Carolina and 
Georgia was throughout this period. It is clear from the various regions in which they 
originated in Africa that the cultures of enslaved people made them diverse.120 Prior to 
1740, most of South Carolinian blacks were African born, and between 1750 and 1775 
colonial slave traders imported a further 125,098 slaves into the South Carolina and its 
southern neighbor, Georgia.121 While Planters in South Carolina and Georgia, while 
predisposed to purchase slaves from specific rice-growing regions of Africa, often could 
not wait for ships from these regions to arrive to meet their immediate manpower needs, 
and thus transshipped slaves from any colony they could. In many cases, this meant that 
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individual or small groups of transshipped slaves found themselves on lowcountry 
plantations dominated by a predominate culture practiced by slaves from a single region 
of Africa. This led to “social alienation for many captives,” but also led to a more diverse 
and, eventually, creolized slave population on certain plantations.122 
 
Table 2.1) Slave ships arriving in South Carolina and Georgia from 1750 to 1775, and their region 
of origin in Africa. Data from: slavevoyages.org 
 
 
Region of Slave 
Embarkation 
Number of Slave Ships Percentage of Total Slave 
Imports 
Senegambia 118 32.6 
Sierra Leone 61 16.8 
Windward Coast 43 11.9 
Gold Coast 42 11.6 
West Central Africa 35 9.6 
Other 33 9.1 
Bight of Biafra 26 7.2 
Bight of Benin 8 2.2 
South Eastern Africa 1 0.2 
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The methods of creating and running of South Carolina plantations by planters 
aided in the creation of new cultures, based on African ones. Most planters subdivided 
their vast land holdings, particularly away from the immediate vicinity of urban areas 
along the coast. On these smaller lots, worked by smaller groups, slaves could practice 
their culture away from the prying eyes of whites.123 The development of the task system 
on rice plantations in the colony also meant that slaves had time to not only grow their 
own crops but also to practice their cultures in ways that gang worked slaves in other 
colonies did not.124 Many slaves, once confined to their subdivision, would very seldom 
have interactions with whites, with the odd overseer likely the only one they would see 
with any frequency. Most planters lived on larger plantations closer to urban areas and 
so the slaves in these areas, with more frequent contact with whites, would experience a 
more creolized atmosphere than those away from the coast. Incidentally, it is in 
Lowcountry regions along the coast that South Carolina’s famed creole Gullah culture 
continues to thrive.  
In addition to this, even on larger plantations on which planters themselves 
resided, slaves would have little direct contact with whites. This was particularly true 
during certain times of the year when planters would escape the sickly climes of their 
swampy plantations for the cities of Charlestown or Savannah.125 In these periods, only a 
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skeleton crew of whites, normally confined to the overseer and his family, would run the 
plantation.  
Whites in Southern colonies both feared and nurtured the cultures practiced by 
slaves upon plantations. The use of African herbal remedies to cure common ailments 
was widespread on plantations. In the early years of the colony, African slaves knew much 
more about herbal medicine than their white counterparts. Consequently, many planters 
turned to their slaves for such remedies when contagions spread through their 
households. Even early white medical practitioners used African botanical knowledge in 
their own practice. Alexander Garden, the most well-known physician in South Carolina, 
criticized his fellow doctors in 1753 for learning all they knew of the colony’s plant-based 
cures from “negro strollers and old women.”126 Despite this, planters were constantly 
fearful that their slaves would use their knowledge of botanicals to do them harm. Slave 
poisoning was one of the biggest fears of planters and the wider population.127 Thus, a 
paradox faced planters: they needed African knowledge of botanicals, yet the same 
knowledge could either heal or kill them. Other aspects of slave identity were also subject 
to similar suspicion by the white population of the southern colonies.  
With the highest proportion of slaves imported from Senegambia in the pre-
revolution years, it is hardly surprising that this region of Africa produced most runaway 
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slaves in South Carolina.128 As most of the rice plantations were in the Lowcountry of 
South Carolina and Georgia, and this is was the destination for the vast majority of slaves 
of Senegambian heritage due to their knowledge of the crop, it is highly likely a large 
number escaped to the British, who occupied the region between 1778 and 1782. Thus, 
it is also likely that slaves either from Senegambia or the Windward Coast (including Sierra 
Leone), or descended from these cultural groups, made up many of the men of the 
Carolina Corps.  
As many of the Carolina Corps likely descended from either Senegambia or the 
Windward Coast, it is equally likely that most were from the Mande ethnic group. Of this 
group, the largest proportion found in South Carolina and Georgia were the Mandinka.129 
The Mandinka, though controlling a vast territory in Western Africa, were a divided 
people on the issue of religion. Large numbers of those in the eastern areas of the empire, 
around modern-day Mali, had converted to Islam from their traditional religions. Muslim 
Mandinka tribes frequently raided those who lived in the west of the empire and 
maintained their traditional beliefs. Thus, it was these western Mandinka who often 
found themselves bound in chains for the New World.130 While creolization certainly 
occurred between African ethnic groups upon arrival in South Carolina, Mandinka (and 
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more broadly Mande) culture would have been very visible in the colony, and the same 
was likely true within the ranks of the Carolina Corps.  
In Africa, certain areas of Senegambia were known for their militaristic societies, 
and it is thus likely that some of the soldiers of the Carolina Corps had military experience 
before the American Revolution. Due to enhanced trade with Europeans, some of these 
Mandinka may have even used guns before being enslaved.131 The actions of the slaves 
taking up arms in rebellion against their former masters during the Revolution may be 
explained, or at least better understood, when it is taken into consideration that 
Senegambia had the largest incidence of slave rebellion of all the regions of West 
Africa.132 It is probable, therefore, that the ranks of the Carolina Corps may have provided 
a familiar military setting for some of the former slaves who were well-versed in military 
tactics and proficiencies before they even left Africa.133 
Whether largely Mandinka or more creolized, the men of the Carolina Corps were 
culturally distinct from the slaves and free blacks they interacted with in the British 
Caribbean. The men of the Carolina Corps no doubt received the moniker not only 
because of their geographical origins into the British military system, but also because the 
unit of men were markedly different from the black peoples of the Caribbean. British 
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officers noted this cultural difference early after their arrival to the West Indies. In June 
1784, after eighteen months of service in the Caribbean, Major William Chester on Saint 
Vincent still referred to the unit as the “American Negroes.”134  
The slave importation system of South Carolina and Georgia also contributed to 
the ethnic distinctions between the Carolina Corps and those blacks in the Caribbean. The 
southern American colonies were part of the intercolonial slave trade between British 
possessions within the Greater Caribbean region.135 This trade encouraged the 
transshipment of large numbers of slaves from Caribbean islands to South Carolina and 
Georgia, along with an even greater number of directly imported Africans. The result was 
that, while many Caribbean slaves did arrive in these areas, their numbers were never 
great enough to effect changes in the already established slave cultures of the mainland 
colonies into which they integrated. This was particularly true because Lowcountry 
planters often purchased Caribbean slaves in small numbers.136 However, for the Carolina 
Corps, the continued transshipment of slaves between British possessions does provide 
an intriguing concept: for a few, service in the Windward Islands meant they were 
returning home. 
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Most of the men of the Corps had not entered the mainland colonies from the 
Caribbean, however, and this meant they were linguistically distinct from the slaves and 
freed blacks of the West Indian islands. While few of the men and women transported to 
South Carolina and Georgia would have had a knowledge of the English language when 
they arrived, necessity to speak a common language would have led to its quick adoption 
by most slaves. However, the various ways that Africans retained their identities on 
plantations meant that enslaved individuals continued to speak certain African dialects. 
The overall result was a linguistic creolization and the creation of the Gullah (South 
Carolina) and Geechee (Georgia) dialects. This creole language did not appear overnight, 
instead evolving slowly out of the cosmopolitan languages that existed throughout the 
region.137 Slaves arriving in the colonies would have learned their first English words in 
the form of these pidgin languages. Thus, regardless of whether the men of the Corps had 
been born in Africa or within the colonies, most would have had contact with Gullah or 
Geechee, and would have had some familiarity with it linguistically.  
The speaking of a form of pidgin continued in every British slave colony during the 
eighteenth century, but each of the dialects spoken was distinct.138 Even in British slave 
trading posts in Africa, the local slave traders developed their own form of English to 
communicate effectively with whites. The variation in pidgin languages came from several 
factors, not least the regional origins of the slaves of certain colonies. The languages were 
constantly evolving also, changing as the demographics of their geographical regions did 
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likewise. The result was that Gullah and Geechee, although linguistically like the pidgin 
dialects spoken on the various Windward Islands, was unique to the Carolina Corps in the 
region.  
The linguistic differences between the Carolina Corps and the other creole peoples 
of the Caribbean islands on which they served would no doubt have been an obstacle to 
communication with people who were ostensibly like themselves. In the Caribbean, the 
Carolina Corps, though based in Grenada, were frequently detached to various other 
Windward Islands for short assignments as their services became necessary. This meant 
that Corps members would probably have had to learn various regional dialects in a short 
amount of time to communicate on a basic level with the black communities on the 
islands upon which they were serving. The Carolina Corps did adapt linguistically, 
especially on their home base of Grenada, but the group still encountered difficulties due 
to the diverse cultural makeup of the Windward Islands (see Table 2.2).  
Even having English as a lingua franca would not have solved the communication 
issues between the blacks of the Windward Islands and the Carolina Corps. The common 
language of the British Empire would certainly mean the two groups, as well as the many 
whites who they encountered in day-to-day tasks, would have had a method of 
communication. This would have been particularly true in urban areas where more formal 
English prevailed; however, on the many plantations of the Windward Islands, where 
pidgin dialects thrived, the linguistic barrier would remain. As Table 2.2 illustrates, the 
largest importation of slaves to the British Windward Islands came from the Bight of 
Biafra, which was itself a linguistically interesting place. In Biafra, Igbo became the 
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Table 2.2) Numbers of slave ships arriving in the three main stations in the Windward Islands 
where the Carolina Corps served from 1750 to 1783, and their region of origin in Africa. The 
“Other” category is given for ships that did not list their region of origin. Slavevoyages.org. 
 
 
Windward Island Region of Slave 
Embarkation 
Number of Ships Percentage of 
Total Slave 
Imports 
Grenada Bight of Biafra 62 23.5 
 Gold Coast 47 17.8 
 Windward Coast 34 12.9 
 Senegambia 31 11.7 
 Sierra Leone 18 6.8 
 West Central Africa 9 3.4 
 Bight of Benin 5 1.9 
 Other 56 21.2 
Barbados Bight of Biafra 136 20.6 
 Gold Coast 113 17.1 
 Senegambia 66 10 
 Windward Coast 64 9.7 
 Sierra Leone 48 7.3 
 West Central Africa 30 4.5 
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 Bight of Benin 13 1.9 
 South East Africa 1 0.3 
 Other 187 28.3 
Saint Vincent Bight of Biafra 22 32.4 
 Senegambia 11 16.2 
 Windward Coast 9 13.2 
 Sierra Leone 9 13.2 
 Gold Coast 7 10.3 
 West Central Africa 2 2.9 
 Bight of Benin 1 1.5 
 Other 7 10.3 
 
 
predominant lingua franca despite the fact that the region had no predominant 
centralized empire. Much of the present day Bajan creole language of Barbados has its 
origins in the Igbo language, and so it appears that the African dialect remained the 
dominant language in at least some West Indian colonies. This differed from the mainland 
North American colonies, where creolized languages such as Gullah which was much 
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more English-based, were more common.139 This differentiation in localized pidgin 
dialects caused the communication problems the Carolina Corps likely faced upon their 
arrival in the West Indies. 
 Without one or two major African cultures dominating West India plantations, the 
slave population was easier to creolize then in South Carolina and Georgia, where such 
prevalent cultures persisted into the seventeenth century. As Hilary Beckles notes, 
“During the eighteenth century, these groups (incl. Ashanti, Ibo, Fanti and Yoruba) rapidly 
intermixed, and ethnic divisions quickly became muted.”140 While the Pidgin English 
spoken in the islands was like their own Gullah or Geechee dialects, and though they had 
likely met Africans from all the regions represented in the Windwards before, the overall 
culture was distinct from that of the southern mainland colonies.  
**** 
 The Carolina Corps occupied a socially liminal position in the Caribbean because 
neither the white nor enslaved populations considered them the same as slaves, but they 
obviously were not white. The black troops, entering the Caribbean as freemen and 
soldiers, occupied a more intermediary position in the Windwards than they had in the 
mainland colonies. On Barbados, the English planters’ decision to use large numbers of 
indentured servants during the early periods of colonization aided the creolization of that 
island’s population. The English particularly used Irish Catholics as servants, claiming that 
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such backbreaking work as creating a cultivated landscape on a tropical island was all such 
people were good for.141 Soon, African slaves became the preferred source of labor on 
the island, where they worked alongside poor whites before racial slavery dominated. The 
result was the widespread interaction, even cohabitation and marriage between poor 
whites and black slaves during the foundation era in Barbadian history. Even by the 
eighteenth century, poor whites often found themselves living near Barbadian 
plantations. Thus, creolization due to direct contact between large numbers of whites and 
blacks was greater on Barbados than in either South Carolina or Georgia.  
 The interactions between the men of the Carolina Corps and the white population 
in the West Indies was also considerably different than it had been in the mainland 
colonies. The sheer size of South Carolina compared to the Windward Islands, such as 
Barbados, meant there could be geographical barriers to socializing between races, with 
most poor whites living in urban and upcountry areas rather than near plantations. 
Outside of these urban centers, higher property prices driven by the need for plantation 
land forced poorer whites out of the rural lowcountry. Colonial charitable organizations 
gave the poor whites of South Carolina much greater relief, driven by wealthy elites who 
wanted to create a clear socio-economic buffer between the group and slaves.142 In 
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addition, indentured servitude was not particularly long-lived in South Carolina, while it 
thrived for decades on Barbados. For those who did sign indentures to immigrate to South 
Carolina, its size meant those who survived could receive fifty acres of land to sustain 
them economically at the end of their contract.143 This was not the case on Barbados, 
where many servants on the island found themselves jobless and needing relief at the 
end of their indenture period, a position they would pass on to their descendants 
throughout the colonial period.144  
During his tenure in the West Indies, army surgeon Dr. George Pinckard wrote of 
the plight of poor whites on Barbados: “They are descended from European settlers, but 
from misfortune, or misconduct, in some of the race, they are reduced to a state far 
removed from independence; often, indeed, little superior to the condition of free 
negroes.”145 The white elites in South Carolina were more wary of racial integration and 
also had the means to avoid it, and thus they kept certain whites poor but separate from 
the enslaved population by using their wealth to make race a cultural boundary. Race was 
also used as a way of creating social divides between poor whites and blacks in the 
Caribbean, although the pocketbooks of the wealthy were wielded much more rarely than 
in South Carolina.146 
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 The muddled racial and ethnic societies of the Caribbean, which allowed the 
Carolina Corps to occupy a unique collective space in the region, also created a 
complicated dynamic when it came to the unit’s interactions with the free black 
population. On Grenada, the Carolina Corps found themselves linguistically and culturally 
distinct from this free black population, providing another societal barrier for them to 
traverse. While there was a small, well-established free black population on Grenada 
when the Carolina Corps arrived in 1784, most of these were of French descent.147 These 
free people of color and their former masters made up a large population of Francophone 
speakers on the island, which had changed hands between France and Britain three times 
in the previous two decades. Few if any of the Carolina Corps had the ability to speak 
French before their arrival on the island, and therefore the cultural background of most 
of the free people of color on Grenada would have provided a barrier to the unit’s 
integration with this group on the island.  
The British system of slavery on Grenada freed far fewer slaves than the French 
had. Indeed, under British governance from 1783 to 1787, the number of free people of 
color on the island fell.148 In 1777, two years before the French captured the island, there 
were only 210 free colored inhabitants in Grenada, yet by 1783, when the British regained 
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control, there were five times this number. Therefore, the 300 or so men of the Carolina 
Corps, made up almost one-fifth of Grenada’s free black population. 
 Another barrier to interaction between the free blacks on Grenada was the 
property holding status of many of its Francophone members, an economic position 
unattainable to most in the Carolina Corps. Grenada was also nearly unique regarding the 
positions of authority that free people of color could hold under British rule. An 
illustration of the power retained by the group is the conversation that Edward Mathew 
had with “Louis La Grenade, a Mulatto of this Colony, of considerable property.” In this 
instance, Mathew approached La Grenade, a free black, Francophone plantation owner 
in order to employ him as an agent for the crown to recruit his fellow free blacks on 
Grenada into the Carolina Corps. Mathew specifically chose La Grenade for the task as 
“he has great influence, from his character, property and situation as Captain of a Colored 
Company attached to the Saint George’s Regiment.” 149 Despite British wariness of free 
blacks, by 1790, the military situation had become such that army officers in the 
Caribbean were willing not only to arm them, but also to incorporate them into white 
militia regiments.  
 The Haitian Revolution changed the way the white British population viewed free 
people of color on Grenada, but it had very little effect on how they saw the Carolina 
Corps. Only eighteen months after Mathew conducted his unsuccessful recruiting mission 
with the help of Louis La Grenade, the Grenada Assembly passed “An Act to prevent the 
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sudden increase of Free Negroes and Mulattoes,” which regulated the free people of color 
on the island while also making it much harder to manumit slaves. The scrutiny of free 
blacks on Grenada became so intense in the wake of the violence on Saint Domingue that 
in January 1792, the leaders of this group wrote to Edward Mathew to promise their 
adherence to the British crown, probably fearing re-enslavement. This was not unique to 
free people of color on Grenada, but was witnessed throughout the Caribbean in the wake 
of the Haitian revolt. Despite this crackdown on free people of color, the Carolina Corps 
escaped what could have been a disastrous situation resulting in their disbandment. 
Rather, Mathew expanded the size of the unit in the wake of the Haitian revolt and 
recommended making it a full regiment. Part of this could have been due to self-
preservation on the part of Mathew, who may have feared that the Corps would have 
revolted upon hearing they were to be disbanded. Nonetheless, The loyal military service 
performed by the unit differentiated the men of the Corps in the eyes of its commanders 
and the white British population from other free people of color in the region.  
 Regardless of their communication issues when they first arrived in the Caribbean, 
interactions between the free black soldiers of the Corps and the enslaved populace were 
frequent. It was also the case that the initial alienation of the Corps due to language and 
culture would only have lasted if the men of the unit did not adapt. No doubt after several 
years of service in the region, the men of the Corps would have spoken the same pidgin 
dialects as the slaves they policed. The frequent encounters of the Corps with enslaved 
individuals, both on plantations and in the urban areas of the island, necessitated this 
adaptation. It was also common for black men in the service of the military to form 
94 
relationships, both sexual and otherwise, with enslaved women on the islands on which 
they served.150  
 The Carolina Corps had close interactions with enslaved individuals due to the 
roles they played in the British military in the Windward Islands, often with mixed results. 
Despite the presence of the Carolina Corps’ 300-man strong pioneer and artificer 
companies, the derelict state of the fortifications in the Windward Islands meant the 
British also rented local slaves to supplement their black labor force. In 1787, acting 
governor William Lucas, writing to Whitehall of the need to repair the works above the 
principal Grenadian settlement at Saint George, requested “an additional supply of 
Negroes if they should be required” to help complete the work.151 The same British Army 
engineers who had command over the Carolina Corps would have overseen these hired 
slaves, and thus close interaction between the two groups would have been common. It 
is also likely that the slaves, whose owners would require compensation in case of injury 
or death, received different treatment to the members of the Carolina Corps.152 It would 
not be at all surprising if the slaves resented the status of the Carolina Corps troops and 
the variations in the working conditions that existed between the two groups.  
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The British commanders actively fostered resentment between the Corps and 
enslaved laborers, using it as a tool to keep the two groups from engaging as much as 
possible. The easiest way they could do this was to distribute different quantities of 
rations and supplies to the two workforces. On Dominica, in 1790, the Adjutant General 
of Grenada wrote to his Commissary counterpart on Dominica on this very issue. Upon 
hearing that the engineers on Dominica fed the rented slaves the same as the Carolina 
Corps, he wrote that Mathew “does not feel himself authorized to shew such evident 
partiality to the Colony Negroes of Dominica, as to allow them, and them only, the same 
Rations as the Carolina Pioneers, who are to every intent and purpose Soldiers.”153 
Mathew ordered the reduction of rations for the hired slaves. Mathew’s orders show the 
extent to which Mathew considered the men of the Corps to be British soldiers, differing 
entirely from the slaves of the Windward Islands.  
The greatest cause of resentment between the Carolina Corps and their enslaved 
counterparts was the freedom that the soldiers of the unit had. While being an enlisted 
man in the British Army meant an adherence to rules, hard labor, violent discipline for 
indiscretions, and the monotony of routine, it was not slavery. At the end of the day, when 
hired slaves returned to their plantations or hastily constructed huts near the site where 
they worked, the men of the Carolina Corps had leisure time and the money needed to 
enjoy it.  
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When Guy Carleton originally envisioned the unit in 1782, the men of the Carolina 
Corps were to paid sixpence a day.154 The British increased this base salary during the 
tenure of the unit in the Caribbean and allowed its supplementation through the 
performance of extra fatigue duty. The men of the Carolina Corps had some freedom of 
movement at the end of a workday, were given more rations, and received pay for doing 
the same work that hired slaves were coerced to do. 
 As with Mathew’s attempts to keep a noticeable distinction between the men of 
the Corps and the general slave population of the Windward Islands, other commanders 
tried their best to separate the two groups. The British commanders attempted to 
separate the men of the Corps from slaves most frequently by attempting to instill a sense 
of pride in the members of the Corps that would induce them to a sense of superiority 
over the slaves around them.155 If freedom was not alone a badge of honor, the fact that 
the men of the Corps wore the red coats of the British military and carried muskets must 
have been a point of pride for them. However, the symbols of their elevated status may 
have been a point of honor for the freemen of the Carolina Corps, but they were symbols 
of oppression for the plantation slaves that they superintended.  
 The one group that the British military establishment could not keep the men of 
the Carolina Corps from was enslaved women. For all the talk of honor and superiority 
that could keep the men of the Corps separate from male slaves, natural feelings overrode 
even the strictest orders from commanders. Men from the Corps, living close to a number 
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of enslaved women in any of their posts, often sought to form relationships with members 
of the opposite sex. Unlike in white British units, where wives of soldiers acted as camp 
followers, the British permitted no women to attach themselves to the Carolina Corps 
once they arrived in Grenada. Thus, any carnal or romantic relationship between the 
enslaved women and the men of the Corps had to be conducted illicitly. In his 1807 
account of life in the West Indies, planter Sir William Young was largely dismissive of 
concerns regarding the West Indian Regiments, successor to the Carolina Corps. However, 
recounting his personal experience, he did suggest “there being no women attached to 
these corps, the negro soldiers often intrude upon the plantations.”156 Indeed, it became 
a common complaint that the men of the Carolina Corps and later West Indian Regiments 
often caused disruption on plantations by impregnating enslaved women or encouraging 
them to run away.  
 The British were not blind to the fact that the armed blacks in their ranks were 
involved with enslaved women. In 1796, a colonel of one of the newly formed West Indian 
Regiments suggested the importation of women from Africa to marry to the soldiers 
“ultimately as a means of economy, their children being trained in the service.”157 It is 
clear from such ideas that exposure to the concepts of West Indian plantation slavery 
meant British officers began to incorporate them into their understanding of how to 
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effectively run black military units. Members of the Corps also solicited the services of the 
many black prostitutes who frequented the camps of the British Army. Indeed, the 
numbers of prostitutes visiting black units had become so great by 1799 that the President 
of the Saint Vincent Assembly suggested the permanent employment of such women in 
the camps of the black troops.158 While the attempts of the British to control the sexual 
freedom of their black troops were ongoing, the men continued to form relationships that 
were more permanent with enslaved women on plantations.  
 The relationships between black soldiers and enslaved women on plantations, 
although officially condemned by the British military, were both a blessing and a curse for 
white British society in the Caribbean. On the one hand, the children of enslaved women, 
even if they were the product of a liaison with a free-black soldier of the Carolina Corps, 
were the property of the plantation owner. Therefore, planters gained more earning 
potential through the sexual relationships of their slaves and black soldiers. It may also 
have been that free people of color, several of whom owned large plantations on the 
islands served by the Carolina Corps, viewed black soldiers more sympathetically. There 
was also a predictable benefit for the British military to the intrusion of their black troops 
onto plantations. As explained by Sir William Young, the visits of black troops to enslaved 
women caused “a growing animosity between them and the [male] slaves.”159 For the 
British, attempting to alienate the slave population from their black troops, soldier-slave 
liaisons and relationships must have seemed a blessing. However, this did not allay the 
                                                          
158 Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 125.  
159 Young, Common Place Book, 214.  
99 
fears of the planters who saw the dangers of having armed men in close contact with their 
male slaves. These planters also feared that “a rising generation of children, born and 
remaining slaves, with relation to a soldier-father, might at some time awaken feelings, 
and create consequences, endangering the entire colonial system.”160 This stemmed from 
the fact that planters feared that armed blacks may spread ideas of freedom and violence 
to a slave population that they wished to keep passive. Despite the threats of 
recrimination, the black troops of the British Army continued to visit plantations and to 
create relationships with the female workers.  
**** 
 As socially accepted as the men of the Carolina Corps were, the fact remained that 
the British still viewed the men of the unit as anatomically different due to their race. This 
difference was not only obvious due to the color of their skin, but also due to the 
perceptions that white officers had towards the resilience of black bodies in tropical 
climates. As stated in chapter 1, this racial understanding of medicine was critical to the 
formation of the Carolina Corps. However, the very biases that gave the men their 
freedom would have a catastrophic effect on the unit once it arrived in the Caribbean.  
The British lacked basic understanding of the two major tropical diseases that 
caused white mortality in the West Indies, the mosquito-borne ailments of malaria and 
yellow fever. They understood that black bodies were more resistant to such diseases but 
lacked the science to explain the phenomenon. Modern medicine has proven that some 
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West Africans are born with sickle-cell trait, a condition that gives a person a stronger 
resistance to malaria.161 While disease immunity was certainly a racially stigmatizing 
factor in British colonial society, the numbers do suggest that black soldiers were much 
less likely to die from tropical diseases than their white counterparts. This was the case 
with the Carolina Corps once they arrived in the Windward Islands after the Revolutionary 
War (Table 2.3). This was in spite of the British forcing them to work longer hours, and 
more strenuously than their white counterparts.   
When looking at the numbers of fatalities within the peacetime garrisons of the 
Windward Islands it is important to understand the differences between the units that 
were present there. The mainstay of the British Caribbean garrisons were the units of 
Royal Artillery who manned the coastal fortifications of the various islands. These units, 
though numerically small, were stationed in the Caribbean for long stretches of time. As 
a result, most underwent the “seasoning” process when first arriving in the region, and 
thus had a much lower mortality rate from mosquito-borne diseases than other white 
units.162 Also, they were the smallest unit on Grenada, never numbering more than 
seventy men. 
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Table 2.3) A list of the number of fatalities among troops stationed on Grenada: January 1785 to 
January 1786. To put the numbers into context, the Carolina Corps was of comparable to size to 
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and 1786. CO 101-26.  
Month and Year Royal Artillery 
(White) 
2nd Battalion, 60th 
Regiment (white) 
Carolina Corps (Black) 
January 1785 1  4  5  
February 1785 0  3  2  
March 1785 0  0  0 
April 1785 1 4 2 
May 1785 0 4 1 
June 1785 0 2 2 
July 1785 0 3 0 
August 1785 0 6 1 
Sept. 1785 1 4 1 
October 1785 0 1 1 
November 1785 0 1 1 
December 1785 1 1 0 
January 1786 0 0 1 
Total 4 33 17 
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Of all the British units on Grenada, the ones worst hit by disease were the regular 
infantrymen of the 60th Regiment. These men, the remnants of Royal American Regiment, 
had been raised in the mainland American colonies during the Revolutionary War, mostly 
in regions with lower instances of yellow fever or malaria. Thus, upon reaching the 
Caribbean without adequate time to be “seasoned,” they succumbed to tropical illnesses 
in droves. The same was true of their replacements, who came from throughout the 
British Empire and abroad. It is also important to note that the men of the 60th Regiment 
did not perform the same levels of hard labor on Grenada as the men of the Carolina 
Corps did. Therefore, it is likely that most of those who died on the island succumbed to 
tropical ailments rather than exhaustion.  
The results of the Corps performing fatigue duties were not limited to simply 
saving the lives of white troops. Their mere presence, and loyal service, meant the British 
had to send fewer white troops to defend the islands. The British high command was no 
closer to understanding why, but through their blundering misunderstanding of racial 
climatology, they hit on a simple fact: white men did not die in the West Indies if they 
were not sent there to begin with. It was an easy equation for the men in London to 
explain to Parliament and would be a foundational tool in the creation of the later West 
India Regiments.  
Whether immune to mosquito-borne diseases or not, the men of the newly 
formed Carolina Corps were not resistant to the hard labor and squalid living conditions 
they would be subjected to in the British West Indies. In a history of the unit for the 
Colonial office, an anonymous author explained the discrepancy in the work between the 
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white and black troops on Grenada. They explained that some of the men of the Carolina 
Corps had been attached to the white units in his command “to assist in doing the 
laborious duties” of the unit.164 This was not an unusual role for blacks in the British Army. 
Throughout the colonial period, the British military hired slaves on Caribbean islands to 
do such fatigue work on behalf of their white regular units.165 The rationale for having the 
Carolina Corps provide most of the hard labor for white units followed the standard 
British military doctrine of the time; the author explained the Carolina Corps were “better 
able to bear fatigue in that climate.”166 The officer, like Moncrief before him, was clearly 
influenced by the racial ideas of British climatological understanding of the time, and the 
Carolina Corps paid a heavy price because of it. 
Environmental evidence from the South Carolina and Georgia regions between 
1750 and 1770, when most of the slaves who would form the Carolina Corps were either 
born or arrived into the colony, shows hotter and wetter than usual spring seasons. Such 
a climate was the perfect breeding ground for malaria-carrying mosquitos.167 In addition, 
the swampy conditions found on the rice and indigo plantations of the southern 
lowcountry meant mosquitos were regularly present in the regions. Most slaves would 
therefore have been exposed to malaria and yellow fever carrying mosquitos long before 
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their evacuation to the Caribbean. The majority of the deaths listed in the regiment were 
not the result of these tropical diseases, unlike for their white counterparts. It is more 
probable that the British military bias towards hard labor in a savage climate played a role 
in their deaths. The men of the Carolina Corps were simply being worked to death. 
While Edward Mathew certainly subscribed to the idea that the bodies of his 
Carolina Corps were different from those of his white troops, he was pragmatic enough 
to know that human bodies can only take so much before total collapse. Like the rest of 
his units, the Carolina Corps was given its own surgeon to care for the sick among them. 
As well as this, the unit was sometimes removed from Grenada to garrison other islands, 
meaning their place as fatigue units was taken by hired slaves.168 Such assignments, while 
not periods of leave, would have given the men of the Carolina Corps a short respite from 
the torturous fatigue duties they were regularly employed in. Seeing the slow exhaustion 
of the men, and the irreplaceable attrition of the unit, Mathew decided to suggest a 
change of duty for the men of the Corps in 1790. 
Writing to Lord Grenville in the Colonial Office, Mathew suggested he and the 
Grenadian Assembly lamented seeing the Corps “applied more to duties of Fatigue, and 
laborious Work, than exercised as soldiers.”169 From this point on, Mathew changed the 
way he used the men, slowly employing them in more soldierly pursuits, and began to 
petition Parliament through the Colonial Office to turn the unit into a full regular 
regiment. Part of this was purely utilitarian, as Mathew clearly believed he had the ability 
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to train black troops to perform as ably as white ones. Moreover, racism could only 
stretch so far in the mind of a military commander who daily saw the suffering of the men 
under his command. It seems that at this stage, Mathew, like Moncrief earlier, began to 
see the unit as human rather than simply laboring machines and decided to advocate on 
their behalf. Unfortunately, the reprieve did not come soon enough to save the nearly 
100 men who died because of the inability of their British masters to separate race from 
science in the eighteenth century.  
**** 
 In October 1790, an advertisement in the New Grenada Gazette, the main weekly 
publication in the colony, read: “Deserted from his Majesty’s Troop of Black Dragoons the 
12th of July last, William Sawyer, a Private in the said Troop.”170 In its description of the 
deserter, the advert notes that Sawyer “speaks the French and English languages 
fluently.” Considering that the Carolina Corps had not received new recruits since its 
evacuation from Charlestown in 1782, this description provides an insight into the 
creolization of the troops. While it is possible that Sawyer knew French before the 
Revolutionary War, it is much more likely that he learned the language on Grenada (a 
colony so bilingual that the printing of the advertisement took place in both languages).  
The desertion of William Sawyer should have been a simple mission for William 
Mackrill, the captain in charge of the Carolina Corps’ dragoon company, but it was not. 
Sawyer had developed a close connection to the French-speaking district of Grenada, 
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known as Marquis. The dragoons were the smallest unit of the Carolina Corps, consisting 
of roughly forty men, and so Sawyer’s desertion was obvious to Mackrill. Mackrill knew 
Sawyer’s destination enough to publish it in the advert, perhaps because he personally 
knew the trooper’s affinity to the area, or because he used threats, bribes, or both to get 
the information from one of the other men under his command. Locating Sawyer was not 
an easy task, however, and despite the small size of Grenada, the trooper was still in 
hiding in October, three months after his original desertion.  
Desertion was a rarity among black troops in the British Army, especially when 
compared with their white counterparts. While the West India Regiments constituted a 
third of the entire British West Indian garrison between 1796 and 1825, only 16 percent 
of desertions in the region were by black soldiers. The numbers were equally low in the 
Carolina Corps.171 Superficially, the reason so few men deserted was harsh punishment. 
Whipping was often a capital punishment in the British Army in the Caribbean, with 
sentences of up to 1500 lashes given to deserters, an amount of physical punishment no 
man could survive. Another reason may simply have been that the men of the Corps had 
once been slaves, and had elevated themselves to a higher position in British colonial 
society. Fear of having this freedom removed no doubt stayed many who contemplated 
deserting. Sawyer’s at least temporarily successful escape was testament to his previously 
cultivated relationships on the French-speaking plantations of Grenada. It would certainly 
seem that his assumption of safety at his destination facilitated his decision to run. Most 
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black soldiers did not follow Sawyer’s example, however, finding a degree of security and 
dignity in crown service that few wished to risk.  
 While trying, but failing, to stop the Carolina Corps’ immersion in Caribbean slave 
cultures, the British also attempted to physically isolate the Corps from white soldiers 
during its time in the Windward Islands. On Grenada, the British segregated the Corps 
from white troops as much as possible. In the 1792 return of annual expenses for the 
Grenada garrison, the military authorities allocated £20 to the “Barracks of Black 
Corps.”172 While the Corpsmen would mingle with white troops, the rigid segregation of 
races present in the British army of the Caribbean at the time helped limit these 
interactions during active duty.  
 Outside of the controlled confines of Grenada, however, this segregation failed. A 
return of the company of pioneers, the largest single body of the unit, showed that in 
January 1789, 122 of the 194 men of the Carolina Corps were serving outside of 
Grenada.173 The small detachments of Carolina Corps soldiers sent to the various islands 
outside of Grenada meant it was impractical for the men to have their own barracks. The 
British assigned most of these troops to work as pioneers and laborers for white regular 
units on the various British Windward Islands. As a result, most Carolina Corps soldiers 
shared barracks with their white counterparts on islands outside of Grenada, leading to 
widespread inter-racial communication.  
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 The British military were not blind to racial interactions in the West Indies and 
used Christianity to try to indoctrinate their former slave soldiers into understanding their 
new position within colonial society. The British military sought to undermine the 
traditional religions of the men, and to “civilize” them with Anglican teachings.174 Another 
reason they encouraged Christianity was to create another tangible link between the 
black troops and the white men who led them. On Grenada, the Anglican Church baptized 
both slaves and free people of color, which was not necessarily the norm on all British 
Caribbean islands.   
 While the British Army certainly attempted to force the issue, many blacks 
throughout the post-American Revolution British Atlantic found Christianity 
independently of these authoritarian methods. Free blacks in the British Empire often 
used religion to advance themselves socially with many using Christian teachings to 
express their understanding of their new found liberty.175 For these blacks that came 
willingly to Christianity, living within British society helped to facilitate their practice of 
the religion. Both Boston King and David George became prominent preachers and civic 
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leaders in Nova Scotia, and later Sierra Leone. 176  In the Carolina Corps, a soldier named 
Baker became a prominent Methodist preacher among Dominican slaves. Baker achieved 
such a level of conversion among the slaves of Dominica that these slaves, in turn, 
propagated Christianity on the plantations on which they resided.177 The reverse diaspora 
of black Loyalists into the Caribbean at the end of the American Revolutionary War helped 
spread Afro-Christianity into the region on a much greater scale than before.178  
 The men of the Carolina Corps were not mere pawns of the British military system, 
and actively used such British machinations as enforced Christianity to raise their status 
in British colonial society. For the men, it would have been evident that religion was key 
to upward mobility in British society, especially to those soldiers previously exposed to 
Christianity on plantations in the mainland American colonies. The soldiers of the Corps, 
serving as the police force for plantations in the Windward Islands, may also have helped 
to enforce the surface-level crackdown on the practice of traditional African religions 
within Caribbean society and observed the distaste that the British superficially had for 
such beliefs. As a result, many would likely have kept their personal beliefs hidden to 
engage, at least publicly, in the practice of Christianity. They no doubt would have realized 
that their freedom only allowed them so much mobility and that more meaningful 
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engagement with British society, including the practice of Christianity, would help them 
progress as far as white racial prejudice would allow them.  
The long exposure to Christianity dictated by British military doctrine did not mean 
the religion always replaced the traditional beliefs of the soldiers of the Carolina Corps, 
who usually reconciled their former beliefs with new ones. This was not unique to blacks 
in the British West Indies but was a staple of slave religion throughout the Atlantic 
World.179 In fact, in slave societies, whites often interacted with these creolized religions, 
especially when it came to the use of traditional African medications and healing 
remedies. This cultural mixing created new religious systems, including Voodoo in Haiti 
and Shango in Trinidad.  
In public, the practice of Obeah, the alleged traditional African religion of many of 
the Carolina Corps troops, was either frowned upon or condemned, but this did not stop 
their practicing it in private. The British military did not completely ban the traditional 
practices of Obeah, largely because the white officers understood the dangers of 
completely forcing the removal of all cultural traditions from their black soldiers. As a 
result, the black troops of the British Army practiced a creolized form of religion, based 
on their traditional Obeah and imposed Christian beliefs. The British reported that the 
Black Rangers, a unit raised only a few years after the Carolina Corps, had “the same 
superstition as the rebels, with regard to their amulets of obias making them 
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invulnerable.”180 The same situations no doubt occurred with the Carolina Corps 
whenever they faced their fellow African descendants in the Windward Islands. While 
most creolized religions in the Caribbean formed under Catholic governance, similar 
religions also grew on the Anglican islands in the region.181 The creolization of religion was 
just one part of the balancing act that the Carolina Corps and the subsequent West Indian 
Regiments performed to maintain a transitional position between black and white 
Caribbean societies. 
**** 
 While the Carolina Corps interacted with enslaved and free blacks across the 
Windward Islands, perhaps no more important encounter occurred within the unit than 
with the Black Caribs of Saint Vincent. The Black Caribs were a unique society. Descended 
from slaves who fled the islands surrounding Saint Vincent and the Indians native to the 
island, the Caribs were an astute group who were thoroughly aware of the European 
rivalries at play in the Caribbean region. During the American Revolutionary War, the 
Caribs “sent their Chief to Comte D’Estaing, then at Martinico, inviting him to an Attack 
of the Island.”182 The Caribs of Saint Vincent had been subjects of both French and British 
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rule, even fighting a prolonged war with the British in the years before the conflict began 
on the American mainland.183 The British remained understandably concerned by the 
autonomous creole population living on the windward side of Saint Vincent after the 
Revolutionary War concluded. The Caribs on Saint Vincent had only recently become a 
problem for the British, but the group had occupied the island for over a century before 
the British took possession of the island during the Seven Years War.  In January 1789, 
James Seton, the Governor of Saint Vincent, sent a report to Home Secretary, Lord 
Sydney, in which he described the Caribs as “savage People” who were “so extremely 
jealous” of British society.184 The British were as afraid of their race and autonomy as they 
were ignorant of Carib culture, and thus felt the need to keep a watchful eye on the group.  
 The reason that the Carolina Corps were in such proximity to the Caribs was the 
competing land claims that the group and the British government had for parts of Saint 
Vincent. James Seton estimated that some 250 Caribs capable of taking up arms lived in 
the area in 1789.185 With the chances of war with France increasing during this period, 
Seton was particularly worried about the Caribs making a similar deal with the French as 
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they had during the American Revolutionary War, supplying Britain’s colonial adversary 
with military aid in exchange for land and commodities. There was another reason why 
the British wanted to gain control of the disputed territory on the windward side of Saint 
Vincent. Parliament had quickly fixed upon the island as one of the destinations for the 
slaveholders of the white loyalist diaspora after the Revolutionary War.  About land for 
these people, John Graham, the former royal lieutenant governor of Georgia, wrote to 
Edmund Lincoln, “I find there are none capable of cultivation, or that would answer the 
purpose proposed, excepting the Island of Saint Vincents only.”186 He also made it clear 
that the removal of the Caribs would be highly beneficial for this purpose. It was for these 
reasons that the Carolina Corps occupied a post at Biabou throughout their tenure in Saint 
Vincent.  
In asking for the dispatch of a detachment of the Carolina Corps to Saint Vincent, 
Lincoln explicitly differentiated the ethnicity of British troops based on physiology. He 
wrote to Lord Sydney, the British Home Secretary, that he wished “a considerable part of 
the Black Corps would be destined for the service of Saint Vincent, as being now inured 
to the climate, & more capable than European Troops of following the Charaibs into their 
woody mountains.”187 Unfortunately for him the small garrison he received in 1784 from 
Edward Mathew to rebuild the island’s crumbling defenses were hardly capable of 
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offensive action against the 3000 to 5000 Caribs who Lincoln estimated lived on the 
Windward side of the island. 188 Instead, the Carolina Corps began work building a 
fortification by the harbor at Biabou, on the border of the contested Carib territory.189 
This location meant the Carolina Corps were in frequent communication with the Caribs. 
This communication would have a material effect on the men of the Carolina Corps 
throughout the rest of its existence.  
To modern eyes, it may seem counterintuitive that Edmund Lincoln sent the black 
soldiers of the Carolina Corps, who only two years earlier had been slaves, to live near 
one of the few fully recognized autonomous black society in the British Caribbean. 
However, the racial lens that Lincoln and the entire British military establishment viewed 
the Carolina Corps through meant they were the preferred unit to conduct any major 
construction project in the Windward Islands. The construction of the key fort at Biabou, 
designed to both protect British shipping in the harbor but also suppress any potential 
Carib revolt was, therefore, the perfect employment for the Corps. There was another 
reason why Lincoln specifically picked the Carolina Corps to be the British unit most 
frequently in contact with the Caribs. Requesting a stronger garrison from Edward 
Mathew, he specifically wrote that he wanted to counter the threat of the Caribs using 
more men of the Carolina Corps “of whom I understand they are extremely afraid, 
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knowing they can follow them into their woody mountains better than Regular troops.”190 
Thus, for Lincoln, the benefits of the Carolina Corps working on the fort at Biabou 
outweighed any disadvantages that could have come from it.  
Living close to the Caribs, the men of the Carolina Corps would have had an 
opportunity to become familiar with their autonomous culture. A single chief ruled the 
Caribs of Saint Vincent, and the group lived in small villages where they worked the land 
as farmers. The treaty of 1773, which ceded the northern parts of Saint Vincent to the 
group, meant they were not under the direct authority of the British, simply sharing the 
island with them. The Carolina Corps would have seen this fully autonomous group and 
would have been part of their trading network, as British frontier posts so often were. 
This would have shown the soldiers that the Caribs were much more than the “insolent 
and restless” people described by Governor James Seton.191 
The Caribs were more like the men of the Carolina Corps than their white officers 
were or could ever hope to be. In the racialized society of the British Caribbean, both the 
Caribs and the soldiers of the Carolina Corps operated in a strange space. Both groups 
were legally free, but both found constraints placed on this freedom based on their race 
and culture. The Caribs, many of whom had been born in Africa or were first generation 
descendants, spoke a strange linguistic mix of French and Arawak-Carib. Some also spoke 
English based on the proximity and trade relations the group had with the colonial power. 
More in line with the soldiers of the Corps, however, the Carib religion was a creolized 
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mix of French-imported Catholicism, indigenous Carib spirituality, and traditional African 
beliefs.192 Unlike the Corps, the Caribs were under no obligation to conform to the norms 
of British colonial society. Thus, some members of the Corps were likely viewed with the 
same envy, as the soldiers themselves were by the slaves they often labored alongside.  
The rotation of Carolina Corps troops to Saint Vincent exposed a large enough number to 
Carib culture to facilitate that society influencing the unit as a whole. At no time did the 
detachment of troops on Saint Vincent number less than thirty men, or roughly ten 
percent of the entire unit. As well as this, the number increased during periods of greater 
tension, or simply at times when the men were more required for labor on the island than 
on Grenada.193 The men also rotated between posts and islands by the British military to 
keep them from forming too close a connection to the enslaved people they lived beside. 
Ironically, this rotation system meant that every soldier of the Corps ended up having 
some contact with the Caribs on Saint Vincent, or served alongside someone who had. 
This contact soon began to have a detrimental impact on discipline in the Corps’ ranks.  
Some members of the Carolina Corps began to desert to Carib territory within 
months of their arrival on Saint Vincent. This came as a complete shock to the British 
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officers who had thought the Corps completely loyal to the Crown.  In August 1784, only 
seven months after the arrival of the detachment on the island, the first member of the 
Corps deserted to the Caribs.194 With the punishment for desertion to the Caribs almost 
certainly the death penalty, the soldier must have weighed up the risks and decided that 
life with the Caribs was better than staying with the Corps. This confounded the British 
leadership on the island, who believed that the Caribs hated other black groups, their 
evidence being a series of Carib raids on white plantations within the disputed territory. 
During these raids, the Caribs had destroyed property and killed several slaves. British 
officials spoke of the “ill blood thereby occasioned between them & the Negroes.”195 
What the British mistook for racial malice against slaves was more likely a form of attrition 
warfare adopted by the Caribs, wherein they destroyed all British property to hasten the 
Withdrawal of whites from the territory.196 Also in contradiction to these British beliefs, 
the Caribs harbored runaway slaves from British plantations, often incorporating them 
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Fig. 2.1) A map of Saint Vincent, as the island appeared during the Carolina Corps’ service there. 
The black boundary lines mark the mountainous and cultivated lands ceded to the Caribs after 
the Carib War in 1773. The red line marks the uncultivated land contested by British settlers and 
the Caribs throughout the 1780s. The star marks the fort and port of Biabou, the garrison of the 
Carolina Corps. Lines and star added by the author. Byres, John, J. Bayly, and S. Hooper. Plan of 
the Island of Saint Vincent laid down by actual survey under the direction of the Honorable the 
Commissioners for the Sale of Lands in the Ceded Island. Map. London: S. Hooper, 1776.  
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into their own culture. This had been one of the causes of the First Carib War. It also 
clearly shows that the perception of plantation slaves as property was not unique to 
whites, but existed similarly within the minds of the Caribs who attacked them. 
Meanwhile the Caribs treated runaway slaves much more civilly. 
 The Carolina Corps did not suffer ill effects due to their close geographic proximity 
to the Caribs. No open conflict ever broke out between the various groups on Saint 
Vincent during the time when the Corps had a detachment there and some soldiers 
became enamored with the Carib culture. While only a very small group of Carolina Corps 
soldiers took the opportunity of joining the autonomous black community on Saint 
Vincent, the interaction of the unit with the Caribs had a profound effect on them and 
their service in the West Indies.   
**** 
The Carolina Corps were a truly unique group within British Caribbean society.  
They were obviously not white, but neither did they fall into most of the racial 
characteristics that the British used to define black society in the region. They were 
sometime members of each group, while being alienated from them at other times. The 
ethnic makeup of the men, being largely from a single region of Africa or from plantations 
influenced by this Rice Coast culture in South Carolina, meant they were ethnically 
different from the slaves that they encountered in the Caribbean. Linguistics and culture 
kept the Corps separate from the enslaved peoples of the islands where they were 
serving, at least when they first arrived. Even though the British tried their best to 
exacerbate this separation, the cultural familiarities between the Carolina Corps and their 
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enslaved neighbors often became too hard to control. This was especially the case with 
women, with whom the Corps created kinship groups. A misreading of the situation on 
Saint Vincent by the British in relation to the Caribs also meant that the Carolina Corps 
developed relationships with them also.  
 This chapter has explored the ways in which the Carolina Corps navigated through 
the complex racial environment of the British Caribbean. Some of these interactions are 
hard to unlock from surviving documents chronicling the unit and the wider British 
Caribbean. As a uniquely creolized group in the British Caribbean, the Carolina Corps 
retained African identities in certain ways, but also use their learned knowledge of white 
British society to progress also in that society. In this way, the Corps’ only major difference 
from the creolized slaves they co-existed with was their social standing. The identities of 
all groups within the Caribbean, white and black, had become too fluid to tie to any 
specific region.  
Perhaps more than any other black group in the British Caribbean, the Carolina 
Corps were a pure product of a creolized Atlantic society. While the Caribs, obviously a 
product of creolization also, stood apart from the British in the Caribbean as an 
autonomous entity, the Carolina Corps were a group of creolized men who were actively 
engaged with a white society that had taken on aspects of creolization. On the most basic 
level, the arming of black men who were former slaves based on ideas of climatology and 
the issuing of guaranteed legal rights to them shows how British society in the Caribbean 
had begun an understandable shift from metropolitan to creolized thinking. The same can 
be seen in the food British people ate, the creolized languages spoken on the islands, and 
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the African religious practices used by whites on the islands. O’Shaughnessy writes about 
the British Caribbean during this time, “Whites in the British Caribbean were creoles…they 
possessed distinctive characteristics in their speech, diet, dress, architecture, values, and 
behavior that were peculiar to the Caribbean.”197   
 The roles that the Corps performed in the West Indies enhanced their integration 
within British Caribbean society. As part of the military establishment, they not only 
protected the British territories in the region but also safeguarded the institution of 
slavery. These both brought them into contact and kept them isolated from the slave 
communities they encountered. It was only when they took off their red coats and laid 
down their muskets that the men of the Corps could have anything like a natural 
interaction with their fellow blacks on the Windward Islands. The very tools brought them 
closer to acceptance in white society that alienated them from the black one.  
 It is important to make clear that the Carolina Corps while performing African 
cultural rituals when among the enslaved people of the Windward Islands were likely 
performing whichever creolized belief existed in a certain locality. When with their white 
commanders and among white society, the men of the Corps reverted to a more British 
societal norm. This allowed for the cultural retention of religions such as Obeah, observed 
by numerous British officers, while also allowing the men to practice Christianity, at least 
publicly. The soldiers of the Carolina Corps were no longer truly African when they left 
Charlestown, but a product of Gullah and Geechee culture. Due to their unique position 
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in the West Indies, however, the Carolina Corps became culturally adaptive and so could 
easily step into the different creolized African cultures practiced by the enslaved peoples 
on the different islands where they served. Scholars have long argued about the retention 
of African identity within the Atlantic world, yet the Carolina Corps used these retentions 










“They may always be as much confided in”: 
Social Mobility, Loyalty and the Perception of Nationalism; the Carolina 
Corps and British Society in the West Indies 
 
On December 11, 1790, something happened in the British Army that had never 
occurred before in its illustrious history. That day, Edward Mathew sat down to write Lord 
Grenville, the British Secretary of State, regarding the state of the Carolina Corps. 
Grenville had asked in a previous letter for an update on the state of the unit, but what 
should have been a simple evaluation of the black troops was anything but. The unit had 
been declining in usefulness for some years, from “long service, from old age, and from 
desease [sic],” as Mathew put it. However, he resisted calls to dissolve the unit, and had 
a radical idea for those troops who had served so loyally, but who had reached the end 
of their useful lives as soldiers.198 As a quarter of the men were now unable to perform 
military service, rather than see them fall into destitution, Mathew suggested a radical 
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idea:  “on More Mature deliberation, I shall propose some Invalid Establishment, with due 
attention to Economy.”199 With the simple suggestion that the men of the Carolina Corps 
should receive a pension upon retirement, Mathew elevated them to a financial position 
similar to white regular soldiers in the British Army.  
 Another surprising aspect of Mathew’s petition for a pension for the Carolina 
Corps was the fact that the Secretary of State did not immediately dismiss it. Rather, Lord 
Grenville wrote back that “Your ideas respecting the disposal of the Invalids belonging to 
this Corps will have due consideration, whenever they shall be communicated to me.”200 
It is worth noting that while Grenville’s letter contained numerous references to “blacks” 
and “negroes,” he did not attach such racial terms to the veterans of the Carolina Corps, 
calling them simply invalids, perhaps showing that Mathew’s view of the Corps had also 
pervaded the halls of Westminster. Overall, Grenville’s was a surprising response from a 
ministry as fiscally conservative as Britain’s in 1790. In the end, the men of the Corps 
received their pensions, becoming the first black unit in the British Army to do so and 
setting up a system that would continue among free black soldiers in Crown service in the 
Caribbean from that point forward.201 The British military establishment, through both 
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necessity and expedience, had begun to see the Carolina Corps as soldiers, rather than 
simply black men.  
 It is also worth noting that the men of the Corps received their pensions at a time 
when the British needed to ensure their loyalty. The Haitian Revolution had been raging 
for two years, and the British faced a stark choice; either disband the unit to ensure they 
did not partake in a wider Caribbean revolt, or give the men incentives to remain loyal. In 
choosing the latter, the British made the conscious choice to keep the unit intact as a 
fighting unit, but also recognized the needs to incentivize later black military service in 
some way. The British were forced to employ similar incentives on Cuba during the Seven 
Years War, being forced to grant freedom to some slaves to counter a similar offer made 
by the Spanish on the island for blacks performing military service.202 Just as the Carolina 
Corps needed a specific set of circumstances to be created, so outside circumstances 
aided in their achieving certain rights, including their pensions. 
 As significant as the story of how the Carolina Corps received its pension from the 
British military high command is, it is important to understand the actions of those in the 
ranks that drove it to fruition. Due to their dispersed location, Edward Mathew would 
have received most of his information regarding the Corps from its officers.203 In turn, 
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these officers would have received daily briefings about the rank and file of the unit from 
the numerous non-commissioned officers: mostly black soldiers who had risen through 
the ranks. As a result, it was largely the reports of black non-commissioned officers that 
informed the officers, and eventually Edward Mathew, of the plight of certain members 
of the unit. While this does not constitute a direct petition of assistance from the men of 
the Carolina Corps to the British military establishment, it does show a tremendous grasp 
of the intricacies of the service.  
 This chapter will explore the ways in which the Carolina Corps interacted with 
British society, both civil and military, within the Windward Islands. It will look particularly 
at the ways that the Carolina Corps perceived, and were perceived through, the 
nationalism of British subjects in the Caribbean. Explaining the power of nationalism, 
Benedict Anderson suggested that “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation 
that may prevail…the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”204 
There was perhaps no greater “imagined community” than the Windward Islands during 
the final two decades of the eighteenth century where, despite a diversity in culture and 
distance, the people of the British Caribbean clung fiercely to their national identity. The 
Carolina Corps certainly entered within this community, but the question is how much of 
a part of it did the unit become?  
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 While similarities existed between the lives of slaves and soldiers in the Carolina 
Corps, the rights given to the troops elevated their position well beyond what was 
attainable by most of those held in bondage. This chapter will argue that the British 
military perceived the Carolina Corps as being an integral part of the West Indian 
community, while civil leaders were happy to use the troops but never saw them as 
anything other than British subjects. These were not advances available to slaves, and 
thus while certain conditions between them and the men of the Corps were similar, their 
overall experience was very different. For the soldiers’ part, the men of the Carolina Corps 
used the systems and protections offered by military service to their full advantage. While 
the individual beliefs of the troops regarding their Britishness cannot be assessed using 
extant sources, the unit did what it needed to do in order to advance in British Caribbean 
society. What was true for colonial Africans in the twentieth century was just as true for 
the Carolina Corps in the eighteenth. This chapter will show how the British came to trust 
and, in some cases, even admire the men of the Corps due to their apparent adherence 
to British sovereign society during their service in the Caribbean. Through their loyal 
service, the troops also bolstered British understandings of a new form of imperialism, 
one in which subalterns could be used to defend imperial ideals. This would later involve 
the widespread recruitment of such groups, and remain the main military tactic of the 
British Empire for the rest of its existence. 
 The soldiers of the unit lived in a unique social positon in the West Indies and the 
men of the Corps held a similar station in relation to their national identity. The men wore 
the masks of Britishness when it benefitted them, especially through the military system 
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on the islands, but could just as easily take them off in private, especially in their 
interactions with their fellow black inhabitants. The white settlers of the Caribbean would 
have noticed this appropriation, yet still ostracized the unit due to their race. Being a 
British subject was different from being white, after all.  Perhaps the most interesting 
group to analyze relating to this subject are the white officers of the Carolina Corps, who 
interacted with the men the most and saw them in their truest form. What they saw must 
not have offended or frightened the officers too badly, because almost universally they 
supported the retention and later expansion of the unit. By exploring these 
entanglements between the Carolina Corps and British Caribbean society, this chapter 
will assess the ways in which the unit were treated as, and perceived to be, British subjects 
by white elites in the West Indies.  
 For the purposes of this chapter, being British, or performing Britishness, is the 
active engagement, real or perceived, of an individual or group, within British society. In 
the case of the Carolina Corps this assessment will include the engagement of the unit 
within British society on both a civil and military level. Likewise, this chapter will assess 
the Carolina Corps’ engagement with British society both from the point of view of the 
British, whose perceptions of the Corps as British was just as important as any actual 
affiliation the Corps had to the nation state, and that of the Corps itself. In this way, this 
chapter will be able to show both how the British perceived the unit and the actual ways 
that the Carolina Corps engaged actively with British society in the West Indies.  
 The chapter will begin by analyzing the ways that the men of the Carolina Corps 
interacted with three different groups of whites: planters, officers outside of the unit, and 
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white British regular troops. This began with the initial opposition that the unit faced. It 
will then show how certain members of colonial society and the British military used the 
unit as a foil to articulate larger grievances towards British administration. Queries and 
insults regarding the loyalty of the unit to the Crown often accompanied these attacks on 
its character. This section will also look at the legal position that the Corps occupied in 
British Caribbean society due to its unique military position in the region.  
 The focus of the chapter will then turn to how the soldiers of the Carolina Corps 
incorporated the ideals of British nationalism and loyalty, so favored by white settlers, 
into their public lives to advance within West Indian society. As with so much of the Corps’ 
existence in the British Caribbean, much of this was a matter of perception among whites 
rather than any true account of the units’ emotional attachment to the imperial cause. 
This perceived loyalty and nationalism was indicated by the choice of the men to remain 
serving in the Corps, or in the case of new recruits from Nova Scotia, to join the unit at 
all. The Corps’ integration into British society was facilitated by their increased 
interactions with whites, both in the enlisted ranks of the army and in wider West Indian 
society. These interactions with white soldiers and civilians will provide the conclusion for 
this section of the chapter. 
 The final section of the chapter shows the impact that the military service of the 
Carolina Corps, and the perception of loyalty that accompanied it, had on the British 
officers in the Windward Islands. This analysis will show that while calls for the disbanding 
of the unit was taking place, particularly in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Haitian 
Revolution, the officers of the Corps fought successfully to keep the unit intact. Indeed, it 
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will show that through their excellent record of service in the West Indies, the men of the 
Carolina Corps impressed their commanders sufficiently that the unit not only survived, 
but expanded in numbers even after the events on Saint Domingue. Overall, this chapter 
will show that the men of the Corps were aware of all the legal and social rights that being 
perceived as a loyal soldier in the King’s army gave them, and that they used these rights 
to their full advantage.  
**** 
From the very start of their service in the British military, the Carolina Corps faced 
ostracism. In South Carolina, while the military welcomed all recruits to their decimated 
ranks in the final year of the war, the main opposition to arming blacks came from loyalist 
plantation owners. William Bull, the slave-owning former lieutenant governor of the 
province, found the use of black dragoons by the British in 1782 horrifying, due to the 
“savage nature” that the black race possessed.205 Men like Bull refused to overlook race 
even as Patriot forces were pressing the British into smaller and smaller perimeters 
around Charlestown, even though the arming of large numbers of slaves could have been 
their salvation.206  
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Racial opposition to the arming of blacks was not unique to the British colonies. In 
Spanish Mexico, where free colored men had served for decades in the colonial militia, 
black troops often faced worse punishments than their white counterparts and verbal 
abuse from the white colonial population.207 The biggest cultural split from this was in the 
French Caribbean during the Revolutionary Era, as the outnumbered French desperately 
raised as many troops as possible to defend their colonial possessions from their imperial 
European adversaries. Here, pure pragmatism led the French to abolish slavery to win 
over the rebelling slaves on Saint Domingue, with thousands joining the French colors.208 
While the British were in just as desperate a situation in South Carolina during the 
Revolutionary War, white loyalist opposition meant that it took until late 1781 for the 
arming of blacks to begin on a large scale. The Americans facing them were even more 
steadfast in their racial convictions, never officially arming slaves south of the Potomac.  
The British were very careful in the way they used the men of the Carolina Corps, 
often portraying the unit to local plantation owners as little more than government-
owned slaves. Julius Scott described the fear some planters had towards any black who 
seemed to exist outside of slavery in the islands: “the persistence of labor mobility called 
forth an anguished response from the ruling class.”209 As such, the British kept the unit 
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on a tight leash for the benefit of these planters. This had begun in South Carolina, where 
most of the unit performed fatigue duties alongside loyalist owned slaves. The unit 
engaged in similar tasks after its evacuation to the Caribbean at the end of the 
Revolutionary War. This changed, of course, during times of crisis, when the people of the 
Greater Caribbean – like white Loyalists in South Carolina – had no problem arming the 
Corps. However, during the predominant periods of peace in which the Corps served, the 
men were more laborers than warriors. 
While the civilian loyalist population may not have been in favor of arming slaves, 
the British officers who served in South Carolina saw it as the correct course of action. 
While visiting the colony in the winter of 1782, Lord Dunmore, whose plan to arm blacks 
in Virginia at the start of the Revolution was laid waste by the ravages of smallpox and 
racial animosity of the colony’s planters, argued in favor of the arming of slaves. Dunmore 
wanted a force of 10,000 slaves, planning to entice them with a bounty for enlistment 
and freedom upon the completion of their service.210 While most other British 
commanders were not so ambitious in their schemes to recruit slaves, the raising of the 
Carolina Corps occurred during the final years of the conflict.  
In the Caribbean, the Carolina Corps faced consistent questioning about their 
usefulness and loyalty to the British crown by both white civilians and some remote 
members of the British military, many of whom had never seen the Corps in action. Often, 
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the criticism aimed towards the men of the Corps had nothing to do with the actions of 
the troops. On Dominica, where slave revolts orchestrated by the French planters or 
Caribs on the newly acquired British island were never far away, Governor John Orde had 
some very strong opinions about the Carolina Corps. In 1786, during a time of unrest on 
the island, Lord Sydney, the Secretary of State at the time, wrote to Mathew to suggest 
sending a detachment of the Corps to Dominica. Orde suggested he would have already 
asked Edward Mathew to send some of his troops to defend the island, “but added to 
their being in general lame, infirm … they have lately manifested such a mutinous and 
disorderly disposition” so he had decided against the request.211 What is particularly 
curious about Orde’s attack on the Carolina Corps was that he had had no first-hand 
experience with the men of the unit, which at the time was based only on Grenada and 
Saint Vincent. Thus, his fears seem to emanate purely from personal grievances and 
underlying white fears of fielding a force of armed black men. Also, Orde is the only person 
to mention any form of major disorder within the ranks of the Corps, with neither Mathew 
on Grenada or Edmund Lincoln, governor of Saint Vincent, making any such reports. 
Finally, Orde’s suggestion that the men of the unit were already lame and infirm by 1786, 
within only two years of their arrival in the West Indies contradicts Mathew’s 
contemporaneous accounts of the high level of activity performed by the men of the unit.   
 The truth behind Orde’s open attack against the Carolina Corps had absolutely 
nothing to do with the unit itself. For years, Orde had been unhappy with the role that 
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Edward Mathew played as commander in chief of British forces in the Windward Islands. 
Two years earlier the two men had a quarrel over who had command over the British 
military officers on Dominica. The dispute reached such a level that Orde felt it necessary 
to write Lord Sydney to assure him that no harm was done to the military establishment 
in the region by it.212 This may explain why Orde, who had no experience with the Carolina 
Corps, was so hostile to a unit that was really the pet-project of Mathew in the Windward 
Islands. It would not be the last time that the Carolina Corps became embroiled in a civil-
military feud that was not of their making.213 
 When attacking the Carolina Corps, John Orde decided to question their loyalty, 
rather than going after their race. While this may seem surprising it is not when Orde’s 
positive position towards the arming of his own slave units on Dominica is considered. 
Instead of insulting the unit in a way that might hinder his own schemes towards the 
arming of blacks, he decided to raise the specter of disloyalty and mutiny within the Corps. 
In addition, he attacked the fact that “as American Negroes” the members of the Corps 
were “little calculated to Run over this Rocky Country,” showing his bias in favor of 
Caribbean blacks over those from the mainland American colonies.214 Orde therefore 
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used the apparent disloyalty of the unit as a method to attack Mathew, and undermine 
the credibility of a unit that he had never dealt with first hand.  
 Ironically, when Orde was eager to get a chance to interact with the unit, Mathew 
denied him the opportunity. When a new slave uprising threatened Dominica in 1791, 
Orde wrote to the Secretary of State, Lord Grenville, that “I immediately communicated 
the News to General Mathew, and repeated the Information at two or three Periods, 
begging in each Letter that a Proportion of the Pioneers might be sent to assist the Troops 
as none of our Negroes could be depended on.”215 Regardless of whether Mathew 
received such pleas from Orde, he refused to dispatch the Carolina Corps to assist him. 
Regardless of the ongoing dispute, Orde’s opinion of the Carolina Corps had shifted 
entirely in the five years since he wrote his first letter attacking them. He no longer openly 
questioned the loyalty of the black troops to the British Crown. In fact, he trusted the 
Carolina Corps to remain loyal, asking them to put down a rebellion begun by members 
of their own race. Orde, as Mathew had much earlier, now differentiated between the 
unit and other blacks in the Windward Islands, and he trusted them to fulfil their soldierly 
duty. Perhaps to these officers, more than any other group in the Caribbean, the unit 
occupied that low place in British society alongside the white rank and file of the British 
Army.  
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The geographically small areas where both white and black troops served in the 
Caribbean islands meant there was no way to keep the races completely separated. The 
British military realized this issue, and even confronted it by insisting that while the races 
could serve in a military context with each other, as often occurred when the Carolina 
Corps performed fatigue duties for regular white regiments, they were not to interact in 
social settings. The most obvious symbols of this strategy in the British Caribbean were 
segregated barracks.216 Nonetheless, the freedom granted to the Carolina Corps meant 
that their white officers could not completely prohibit the interaction of white and black 
soldiers in a social setting, and the most frequent setting for these interactions were the 
taverns of the various Caribbean islands.  
 Rum was both the bane and the salvation of the British Army in the West Indies. 
The British used the liquor as a ration, a medicine and a reward to the men of the army, 
both black and white, who served in the region. Rum was also the drink of choice of the 
servicemen in social settings due to its cheapness, a factor that often led to white troops 
becoming addicted to it. The men of the Carolina Corps were as British as any of the white 
troops in relation to their consumption of rum. The situation had become so bad by 1787 
that Samuel Williams, who governed Grenada while Mathew took leave in England, wrote 
to Lord Sydney on the subject. “Your Lordship I am persuaded, will see the Expediency of 
keeping the Soldiers as much out of the Town as possible; and the Necessity of depriving 
                                                          
216 Ironically it was often the Carolina Corps that constructed the barracks which allowed for the segregation 
of the West Indian British Army. For example, in Grenada the Carolina Corps constructed a wooden barracks 
for a detachment of the Royal Artillery in 1792, just one of the many barracks which they built throughout 
the Windward Islands. Mathew to Dundas, 6 January 1792, CO 101-32.   
137 
them of every Opportunity of providing themselves with the new Rum of the Country.”217 
The fact that Williams took the step to limit the men of the Carolina Corps from Saint 
George, the largest town on Grenada, due to drunkenness shows how “British” the black 
soldiers had become regarding their leisure time. The same fears also swirled around the 
white troops, among whom alcoholism led to higher rates of mortality, although the idea 
of curtailing their freedom of movement was a lot more nuanced.218 One major difference 
between the races was that the white officers of the Corps believed their black troops 
had a higher tolerance for the liquor than their white counterparts. Roger Buckley 
explained the situation thus: “Although rum was served at the mess and canteens…the 
black soldier, unlike the white, was not addicted to it.”219 During their service, both black 
and white troops partook in each other’s company and the same intoxicating liquors 
during their social time. This also shows how the men of the Carolina Corps could use 
their perceived Britishness to interact with people of different races to partake in the 
most British of activities, drinking. As surreal as it would have seemed to an outsider, by 
performing such quintessentially British acts, the Carolina Corps inadvertently 
represented itself as British to the white Caribbean population.    
                                                          
217 Immediately before this, Williams was discussing the Carolina Corps, so it is highly probable that he 
meant to ban only this unit, and not white ones, from visits to Saint George. “New Rum” was a highly 
alcoholic liquid created in the Caribbean which, due to its rapid distillation using lead, was often poisonous 
yet highly addictive to those who drank it. Samuel Williams to Sydney, 26 December 1787, CO 101-28.  
218 Buckley, British Army in the West Indies, 281-82. 
219 Historians have suggested this may have been due to a higher tolerance to the liquor, or simply because 
they did not drink rum in the same large quantities that white soldiers did. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 
104.  
138 
 Unfortunately, not all interactions between the men of the Carolina Corps and 
their white counterparts were jovial. On Grenada in March 1785, four soldiers of the 
white 60th Regiment were court-martialed and found guilty of a capital offence and 
sentenced to death. At the very same court session a member of the Carolina Corps was 
condemned and suffered a similar fate.220 Whatever the affiliation between the 
condemned soldier of the Carolina Corps and the white troops he died next to, he 
received the same legal representation as they did. Legal recourse through military courts 
was another benefit that the men of the Carolina Corps had over the slaves on the islands 
where they served, and further tied them into the fabric of British society.  
 For all the benefits that came to the men of the Corps due to their military service, 
they were far more restrictive than those given to white troops. White regulars lived in 
better brick barracks, designed to stop the spread of miasmic diseases via ventilation, 
while the black troops lived in wooden structures they built themselves. Ironically, it was 
the black troops who built barracks in the West Indies, designing better accommodation 
for their white counterparts than they were entitled to use themselves.221 In addition to 
better barracks, the white soldiers also earned better pay than black ones. Outside of 
regular privileges, white troops were free to live with women in these barracks, with 
families of certain soldiers regularly attaching themselves to white units.222 This was 
                                                          
220 Mathew to Sydney, 19 March 1785, CO 101-26.  
221 Buckley, British Army in the West Indies, 327-28.  
222 Women often supplemented the wages of their soldier husbands by serving the larger regiment in some 
capacity. These wives, as well as other women attached to the army, were essential to British military 
functionality in the West Indies. Buckley, British Army in the West Indies, 145-46; 331. 
139 
something officially forbade for the Carolina Corps, although the men often 
circumnavigated the rules by engaging with the opposite sex on plantations, away from 
the prying eyes of their officers. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage the men of the Corps 
had in comparison to white troops was the manner of work that the men of the different 
races performed. The very reason for the creation of the Corps was to provide a fatigue 
unit so that white troops could be spared the most strenuous work in the tropical climate 
of the West Indies. As such, the men of the Corps performed much harder labor, much 
more frequently than their white counterparts did. When placed beside the inherent 
racism that pervaded British West Indian society, it is clear to understand why the men of 
the Carolina Corps were trapped in liminality during their service in the region.  
**** 
 One of the most contentious debates that surrounded the men of the Carolina 
Corps was the legal system they fell under. As soldiers, the men of the Corps should have 
been subject to British military law. However, the soldiers were not British regulars, 
holding only a provincial status. Thus, while in the pay of, and supplied by, the British 
government, the Carolina Corps were not full-fledged members of the military 
establishment.223 Some colonial governors made the argument that the unit, consisting 
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of former slaves, should instead be under the legally administrative regulations of the 
colonial police, which in some instances were much stricter on blacks. The debate 
between the two groups over the legal standing of black military units continued well 
beyond the life-span of the Carolina Corps.224 The various colonial legislatures were 
unsuccessful in gaining legal superiority over the Carolina Corps, as the men of the Corps 
fell under the jurisdiction of military law throughout their tenure in the West Indies. The 
situation was partially resolved in the 1792 mutiny act clarified that any conscript paid as 
a soldier must be legally treated as such.225  
 On Grenada, principal base of the Carolina Corps, the legal situation of the unit 
had an easier resolution because Edward Mathew was both commander in chief and 
governor of the colony. As such, all Carolina Corps legal incidents, whether judged military 
or civil, went to Mathew for final adjudication. While it is unknown whether any Carolina 
Corps members ever applied for clemency from Mathew, other slaves and their owners 
certainly did. In a 1784 case, two members of the Grenadian legislature recommended 
                                                          
The British high command did not wish to return the men to slavery but were also determined to keep the 
men in a service beneficial to them. Sydney to Mathew, 15 June 1783, CO 318-10.  
224 According to Roger Buckley, between 1799 and 1801 there were no less than three rulings issued by 
Crown officials in London about the legal jurisdiction of the West India Regiments, some of which would 
still have contained Carolina Corps members at that time. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 57.  
225 The provision for black troops to receive the same legal protection as whites was revoked for West India 
Regiment soldiers in 1801, with the British Law Lords determining that because slaves were not voluntarily 
recruited, the law did not apply to them. This ruling did not affect the men of the Carolina Corps as the unit 
no longer existed by this time, and because any Corps member still in service had enlisted willingly. Claudius 
Fergus, “Emancipation and ‘military necessity’ during the Haitian Revolution: Challenging the Hegemonic 
Paradigms of Slavery and Freedom,” in Amar Wahab and Cecily Jones, eds., Free at Last? Reflections on 
Freedom and the Abolition of the British Transatlantic Slave Trade (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2011), 31.  
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clemency for a slave convicted of the murder of another enslaved individual, which 
Mathew quickly agreed with.226 In this case, as with all royal petitions for clemency, 
Mathew had to get final petitions approved by the Secretary of State. The fact that no 
such petitions, common in civil jurisdictions, ever made it to Whitehall suggests that 
military law largely governed the Carolina Corps.  
 As with slaves on plantations, the whip dominated the lives of soldiers in the 
British military, with the army creating horrific spectacles designed to terrify soldiers from 
breaking military codes of conduct. As Roger Buckley describes floggings, “They were 
prolonged and emotionally rich rituals of barbaric retribution and salutary terror.”227 
Soldiers would march onto the parade ground, or similar open space, form into ranks and 
then watch the gory spectacle close-up. In a unit as small as the Carolina Corps, which 
never had more than 300 active members in any one place, every soldier would have 
known the unfortunate victim of the flogging. By the time of the Carolina Corps’ service 
in the Caribbean, the British government had theoretically limited the number of lashes 
a condemned man could face but in practice a court-martial could administer any 
punishment they saw fit. Sentences of a hundred lashes for trivial offences were common. 
Officers could order more, depending on the severity of the crime. The race of the 
Carolina Corps, combined with the heightened anxiety present towards blacks in the 
                                                          
226 The case involved the murder of a slave named Peter by a slave from another plantation named Rorey. 
The petitioners appealed to Mathew for clemency citing Rorey’s willingness and ability to track runaways, 
something he had done in colonial service previously. In the end, clemency was extended to Rorey and the 
death sentence was commuted. Home & John Castles to Mathew, 24 June 1784, CO 101-25; Mathew to 
Sydney, 24 July 1784, CO 101-25; Sydney to Mathew, 5 October 1784, CO 101-25.  
227 Buckley, British Army in the West Indies, 203.   
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British Caribbean, meant any indiscretion seen as insubordination led to excessive 
punishments.228 Thus, the cost of the paranoia of white British society in the West Indies 
was often the flesh of black troops. 
 As awful as the over-zealous flogging of their compatriots must have been to the 
men of the Carolina Corps, the British officers of black units found equally degrading ways 
to remind the soldiers of the lives in bondage that they had escaped. Some officers rued 
the use of violence against black troops, suggesting alternatives to violence when 
attempting to enforce British military rules upon the unit. Given that the soldiers of the 
Corps differentiated themselves from the slaves they policed in the West Indies by their 
military status, British officers often punished the black soldiers by treating those found 
guilty of committing indiscretions by removing soldierly privileges. By removing the 
weapons of the troops, lessening their rations, and making them perform fatigue duties 
like a slave, British officers found they could shame black troops into compliance.229 Of 
course, if such non-violent methods failed to achieve the correct result, the officers had 
no hesitation resorting to the whip, or even the noose. 
**** 
                                                          
228 In one brutal example of British over-zealous punishment of black troops, ten deserters from the 4th 
West India Regiment were sentenced to 1500 lashes each. It is hard to imagine any of them surviving this 
torture, and thus it simply became a gory sentence of death by flogging. Buckley, British Army in the West 
Indies, 227.    
229 This was the method employed most frequently by Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Carmichael who 
commanded the 2nd West Indian Regiment for eleven years. Buckley, British Army in the West Indies, 227.  
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 While the excellent performance of the Carolina Corps may seem at odds with the 
constant threat of violence or dishonor that life within the British military brought, the 
soldiers made the choice to accept it. The choice of the runaway slaves from South 
Carolina brought with it many hardships, but none were as harsh as their lives under 
slavery had been. While the whip continued to dominate their lives, the men of the 
Carolina Corps made the conscious decision to choose who was holding it. For all the 
dangers and the hardships, the men of the Corps gained much from their service in the 
British military: money, a home, food, and that most prized possession of all, freedom. 
With their freedom, the men of the Corps could live dignified lives in the British Caribbean, 
even into their retirement with the assistance afforded by their pensions. While it is 
certainly true that the men of the unit lived lives that mirrored the slaves within the 
institution they helped to enforce, the freedom they gained from it gave them choices 
that those enslaved plantation workers never enjoyed. This freedom allowed them to 
pivot towards a British identity, and thus that of a freeman, in a way that slaves simply 
could not. Thus, while slaves may have held a position as British subjects, they could not 
access and engage with British society in the ways that the soldiers could because of their 
status as freed persons.  
 The Carolina Corps were perfectly aware of how their superiors viewed them and 
thus were very protective of their rights as soldiers. The men knew their rights to food, 
accommodation and above all pay, and they knew how to work the system to their 
advantage if the need arose. One such example of this was in 1785 when, after being in 
the region over a year, the Carolina Corps troops began to vocalize their disapproval at 
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their lack of regular pay. The matter became so pressing that Edward Mathew wrote to 
London for permission to appoint Hubert Von Hamel as paymaster for the unit to ensure 
that the soldiers were given their pay “with the same regularity as any other in His 
Majesty’s Service.”230 This incident may have been the basis for John Orde’s criticism of 
the unit’s discipline, although the affair never reached the level of severity that he 
suggested. After the appointment of Von Hamel the subject of ill-supply never reached 
the same heatedness as it did in 1785. By vocalizing their displeasure at their situation, 
the men of the Carolina Corps used their collective bargaining power to achieve positive 
change. 
The men of the Carolina Corps had the opportunity to choose their master in a 
way that most blacks in the racialized world of the British Atlantic never did. Some, of 
course, wanted neither a planter nor an officer as a master and so chose to desert to the 
Maroon colonies or plantations near to their bases.231 However, most did not as the 
choice to join the military establishment gave them the ability to do things that would 
have been impossible to any enslaved person. The men had adopted the military life as 
                                                          
230 Mathew wrote that the situation of not having an appointed paymaster had caused “much irregularity 
in their internal police” when referring to the Carolina Corps. Mathew to Sydney, 17 January 1785, CO 101-
26. In 1802, the men of the 8th West India Regiment on Dominica went further than the Carolina Corps, 
descending into full-fledged mutiny in complaint against the discrimination which they suffered compared 
to white units. The mutiny again shows how black troops vocalized their displeasure against discriminatory 
practices in the military in the British Caribbean. Tyson, “Carolina Black Corps,” 658; Buckley, Slaves in Red 
Coats, 57.  
231 It is worth remembering that those soldiers who deserted the army had little in the way of escape routes 
off of the islands where they served. Thus, most faced recapture, and often executed. Those who ran to 
plantations had to revert to their previous status as bondsmen, a high price to pay for a man who has tasted 
freedom. Buckley, British Army in the West Indies, 227.   
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much as they had adopted Britain per se, and in doing so had carved out a life that few 
would have thought imaginable on their pre-Revolutionary War lowcountry plantations. 
**** 
 Perhaps the greatest proof of the way that black men saw the Carolina Corps as 
an avenue for social mobility in the British Atlantic took place far from the stifling humidity 
of the Caribbean, along the rugged coast of Nova Scotia. By 1791, Edward Mathew 
needed black troops to join the dwindling ranks of the Carolina Corps. The government 
would not permit him to buy slaves for the purpose and the free black population, their 
freedom and lifestyle already secured, also refused to join the unit in adequate numbers. 
Therefore, Mathew came up with a novel plan to recruit more men for the Carolina Corps 
by sending a party from the unit to find willing soldiers among the largest British free 
black population outside of the West Indies, in Nova Scotia. To achieve this end, Mathew 
sent a white subaltern and a small number of Carolina Corps soldiers on a recruiting 
mission to the rugged British province.232 Mathew clearly believed that the sight of black 
men wearing the King’s colors would convince some of the freemen of color in Nova 
Scotia to join the unit. In doing so, Mathew may well have sent the first black soldiers ever 
on a recruiting mission for the peacetime British Army.  
There was a military reason why Mathew wanted to specifically recruit from the 
free black population in Nova Scotia. In the same letter to Grenville, Mathew explained 
                                                          
232 Mathew had originally wanted to send the official Army brig, the only ship he commanded in the West 
Indies, but was dissuaded from doing so by Lord Grenville. Not perturbed, Mathew sent his mixed-race 
party northward on a private vessel. Mathew to Dundas, 6 September 1791, CO 101-31.  
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that the province was home to “a great number of free Negroes, who had been employed 
as Pioneers to the Army serving in the southern States of America…at the close of the last 
war.”233 While Mathew was incorrect in his geography, as most of the Black Pioneers in 
Nova Scotia had served in the middle or northern colonies during the war, he was correct 
that a large body of these men now lived in Nova Scotia. The appeal of recruiting men 
already trained in the work that the Carolina Corps undertook frequently in the West 
Indies was too much for Mathew who, without waiting for confirmation of his plan, sent 
the recruiting party north to Nova Scotia.  
 Upon arriving in Nova Scotia, the recruiting party found a free black population on 
the verge of collapse. At Birchtown, the largest free-black community of some 1400 
people, the population suffered due to the racial animus transplanted to the region by 
white loyalist refugees from America. White planters, many of whom had brought their 
slaves with them to Nova Scotia, as well as the general white population, quickly 
understood how to take advantage of their black loyalist neighbors. Maya Jasanoff 
explains “as former slaves, relatively unused to wage labor, black Loyalists frequently 
ended up pressed into work at exceptionally low wages. Many Birchtown blacks became 
indentured to whites at Shelburne, working under conditions that replicated their former 
positions of slavery.”234 News of the sufferings of the free black population in Nova Scotia 
spread all over the British Atlantic. In London, British abolitionists began to devise a 
                                                          
233 Mathew to Grenville, 1 March 1791, CO 101-31.  
234 Jasanoff, Liberties Exiles, 174; Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists; Pybus, Epic Journeys of Freedom; Byrd, 
Captives and Voyagers. 
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strategy to send the free blacks to Africa. In the Caribbean, Edward Mathew saw the 
suffering of the black Loyalists as a recruitment opportunity. As early as March 1791, 
Mathew wrote to Lord Grenville about his plan to raise black troops from the Canadian 
coast. In his letter, Mathew explained “I am informed they did not, in general apply 
themselves to the cultivation of their lands; that they are at present very needy; gaining 
a precarious subsistence as day laborers, and dissatisfied with the long winters of that 
climate.”235 
Mathew was facing some tough obstacles in his recruitment mission in Nova 
Scotia. The British Caribbean as a destination was not an appealing one to many of the 
free blacks, who would have known of the conditions of the region and its high mortality 
rates. Another nail in the coffin for the plan for widespread recruitment in Nova Scotia 
was that although Mathew only wanted experienced veteran pioneers from the 
Revolutionary War, aged between 25 and 35, he did not want to bring any family units 
down to the Caribbean. This stipulation seriously reduced the potential pool of men who 
the recruiting party could target, essentially eliminating married men, those with children, 
or those with any close-knit kinship networks. Given the difficulties surrounding the 
expedition to Nova Scotia, it is testament to the persuasiveness of the recruiting party 
that they managed to convince sixteen enlistees to join the ranks of the Carolina Corps.  
While most black Loyalists in Nova Scotia rejected Mathew’s overtures to return 
to British service, the sixteen veterans who did join him clearly remembered the positives 
                                                          
235 Mathew to Grenville, 1 March 1791, CO 101-31. 
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that came with British military service. These sparks of memories would have been 
reignited when the recruiting party arrived in Nova Scotia, offering them a return to a life 
they knew, and escape from the grim life they were currently living. It is also important 
to remember that life in the British Army promised a degree of security that the men 
lacked in Nova Scotia. Before their evacuation to the maritime provinces the British 
promised the men freedom and land, in truth most only received one partially and one 
not at all.236 The result was that most of the free black men in Nova Scotia owned little to 
no property in the region and struggled to survive. Life in the British Army, for all its ills, 
promised the men food, shelter, and a wage. By talking to the men of the Corps in the 
recruiting party, they would have also understood the social position of the unit in the 
Caribbean and the potential for advancement above what they could achieve in white-
dominated Nova Scotia.  
 The men who enlisted in the Carolina Corps from Nova Scotia were between the 
ages of 24 and 32, meaning it is likely that most were veterans of the Revolutionary War, 
which had ended only eight years prior to their enlistment. Even those who had not 
actively served the British during the war would have had experience with the British 
military, which had granted them their freedom and evacuated them at the end of the 
conflict. The men were all from colonies where slavery had flourished, and two had even 
been born in Africa before falling victim to the horrors of the slave trade. After fleeing 
                                                          
236 At Birchtown, the main black loyalist settlement in Nova Scotia, only 28 percent of the black population 
received the land they had been promised upon their evacuation (184 out of 649 men), and even this lucky 
minority had to wait five years, until 1788, to receive their grants. Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists, 209.  
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bondage only to discover the latent racism that pervaded colonial British society upon 
their arrival in Nova Scotia, it is possible that their most dignified moments in the New 
World came when they earlier served the British Crown. 
 The reasons given for the failure of the recruitment expedition by Mathew were 
two-fold. Firstly, he blamed the season when the mission took place. He explained that 
“the lateness of the season did not allow the Party to try its success in New Brunswick, 
where I am informed, there was a probability of our obtaining much greater numbers.”237 
The second reason given by Mathew is much more telling, “The superior advantages 
offered to this Class of People by the Sierra Leone Company, prevented this attempt from 
being so successful as it would otherwise have been.”238 Unfortunately for Mathew and 
his recruiting party, they had arrived in Nova Scotia at the exact same time as the Sierra 
Leone Company was engaging members of the free black population to journey to 
Africa.239 A major problem for Mathew was that his the recruiting party did not have the 
support of the leaders of the black community as the Sierra Leone recruiters did. Even 
more problematic was the fact that Mathew had very set standards of the type of men 
who he wanted to recruit into the unit, the men needed to be physically able, relatively  
                                                          
237 Mathew to Dundas, 14 January 1792, CO 101-32.   
238 Mathew to Dundas, 14 January 1792, CO 101-32. 
239 Each of the black emigrants to Sierra Leone was the recipient of a land grant: black leaders received nine 
acres, men six, women four and children two. John Clarkson received help in his abolitionist endeavors from 
the black leaders of Birchtown, Nova Scotia, including Boston King and David George. These men convinced 
some 1200 blacks in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to immigrate back to Africa, roughly a third of the free 




Fig. 3.1) The Return of the Nova Scotian recruits to the Carolina Corps. This document gives a rare 
individualized glance into the men of the unit. Return of Nova Scotian Recruits, in Edward Mathew 
to Henry Dundas, 14 January 1792, CO 101-32.  
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young, and preferably skilled in a trade. They also could not use the promise of freedom 
that had been so enticing to the first recruits to the unit during the Revolutionary War. 
On January 14, 1792, Mathew wrote to Henry Dundas about the recruiting mission 
to Nova Scotia and its mixed results. Mathew was downbeat about the success of the 
mission. The sixteen men who had agreed to enlist in the Carolina Corps were barely 
enough to cover the loss of men that the unit had suffered over the previous two years, 
and certainly not enough to sufficiently expand the unit as he wished.240 Thus, from the 
point of view of Mathew, the mission was disappointing. 
**** 
The men of the Carolina Corps fostered a perception of loyalty that helped to 
ingratiate them within British society, and advanced their position with their white 
officers. Indeed, at a time of crisis in 1791, the loyalty that the British believed the Corps 
had to the crown, whether real or imagined, saved the unit from destruction. In that year, 
an anonymous officer (probably either Mathew or Lt. Col. Nicholls) sent a history of the 
Carolina Corps to London explaining the loyalty that the Corps had shown, even at a time 
of increased threats from black uprisings within the Caribbean basin. With the specter of 
Saint Domingue looming large over the entire region, the commanders of the unit sought 
to convince Whitehall that no similarities existed between the Carolina Corps and the 
rebellious blacks of that colony. “An objection may be made to the arming of blacks as 
                                                          
240 The return of the troops enlisted in Nova Scotia is the best evidence I have found regarding the details 
of individual soldiers who joined the Carolina Corps. The return gives the names, ages, height, date of 
enlistment, place of birth, and trades of the men.  
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soldiers, but it has no weight,” the report began before concluding that “they may always 
be as much confided in, if properly commanded, as any part of the army.”241 Indeed it is 
clear by the measures taken by Mathew in Nova Scotia, that he had complete faith in the 
loyalty of the Carolina Corps during his time as commander in chief in the Windward 
Islands.  
 The loyalty of the unit to the British crown was key to their absorption within 
British society. The men of the Carolina Corps were very careful in their insubordination, 
using their position to create tangible benefits, such as in the case of the paymaster, 
without ever mutinying. Despite the shortages in basic equipment, food and pay that 
dogged the unit throughout its Caribbean service, and despite their employment on many 
different missions, they never mutinied. This was not the case with their successors in the 
West India Regiments who openly mutinied in 1802 to try and secure their rights as British 
soldiers.242 The Corps were often the first unit deployed when a slave uprising seemed 
likely. Whenever a runaway slave needed tracking, the unit likewise obliged. Then there 
was the mundane but crucial role that the unit had in providing labor for the white units 
of the colonies, and the maintenance of fixed fortifications throughout the Windward 
Islands. In these roles, the Corps excelled and never questioned their orders. For the white 
supremacist planters of the islands, the claim that the Corps were “more inveterate 
                                                          
241 Anon, Of the Carolina, or Black Corps, ca. Dec. 1791, CO 101-31.  
242 The men of the 8th WI Regiment mutinied on Dominica in 1802, within only six years of their founding. 
The cause of the rebellion was the lack of perceived rights that the men of the regiment had. Unlike the 
Carolina Corps, the 8th WIR recruited its rank and file almost completely from plantation slaves bought 
specifically for British military service. This meant that they were subject to much tighter restrictions than 
the free soldiers of the Carolina Corps. Tyson, “Carolina Black Corps,” 658; Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 57.  
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against people of their own Colour, than any other Troops,” certainly imbued them with 
confidence in the loyalty of the unit.243 The new imperial model that emerged after the 
American Revolution, as molded by abolitionists, featured new ideas of British civilization 
as a cornerstone.244 As such, the Carolina Corps, as former slaves and loyal subjects, 
became emblematic to West Indian planters and white officers of the new identity of 
Britishness emerging within the empire.  
 As news of the Haitian Revolution swept across the plantation islands of the 
Caribbean, the Carolina Corps managed to avoid the repercussions that affected most 
free people of color on British Caribbean islands. The racial animosity and fear stoked by 
the fires of Saint Domingue caused the free blacks of Grenada, most of whom shared the 
same French heritage as the revolutionaries, to write a petition to Edward Mathew in his 
capacity as governor of the province.245 Fearing potential re-enslavement, the petitioners 
insisted that they were writing “at this remarkable Era, to make a renewal of our most 
                                                          
243 The History of the Carolina Corps that this quote was taken from (see Appendix), was written for the 
benefit of the Home Office by one of the unit’s officers. In writing such an explosive comment, the writer 
was probably trying to win support for the unit in the wake of the Haitian revolt. Such a comment made the 
unit seem both loyal and useful against slave revolts. The officer, probably Mathew or Nicholls, was almost 
certainly writing the Home office to ensure that the unit survived the crisis and, given the period it was 
written, may also have been arguing for the expansion of the unit, as Mathew was petitioning for at the 
time. By arguing the Corps were the best-suited troops in the Caribbean for fighting against the black 
majority on the islands, the officer was showing the supreme usefulness of the unit. It is certainly not proven 
that this assessment was correct, but, given their use against runaway slaves (see chapter 2), it was likely a 
perception created due to  their application in this frequent endeavor. Anon, Of the Carolina, or Black Corps, 
ca. Dec. 1791, CO 101-31. 
244 Brown, Moral Capital, 256.  
245 The situation on Grenada was repeated throughout the Caribbean, as seeds of revolution and mistrust 
were sown throughout the Francophone world. Scott, “Common Wind”; Dubois, Avengers of the New 
World.  
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Solemn and unmutable pledge of Loyalty, to the best of Sovereigns.”246 The Carolina 
Corps never experienced any of the open hostility from the Grenadian population that 
their fellow free people of color did, at least none written that survives today. The 
excellent reputation the unit had established in the years prior to the Haitian Revolution, 
as well as the loyalty shown while completing all manner of tasks, served as a shield that 
protected the unit from racial repercussions caused by the uprisings in the French 
colonies. The situation in the early 1790s also made the British authorities in the 
Caribbean give concessions to their black troops to ensure their loyalty, including the 
pensions in 1793.  
 The most prominent example of how their loyalty to the crown aided the Carolina 
Corps is the fact that the unit survived as a single entity despite pressures from London, 
caused by the outbreak of violence on Saint Domingue, to disband it. Much of the 
pressure came from absentee planters, who feared their property in the Windward 
Islands was under threat by having an armed black unit patrolling it.247 The British high 
command in London had argued for the utility of splitting the unit while they performed 
labor duties throughout the Caribbean. Not only did splitting the unit mean that there 
were fewer black troops in any single specific area, reducing the risk of collective action 
by the unit, but it also meant they could simply cover more ground. Secretary of State 
                                                          
246 Petition of the Free Blacks of Grenada to Edward Mathew, 10 January 1792, CO 101-32.  
247 Absentee landlords, commonplace in the British Caribbean, had opposed the Carolina Corps from the 
moment of the unit’s creation due to their fears of arming blacks. Unlike the planters who lived in the 
region, these landlords never saw the benefits of the unit and so were steadfast in their opposition even 
after the Corps had loyally served for over a decade. Tyson, “Carolina Black Corps,” 654.  
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Lord Grenville, basing his view on racialized ideas of climatology and fear of the unit as a 
united force, argued that the Carolina Corps “should again be distributed to perform the 
laborious duties of the (white) Regiments serving in the several Islands.”248 This order 
arrived in the West Indies much to the chagrin of Edward Mathew, who at that moment 
was preparing for the potential outbreak of hostilities with Spain, France, or both. Indeed, 
Mathew, who had seen first-hand the usefulness of the Carolina Corps, objected to 
dispersing the unit. He believed that the threat of the Corps rebelling was essentially nil. 
After all, Mathew had seen the unit put down slave rebellions on the islands that he 
watched over for years to this point. Earlier in 1791, as the plan for the splitting of the 
Corps was being finalized in Whitehall, Mathew had written to Grenville that the Corps 
would be of more service united “than it could possibly be in it’s late scattered situation, 
devoted to the fatigue and servile duties of the Regiments in the different Islands.”249 
Always convincing, Mathew implied that the division of the troops would be more likely 
to cause a slave rebellion than keeping the Corps united.250  
                                                          
248 The plan, as perceived by Grenville, called for detachments of ten men from the Carolina Corps to join 
each white battalion serving in the West Indies as a fatigue detail. While never implemented, largely due to 
the protests of Edward Mathew, the plan does show how the British high command viewed the future use 
of the unit. Grenville to Mathew, 9 May 1791, CO 101-31.   
249 Mathew did eventually get the entire unit centralized on the island of Barbados, which the British had 
designated as their main military post in the Windward Islands. The unit was central to the early stages of 
the building of Garrison Savannah, the main military post on the island. Mathew to Grenville, 27 January 
1791, CO 101-31.   
250 Mathew wrote to Grenville that, “I shall very reluctantly see them again divided, which is highly injurious 
to their discipline.” Mathew to Grenville, 11 December 1790, CO 101-31.  
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As usual, Mathew got his way and the Carolina Corps remained as a single unit 
until their incorporation into the West India Regiments in 1797. In fact, not only did 
Mathew keep the unit together, but he got Parliament to endorse his plan to expand it. 
This was not an easy task, however, and it had taken Mathew’s several years and no less 
than five letters to Granville and Dundas to accomplish it.251 This expansion of the Corps, 
amid the Haitian Revolution, was quite extraordinary and would never have been possible 
without the perceived loyalty of the men of the Corps.  
 While their British officers argued about whether to keep the unit together or not, 
the men of the Carolina Corps continued to impress their officers with their martial 
prowess. In the same letter in which he appealed to Grenville to keep from disbanding 
the unit, Mathew lauded “The progress of the Corps in their military Exercises.”252 
Mathew was not the only Caribbean-based British officer to hold a high opinion of the 
troops. In a memorial to Henry Dundas, Grenville’s replacement in Whitehall, Lieutenant 
Colonel Oliver Nicholls requested consideration as “a proper person, to command the 
Carolina black corps.”253 That a 45-year veteran of the British Army petitioned Whitehall 
for command of a black unit is telling. While Nicholls’ petition was no doubt induced by 
the lack of vacant military postings in the region, the fact that he specifically asked for 
                                                          
251  The letters written covering this subject are as follows; Mathew to Grenville, 28 November 1790; 22 
December 1790; 8 March 1791; 17 July 1791, CO 101-31; Mathew to Dundas, 14 January 1792, CO 101-32.  
252 Mathew to Grenville, 27 Jan. 1791, CO 101-31.   
253 Nicholls did receive the command of the unit from Dundas, although he was forced to do so with 
provincial rank and pay due to the non-regular status of the unit. Oliver Nicholls to Dundas, 26 November 
1791, CO 101-31.  
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command of the Carolina Corps proves that there was no dramatic stigma associated with 
the unit based on their race.254 Another reason that white officers wanted a role in black 
units was the fact that some officers found black units easier to control, as these soldiers 
often complained much less than white soldiers about the behavior of their officers. 
Indeed, there is no proof that the men of the Corps ever lodged any complaints against 
their officers, at least none that made it as far as to a court-martial.  
**** 
  The question asked by this chapter, namely how British were the Carolina Corps, 
creates a false dichotomy. Much like the question of the ethnicity of the Carolina Corps, 
the nationalism of the men of the unit was fluid, used strategically to achieve various 
goals relating to their integration within British colonial society. The lack of written 
documentation from the troops themselves makes an individualized analysis of this 
question almost impossible. However, from the wealth of sources generated by and about 
the unit, it is clear to see that the men of the Carolina Corps performed Britishness as a 
collective throughout their service in the Windward Islands.  
 Perhaps even more important than the nationalism that the men felt towards the 
Empire that had both enslaved and freed them, was the perception of white colonial 
                                                          
254 While the list is too long to recount in a single footnote, Nicholls was not the only white British officer to 
petition Edward Mathew or Whitehall for an officer’s commission in the Carolina Corps. Throughout the 
service of the unit in the West Indies, numerous white officers did so. Considering the high turnover of 
white officers in the Caribbean, where mosquitos passed on deadly contagions regardless of rank, these 
men specifically chose the Carolina Corps over white regiments. While these reasons ranged from 
expedience to admiration of the Corps, collectively they show that the unit was not denigrated due to their 
race or service history. Rather, the men saw the Corps as a legitimate way to enter the British military 
establishment in the region.  
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society towards the unit in this regard. The perceived loyalty of the unit was especially 
clear in the writings of its white officers who saw their men as being as British as any of 
the white troops who served in the West Indies. The fact that the men were under the 
jurisdiction of military courts and could petition their officers for official dispensations 
reveals just how comparable their standing was to white troops in the eyes of their 
commanders. These official privileges that the men negotiated through their actions 
included the pensions they received after their retirement from service starting in 1793.  
 The overall fluidity of identity presented by British Caribbean society in the late 
eighteenth century meant that the men of the Carolina Corps could perform Britishness, 
and consider themselves British subjects, without abandoning any African retentions they 
may have had. The men themselves would have found it possible to be Afro-British, a 
category of difference that would have flourished in the racialized world of the British 
Caribbean. Such a designation would give whites leave to discriminate freely, while also 
accepting the advanced position of the men within black society. Such a position would 
also allow the soldiers to engage with society in a truly creolized way. Thus, the men of 
the Carolina Corps lived a unique existence in the British Caribbean, not only regarding 









“A corps of one thousand Men, composed of blacks…would render more 
essential service in the Country, than treble the number of Europeans”: 
The Carolina Corps and the Creation of the West India Regiments 
 
In March 1795, disaster and liberation came to Grenada. On the night of the 
second, the Francophone blacks of the island, led by a free black planter named Julien 
Fédon, rose in rebellion against British rule. Fédon based his rebellion on the principles of 
the French Revolution, the flames of which licked at the entire Caribbean basin. Historians 
who have studied the revolt have tried to disentangle the facts surrounding it, in an 
attempt to discover whether it was at its heart a French revolutionary movement, or a 
slave rebellion.255 It was likely both, as by the end of the violence, over a year later, slaves 
from both Anglophone and Francophone communities on the island had taken part, with 
                                                          
255 While not originally getting the same amount of coverage as other Caribbean revolts of this era, 
recently scholars have studied the event in much greater detail. These include: Kit Candlin, “The Role of 
the Enslaved in the ‘Fedon Rebellion’ of 1795,” Slavery and Abolition (April 2018). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2018.1464623; Tessa Murphy, “A Reassertion of Rights: Fedon’s 
Rebellion, Grenada, 1795-96,” La Révolution Française 14 (June 2018): 1-26; Edward L Cox, “Fedon’s 
Rebellion 1795-96: Causes and Consequences,” Journal of African American History 67 (Spring 1982): 7-
19; David B. Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus, eds., A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the 
Greater Caribbean (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).  
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many falling victim to British retribution upon the island’s reconquest. Not disputed is 
that in the early days of the violence, the black rebels killed any white English planter they 
came across, including the acting governor of Grenada.256 
While the maelstrom of violence swept up the families and kinship networks of 
the Carolina Corps on Grenada, the men of the unit escaped the bloodshed. Ironically, 
their absence, to join the British force intending to defend the islands of the Caribbean 
from French revolutionary incursions, helped to facilitate the uprising on Grenada. Fédon 
waited until the removal of the Corps and several other units, which seriously weakened 
the Grenada garrison, before setting his plans in motion. When the Corps returned to the 
island with the British forces to subdue the rebels in 1796, devastation reigned in Grenada 
and disrupted its complex social system. The extent of the disorder that affected slave 
family groups is unknown, but considering the violence of the previous year, it is likely 
that whole communities were destroyed in the conflagration.  
Fédon’s rebellion on Grenada was both a result and one of the catalysts for the 
final demise of the Carolina Corps as a fighting force. However, out of the ashes of the 
unit came a new idea that changed the course of modern British military history, the 
creation of the West India Regiments. Like the rebellion itself, events thousands of miles 
away, on the continent of Europe, brought these units into existence. Rebellions such as 
Fédon’s, based on French revolutionary principles, erupted throughout the Caribbean, 
                                                          
256 Kenneth F. MacKenzie to William Cavendish-Bentinck, 28 March 1795, CO 101-34.  
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highlighting Britain’s need for a new fighting force. Unwittingly, the Carolina Corps 
became the very foundation upon which the British wished to base these new units.  
This chapter will show how the experience and example of the Carolina Corps was 
used by proponents of arming blacks to create the West India Regiments. Explored within 
this will be the arguments that raged in London, and throughout the Caribbean, both for 
and against the creation of such units. The Carolina Corps often made appearances in 
such arguments, used to counter the many apprehensions the racially biased white 
leadership in London had towards such a scheme. Analysis of these arguments, as well as 
original plans for the new units, will show how critical the Carolina Corps, as a uniquely 
situated black military unit in the region, was to the eventual adoption of the plan to 
create the regiments.  
The importance of the Carolina Corps to the formation of the West India 
Regiments is not absent from previous scholarship. In Slaves in Red Coats (1979), a work 
about the new military units, Roger Norman Buckley recognized that “The Black Carolina 
Corps was a nearby reminder. The importance of this contingent, which was under the 
command of regular army officers, was recognized all over the West Indies.”257 Buckley 
did not go far enough in his assessment, however, for the Corps was more than a reminder 
                                                          
257 A more substantial six-page section is devoted to the Corps in Slaves and Soldier, while Arming Slaves 
only features fleeting glimpses of the unit to contextualize larger points. Like Buckley, neither Voelz nor the 
numerous contributors in Arming Slaves spend much time on the Corps due to their focus on larger topics. 
The result is that the importance of the unit is lost in these seminal works on the British military in the 
Caribbean. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 6; Voelz, “Slave and Soldier,” 248; David Geggus, “The Arming of 
Slaves,” in Brown and Morgan, eds., Arming Slaves, 211. 
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of the good service of black troops in the Caribbean, it provided the very model for the 
new units.  
 The scant scholarship that focuses on the Carolina Corps, as well as the larger 
corpus on the West India Regiment, has also neglected to explore the plight of the troops 
as they became unknowing participants in Britain’s new military enterprise. This chapter 
will insert the men of the Carolina Corps back into the narrative by showing how the move 
to create the West India Regiments, both geographical and temporal, disrupted the lives 
that the soldiers had spent the previous decade building. The creation of the new units 
disrupted the lives of the soldiers of the Carolina Corps, increasing their terms of service 
with very little tangible benefit. Their status as veteran soldiers becoming more indicative 
of their advanced age than of any additional military honors bestowed upon them. Upon 
their backs and through their sacrifices, however, the British created a new military 
system that would last over a century.  
 This chapter analyses to examine the several stages in the creation of the West 
India Regiments. This structure allows for a deep examination of the reasons for the 
creation of the new units, the arguments surrounding them, and the ways that the 
Carolina Corps influenced these matters. Of course, the focus of the chapter will be the 
role of the Corps in the creation of the West India Regiments and as such, even when not 
mentioned, the unit looms over this entire section. This approach will show the 
intertwined nature of the units by revealing how the demise of the Corps led directly to 
the rise of the later regiments.  
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 The chapter begins by looking at the physical state of the Corps, and the ways that 
the British use of the unit effectively destroyed it in the initial phases of the French 
Revolutionary Wars. This section will show that while the British considered the Carolina 
Corps too old to function effectively by the start of the conflict, their need for men in the 
West Indies forced them to press the unit into service. This section also assesses the 
impact of the drastic changes that occurred within the Carolina Corps resulting from the 
new war footing. These changes included new white commanding officers, changes in 
location, and even the move towards active military action for the entire aging regiment. 
These changes tore the unit from the foundations they had laid since arriving in the region 
and yet, despite causing new hardships, their loyal service meant the unit survived the 
traumas created by the French Revolutionary War. 
 The second section builds off the first to show how the loyal performance of the 
Carolina Corps, and newly raised black units that were modelled on them, caused 
Parliament to allow for the formation of the new West India Regiments. The first part of 
the section looks at the roles that generals in London, particularly those who had seen 
the Corps and other black troops in action, pushed for the creation of these new all-black 
regiments.  The second part looks at how the white officers of the Carolina Corps were 
instrumental in keeping the unit together and in pushing for the expansion of black units 
in the region. It will show that the Carolina Corps, through its loyal service and 
opinionated white officers, was instrumental in the creation of the West India Regiments.  
 The final section of this chapter discusses the creation of the West India Regiments 
and the Carolina Corps’ incorporation within them. The impact of free men working 
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alongside slaves will be discussed, as will the ways that the men of the unit were originally 
used upon the units’ creation. While the second section discusses the ways that the Corps 
influenced the creation of the West India Regiments, this section will assess their practical 
impact during their foundational stages. Overall, this chapter argues that the Carolina 
Corps was critical to the foundation of the West India Regiments.  
**** 
 In 1793, the British faced a military crisis. On the European continent, the French 
had executed their King and embarked on a campaign of conquest that threatened the 
stability of the whole of Europe. When France declared war in February, Britain was in a 
precarious spot militarily. While it remained the most powerful naval force in the world, 
its army was extremely weak, numbering only 40,000 regulars, spread over three 
continents.258 With the very real threat of a French invasion of the British mainland, and 
a need to prop up their weaker allied nations in Europe, most British troops were retained 
on that continent. This meant a deprivation of British manpower from the islands of the 
British West Indies. The Colonial Office in London was soon awash with pleas from 
planters, both absentee and in the Caribbean, for greater military protection for the 
islands. 
 The threat of a French invasion of the British West Indies was one that sprung up 
whenever the two nations went to war. In such conflicts, the islands of the Caribbean 
                                                          
258 By 1793, the British had established Imperial possessions in Europe, North America, and Asia. The army 
had always been the weakest of the British military forces, but had suffered from a lack of recruitment 
throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 3. 
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changed hands at a dizzying rate, and this had certainly been the case during the last 
major struggle, the American Revolutionary War. This time, however, the added fear of 
slave insurrection breaking out on islands suffering from shortages of troops, was even 
more pressing due to the shadow cast by the massive uprising taking place on Saint 
Domingue.  
 Against this backdrop, the men of the Carolina Corps, now numbering some 200 
troops under arms, were on the move.259 By the spring of 1792, Edward Mathew, the 
commander who had rated their martial prowess so highly, had returned to England to 
restore his health, never again returning to the West Indies. With Mathew’s departure, 
not only do historians lose their most valuable source on the progress of the Carolina 
Corps, but the unit itself lost its most powerful proponent.  
 The final returns of the unit from Grenada provide an insight into the aging 
soldiers’ duties as they prepared for their relocation. The main work of the pioneers 
remained the restoration and repair of the island’s crumbling fortifications. In November 
1791, the work on fortifications engaged men from all three companies of the Carolina 
Corps, and almost half of the entire unit, but the men of the pioneers made up most of 
the black workforce.260 The British land strategy for the defense of the West Indies was 
                                                          
259 The final return of the Carolina Corps was taken in December 1791, a year before the start of the 
Revolutionary Wars with France. This itemized return listed the men in the unit as; 48 dragoons, 34 
artificers, and 125 pioneers, for a total of 207 men. Return of Black Pioneers, 3 December 1791; Return of 
Black Dragoons, 3 December 1791; Return of Black Artificers, 3 December 1791, CO 101-32. 
260 For a six-day period in November, the average number of laborers working on the fortifications came 
from the following sub-units: 67 from the pioneers, 19 from the artificers, and 1 from the dragoons. Also, 
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contingent on the use of these fortifications. It would not be until after the fall of 
Napoleon that the British, realizing the cost and inadequacy of such defenses, would 
move away from their fixed defense plans in the region.  
 The returns made just prior to Mathew’s departure in 1792, also show the 
different employments of the skilled artificers of the Carolina Corps. The documents are 
unique as they are the only ones that break down the different employments of the unit 
during their entire service in the West Indies. The return shows that most tasks performed 
by the artificers differed little from those of the pioneers. During the same period that 
the pioneers were working on the fortifications, the men of the artificers did much of the 
labor-intensive work that made such construction activities possible. Many partook in the 
same restoration activities, while others took turns as guards of the supply depots, a role 
usually reserved for the dragoons.261  
As well as displaying the utilitarian nature of the artificers, the skills that 
differentiated the unit from the Pioneers were also on display during the same period. 
Some artificers worked to construct sentry boxes, while several others served as 
waggoneers. It is also interesting to note that in addition to the white surgeon who served 
the unit, an artificer named Smart Lacy also worked as a “surgeryman” for the Carolina 
Corps. While this role was likely less skilled than that of the white surgeon, it implies that 
Lacy had picked up some anatomical skills, showing again how the men of the unit used 
                                                          
some 19 slaves from local plantations helped in the repairs on a daily basis. Report of Black Corps Employed 
on the Fortifications, 3 December 1791, CO 101-32. 
261 Return of the Corps of Black Artificers, 3 December 1791, CO 101-32.  
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their military service to gain an education that would have been almost impossible to 
achieve in their former lives as slaves.262 
 The final year that the Carolina Corps spent on Grenada was one filled with 
sorrow. In October 1792, as the unit prepared to leave the island for the last time, the 
veteran commander of the black dragoon company, Captain William Mackrill, died. The 
loss of the white officer, only months after Mathew’s departure for England, severely 
tested the leadership structure of the unit. The chance for career advancement also led 
Mackrill’s subordinates to immediately apply to replace him after his death. One who did 
was Lieutenant James Greene, himself a four-year veteran of the black dragoons.263 
Greene was not the only officer to press his claim for the vacant leadership position within 
the unit. So did James Haverkam, his fellow white lieutenant in the company.264 
 One of the main reasons why the white officers of the Carolina Corps were so 
quick to seek senior leadership positions within the unit was that the colonial office often 
passed them over for promotion. There was good reason for this from a British 
standpoint, as such promotions from outside of a unit meant the avoidance of such 
internal squabbles as that which began after Mackrill’s demise. Nonetheless, the officers 
of the Corps, tired of being ignored for higher positions and perhaps nervous that serving 
in the only black unit in the West Indies would restrict their wider opportunities in the 
                                                          
262 Return of the Corps of Black Artificers, 3 December 1791, CO 101-32.  
263 James Greene to Dundas, 27 October 1782, CO 101-32.  
264 James Haverkam to Dundas, 24 April 1793, CO 101-33. 
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service, had had enough. On May 12, they wrote a memorial to the colonial office in which 
they complained about the practice, stating they felt “much injured by every Vacancy in 
the Corps being filled up from the Line.”265 In the memorial they made it clear they felt 
that the extra fatigue they had to endure at the head of pioneer units meant they were 
much more able to fulfill the necessary duties than their regular line infantry 
counterparts. Dismissing the petitioners, the colonial office continued their normal 
practice by promoting a lieutenant from the 67th Regiment of Foot to lead the dragoons. 
Such unified resentment of the military establishment among the small group of officers 
within the Carolina Corps likely united them in a similar way to the bonds of kinship that 
joined the black troops who they commanded.  
 When the time came for the Carolina Corps to depart Grenada for the last time, 
in mid-May 1793, the white population of the island did not want to see them leave. Not 
only was the island becoming short-handed of white regular troops, but the lieutenant 
governor complained about the effectiveness of the militia who remained on Grenada. It 
was these men who the Colonial Office expected to deal with most external threats, and 
certainly all internal conflicts. Nonetheless, Ninian Home, the lieutenant governor of the 
island, believed that if the militia on Grenada were to fight for any decent amount of time, 
it would “be productive of great inconvenience and discontent” amongst the citizen-
soldiers.266 Thus, the white Anglophone planters of the island, as well its interim governor, 
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266 Ninian Home to Dundas, 7 April 1793, CO 101-32.  
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protested the departure of the Carolina Corps. In almost a decade of service on the island, 
there had been no major slave revolts, and the men had performed admirably, earning 
the grudging respect (or at least tolerance) of the white population.  
 The British establishment on the island was particularly fearful of losing redcoat 
troops due to the influx of French refugees in the wake of the French Revolution.267 
Adding to the already high Francophone population on the island, both white and black, 
the British quickly found themselves in a minority on the island. Ninian Home banned 
further French immigrants from entering Grenada, due to the fear of “many evil minded 
and ill-disposed persons, who publicly avow principles incompatible of allegiance to 
us.”268 Home was terrified the immigrants would start a revolution in favor of French 
republican government on the island. His fears came to fruition just over a year later, 
when Julien Fédon, a Francophone free black man, led a year-long rebellion against the 
British on Grenada.269 
                                                          
267 The influx of French refugees, and revolutionaries, from Saint Domingue and the other French islands 
was not just a problem in Grenada, but caused tensions in the slave societies located throughout the 
Caribbean. Most societies responded as Grenada did, by creating new laws to regulate slaves, or even 
denying entry to black refugees. Scott, “Common Wind,” particularly 233-95.   
268 Home, Proclamation on Emigration of French refugees to Grenada, 29 January 1793, CO 101-32.  
269 Fédon’s Rebellion (1795-96), is one of the most interesting and under-explored slave uprisings to occur 
in the British Caribbean. During the year-long uprising, Francophone free blacks, as well as many slaves on 
both sides of the language divide, conquered all the island except for the main town at St George. Early in 
the conflict, Ninian Home was executed by the revolutionaries, becoming one of the few colonial governors 
to be killed in a slave uprising in the Caribbean. Despite their extensive knowledge of the island, the Carolina 
Corps did not return to Grenada during the uprising. Similar issues arising from the French and Haitian 
Revolutions occurred throughout the Caribbean basin. For example, in Venezuela, only a few miles from 
the French island of Tobago, Spanish officials confronted similar revolutionary infiltration. Scott, “Common 
Wind,” 248-50; 261-62.  
170 
 It is unlikely the presence of the Carolina Corps on Grenada would have prevented 
the outbreak of Fédon’s Rebellion, but their absence from the island facilitated its early 
success. The simple fact is that the number of effective defenders on the island dropped 
considerably with the departure of the Carolina Corps. Including the free-colored militia, 
of which there were 308, the overall militia numbers for the entire island numbered only 
771 men after the departure of the Carolina Corps.270 This meant Home saw his non-
regular defense forces fall by a fifth. More importantly, with the militia being a non-
conventional, part-time fighting force, the loss of the Carolina Corps meant the loss of the 
main fatigue units on Grenada. It is no surprise, therefore, that the fortifications that were 
the prime responsibility of the Corps fell into disrepair after their removal from the island. 
In one of the several pleading letters Home wrote to Henry Dundas in the Colonial office, 
he described the situation thus: “The extent of the Fortifications on Richmond Hill appears 
to me to make two Regiments essentially necessary for their protection, and I believe the 
works were planned under the idea that this Garrison would be allotted to them. At 
present we have not above two hundred and sixty men fit for duty.”271 After the removal 
of the Carolina Corps from Grenada, Home simply did not have the manpower to 
complete his fortifications, or to guard them with adequately trained troops. The removal 
of the Corps thus undermined the entire British strategy for defense of the island.  
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271 If Home is correct, he lost almost half of his full time military defense force on Grenada with the removal 
of the Carolina Corps. Home to Dundas, 12 July 1794, CO 101-33.  
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 Outside of the military disruption caused to Grenada by the departure of the 
Carolina Corps in 1793, the effects of the move personally affected the men of the unit. 
While the historical record is unclear, it does seem that the small number of Carolina 
Corps troops receiving a pension, continued to reside on Grenada after the removal of 
the regiment. For the rest of the men, the move from Grenada would have been a painful 
reminder of their previous departure from Charlestown, an event that all but the few new 
recruits from Nova Scotia had lived through. In the previous decade, the men of the Corps 
had created new kinship and familial groups on the islands where they served, particularly 
on their main base of Grenada. Now the men of the unit had to endure a second round 
of forced separation from their families.  
 The destination of the Carolina Corps after their departure from Grenada was 
Barbados, the new headquarters island for the British military in West Indies.  The island, 
the farthest east of the Caribbean islands and easiest to reach from the metropole, 
became the main garrison of the British Windward Islands in the late 1780s. As such, a 
large standing garrison were stationed there, with many new buildings built to protect 
the main settlement, Bridgetown, and to house the newly arrived troops.272 The men of 
                                                          
272 Barbados was the only British Windward Island never to change hands after first colonization in 1627. 
As one of the largest sugar producing islands in the Caribbean, it was highly prized by the British. Due to its 
natural anchorages, and strategic position (both geographically distant from the islands of other European 
nations, and surrounded by currents which made sea voyages from Britain quick), the island was chosen in 
1785 to become the main British base in the Windwards. Construction on the new garrison buildings began 
in 1789, but stalled by 1793 due to a lack of available funds. Nonetheless, with several key buildings already 
completed, the island became the main British staging point during the Revolutionary Wars with France. 
Construction began again by 1798, and today the site is the largest extant colonial military garrison in the 
British Commonwealth. Barbados Ministry of Community Development and Culture, UNESCO Historic 
Bridgetown and its Garrison: Nomination as World Heritage Site Nomination Document (Bridgetown, 
Barbados: 2010), 93-94. https://whc.unesco.org/uploads/nominations/1376.pdf. 
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the Carolina Corps were one of the first choices for the British commanders to work as 
pioneers on the garrison’s structures, which were completed by 1793 but needed 
constant upkeep.  
In January 1793, Henry Dundas sent the official transfer orders to Barbados for the 
Carolina Corps and placed the unit under the command of Captain of Royal Engineers 
Robert Pringle, specifically “to be employed by him on such Works, and to be stationed 
on such Islands, as he shall think most proper.”273  In addition to this, the British were 
putting together an expeditionary force on the island for use against the French, led by 
Sir John Jarvis and Sir Charles Grey. Although many troops were at retirement age or were 
otherwise infirm, the standing of the Carolina Corps within the British Caribbean military 
establishment meant they were still considered an important enough unit to take part in 
this expedition in 1794.274 
 The 1794 campaign against the French islands sounded the death knell of the 
Carolina Corps as an effective fighting unit. After participating in the British assaults on 
Guadeloupe and Martinique, the already weakened Corps was all but destroyed as a 
fighting force. The number of infirm, and later pensioned, troops had grown 
unsustainably, and not enough free blacks were willing to fill the void left, or at least not 
enough to make a substantial difference to the unit’s dwindling roll. A British attempt to 
                                                          
273 Considering how long it took for the order to first reach Barbados, and then to be forwarded to Grenada, 
the Corps leaving their home base in mid-1793 is the most likely conclusion. The timeline for this chapter is 
based on this deduction. Dundas to Cornelius Cuyler, 21 January 1793, CO 319-5. 
274 Tyson, “Carolina Black Corps,” 661. 
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open the unit to recruitment from the free black French populations of these islands was 
as unsuccessful as the same attempt had been on Grenada, and so the numbers of the 
unit continued to decline throughout the expedition.275 The result was that by the start 
of 1795, when the expedition concluded and the Carolina Corps took up a new station on 
Saint Lucia, there were only eighty men fit for duty in the decimated unit.276  
 Regardless of their lack of active troops, the men of the Carolina Corps continued 
to play a crucial role in the protection of the islands where they served. On Saint Lucia, 
the men of the Corps faced one of their toughest challenges yet. Outnumbered and not 
used to combat operations, excepting the dragoon company that regularly pursued 
runaway slaves, the entire Carolina Corps were called upon by the British leadership on 
Saint Lucia to defend the island. The engagement is one of the only ones written about in 
any detail by their white officers, and so deserves detailed analysis. The action was also 
one of the last that the men of the unit would ever fight together as members of the 
Carolina Corps.  
 In January 1795, there was a substantial slave revolt on Saint Lucia, and the 
Carolina Corps entered the fray to try and quell it. Whether the unit was on the island 
                                                          
275 The British hoped that free blacks who opposed the Revolutions in France and Haiti would join the British 
Army to fight against Republican forces. Although a few did join the Carolina Corps, their numbers were too 
little to change the general attrition the unit experienced during the campaign to capture Martinique and 
Guadeloupe. The idea was first proposed and promoted by General Cornelius Cuyler even before the 
Carolina Corps arrived in Barbados. It was Cuyler who, in 1792, replaced Edward Mathew as Commander in 
Chief of the West Indies. Cuyler to Dundas, 5 March 1793, CO 319-5; Tyson, “Carolina Black Corps,” 662.  
276 In the same letter, Vaughan explains that the Carolina Corps were short of basic supplies, particularly 
clothing. Vaughan to Dundas, 30 January 1793, CO 254-1.  
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specifically for this purpose, or whether their arrival on the island was purely 
serendipitous is unknown. For the first time since the final days of the Revolutionary War 
in South Carolina the entire unit took up arms. What is also clear is that the Carolina Corps, 
despite being better armed than the French-led republican slave rebels, failed to quell the 
rebellion. Vaughan described the action: “a spirited attempt made by the Black Carolina 
Corps to drive them from their station, having failed of success it became necessary to 
send Brigadier General Stewart with a strong detachment of His Majesty’s Troops” to end 
the uprising.277 The British forces eventually defeated the rebelling slaves in the 
mountainous interior of Saint Lucia, albeit without the further use of the Carolina Corps.  
 As in Saint Vincent, the men of the Carolina Corps faced the slave rebels on Saint 
Lucia because of the perceptions of white commanders of their value against other blacks. 
Unfortunately for the Corps, the unit was simply too weak to fight a determined enemy. 
The slaves were not afraid of the black unit, shown by the fact that they stood their 
ground and defeated the Carolina Corps before running in the face of the advance of 
white troops sent to relieve their beleaguered black allies. The Corps was also weakened 
by the fact that the majority of their number had little or no experience in handling 
offensive weaponry and thus, despite gallantly entering the fray, the men of the Pioneer 
and Artificer arms of the unit were ineffective. Even before the battle, Vaughan had 
remarked to Dundas that the unit was unfit for any service other than as pioneers.278 The 
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events on Saint Lucia confirmed his assessment and added to the deteriorating view of 
the unit as a useful fighting force in the West Indies. 
 The Carolina Corps had never come closer to dissolution than at that moment in 
early 1795, and the events on Saint Lucia could very well have destroyed it. However, 
events had already begun that would change the course of British military history forever, 
and that would provide a saving grace for the men of the Corps who were still able to 
endure a rigorous army lifestyle. Even as the Carolina Corps were engaging the French 
republican forces in Saint Lucia, two other black units inspired by their example had taken 
the field. These Black Ranger companies, led by two white officers named Malcolm and 
Soter, proved themselves very capable on the battlefield.279 Entering the arena on a path 
already blazed by the men of the Carolina Corps, the Black Rangers breathed new life into 
the recruitment of blacks by the British in the Caribbean. 
 The effects of the Carolina Corps on the recruitment of the Black Rangers were 
tremendous. While desperation helped to force the British commanders in the West 
Indies, particularly Vaughan, to recruit blacks, the step was much more palatable due to 
the excellent performance of the Carolina Corps over the preceding decade. The fact the 
unit survived disbanding, even in the face of their age and diminishing usefulness to the 
cause of the Crown, shows how valuable the British still deemed their service in the 
Caribbean. Structurally, the Corps also provided the British with an example of how a 
black unit could function. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Black Rangers, although 
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lacking an artificer corps, looked remarkably like the Carolina Corps, particularly in its mix 
of black troops led by white British regular officers. Thus, even as the fighting value of the 
unit decreased, the foundations that they created had already begun to change British 
policy. The enormous impact that the Carolina Corps had on the British military 
establishment was not confined to the Caribbean basin, however, but also took hold in 
the imperial metropole. Indeed, events in Whitehall, influenced not only by present 
circumstances but also by the service of the unit, were now beginning to move rapidly, 
ensuring the writing of a new chapter for the men of Corps.  
**** 
 A simple fact was evident to the British military strategists in Whitehall as the 
violence of the French Revolutionary Wars erupted throughout Europe: white men did 
not want to join the British Army. For the first time in generations, unemployment among 
the poor, the usual fodder for recruiters, was falling to new lows due to the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain.280 Similarly, the number of debtors, another previously invaluable 
source of military recruits, was also falling. Then there was the simple fact that service in 
the British Caribbean was incredibly undesirable to any white soldier who aspired to a life 
beyond service in the army. Even for those who did not succumb to the common ailments 
of yellow fever and malaria, these tropical maladies often crippled them for the rest of 
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their life. At a time when Britain desperately needed troops, the white male population 
were simply unwilling to serve.281  
 Additionally while the British lacked white manpower, the French Army in the 
Caribbean had begun to use blacks in large numbers by the time the fighting really began. 
For example, at Martinique, which General Charles Grey attacked in March 1794, the 
French employed a force that consisted of both white regulars and militia, but also a black 
regiment led by a black officer.282 In Grey’s force, only the diminished Carolina Corps 
served as soldiers of color for the attackers. In an attritional theatre of war, which prized 
numbers of healthy troops above all other considerations, the French got the jump on the 
British by tapping into a manpower resource that the British had only begun to toy with.  
 Even on islands that the British controlled, or seized control of, the revolutionary 
egalitarian ideals of the French, including the abolition of slavery, led many slaves to 
revolt against their British masters. On Saint Lucia, the men of the Carolina Corps faced 
such a rebellion personally, while Fédon’s Rebellion on Grenada was tearing their former 
island home asunder.  Similar slave rebellions also occurred on Martinique and 
Guadeloupe, erasing the great gains that Grey had made at the start of his lightning 
campaign against the French West Indian Empire. 
 After replacing Charles Grey, Sir John Vaughan assessed the critical situation that 
the British Army in the West Indies found itself in and strove to find a quick solution. 
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Before 1794 had ended, Vaughan had written to the Duke of Portland, the British Home 
Secretary, to suggest that “a corps of one thousand Men, composed of blacks and 
Mulattoes, and commanded by British officers would render more essential service in the 
Country, than treble the number of Europeans.”283 Vaughan hoped to pattern this new 
force after the existing model of a British line infantry regiment, and he was sure such a 
force would swing the pendulum back in Britain’s favor in the Caribbean.  
 Superficially, Vaughan’s plan to raise a full-strength black regiment seems similar 
to Edward Mathew’s earlier schemes to expand the Carolina Corps, but they were very 
different in design. Mathew had very specific ideas about who he wanted to complete the 
expansion of the Carolina Corps to full regimental size: black freemen. This is evidenced 
both in his attempts to enlist the help of prominent free people of color on Grenada to 
help with recruitment, and in his mission to Nova Scotia. Vaughan, however, was much 
more practical. Aware of Mathew’s failure to secure enough free people of color to serve 
from his own experience in the Caribbean, Vaughan sought to use slaves to fill the ranks 
of his new unit.284 Vaughan wished to requisition slaves from each island using a quota 
system, with their owners compensated with land grants from newly acquired French 
possessions. Unlike the men of the Carolina Corps during the Revolutionary War in 
America, the slaves would remain enslaved as property of the British crown.  
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 Vaughan’s plan, like the earlier efforts of Mathew, ran into domestic opposition 
from a metropolitan government of white men who still could not understand the value 
of arming slaves. Despite this, the island governments in the British West Indies took 
measures into their own hands and quickly raised their own black units to defend 
themselves from attack. The success of these units in suppressing further slave revolts did 
lend some credence to Vaughan’s plan to raise a black regiment. However, Vaughan had 
avenues of support that Mathew did not possess. These avenues flowed from many 
directions, and a great deal emerged through the men of the Carolina Corps.  
 At least one year before Vaughan laid his plan before the Home Secretary, 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Nicolls, seeking command of the Carolina Corps, was setting 
forth a similar scheme. Following the ideas set forth by Edward Mathew as early as 1790, 
Nicolls argued for the expansion of the Corps to full regimental size. Nicolls wrote to Henry 
Dundas describing, “the advantages that might be fairly expected from augmenting the 
Black Corps, serving in the Leeward Islands, and forming them, as a Regt.”285 In his letter, 
Nicolls explained that he had personally petitioned Dundas in London before his return to 
Grenada and that the Home Secretary had been “pleased to say there seemed to be no 
objection” to Nicolls taking control of the unit.  
 Like Vaughan, Nicolls used the war with France as a vehicle to create a full black 
infantry regiment in the Caribbean, and like Vaughan he faced initial opposition from the 
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Home Secretary in London.286 Nevertheless, the persistent effect of high-ranking British 
officers extolling the virtues of black troops amongst the British political leadership 
certainly had an effect. From Nicolls’ letter, it is clear he was not only conducting a letter 
writing campaign to enlarge and then command the Carolina Corps, but was also visiting 
the governmental offices in London to interview the Home Secretary personally on the 
subject. In time the effect of this petitioning made the British political elite much more 
amenable to the concept of creating a black regiment, even if they were still reluctant to 
take concrete steps in practice.287 
 While the written record does not say so, it is almost certain that Mathew also 
used his stay in London to promote his vision for an expanded Carolina Corps. Mathew 
made these attempts in London in addition to the several letters he had written to both 
Dundas and Granville from Grenada. When Mathew returned to Britain in 1792, he was 
not immediately relieved of command over the West Indies garrisons, and he also 
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retained the governorship of Grenada.288 As such, fully expecting to return to Grenada 
once he regained his health, Mathew would have kept close ties to the island while also 
continuing to press his own agenda in the Palace of Westminster. Thus, with military 
commanders pushing for a black regiment both at home and abroad, they began to win 
support.  
 The major opposition to the creation of black regiments, as in the earlier case of 
the Carolina Corps, came from the powerful lobby of merchants and absentee planters. 
This lobby attacked any idea of creating a regiment that would undermine the racial 
hierarchy they needed to flourish. Ever since 1775, the planter lobby forcefully rejected 
plans to recruit from the black population. During the American Revolutionary War, the 
British raised a regiment of free blacks to defend Jamaica but, despite their good conduct, 
they were quickly disbanded due to pressure from the planter lobby.289  Stephen Fuller, a 
member of the Jamaican lobby, summarized the feeling of many whites towards arming 
blacks in the British Caribbean, when he explained that black troops: “are not to be 
trusted in a corps composed of themselves only, & the incorporating of them with the 
whites will not be endured.”290 This was the main opposition argument to the plans of 
Vaughan, Mathew, and Nicolls. However, by 1795, the example of the Carolina Corps had 
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undermined both arguments and military necessity was also eroding the complaints of 
the planter lobby. 
 The use of so-called indigenous troops was not a new concept in the British Army 
when the West India Regiments began to form in 1795. The British had used enslaved 
black troops at times of crisis throughout the decades before the formation of the first 
regular units. More importantly, the British experience with local sepoy troops in India 
was a major catalyst in the British decision to create black regiments to defend their 
Caribbean possessions. The East Indian Company had recruited so many sepoy troops in 
their Indian enclaves that the indigenous troops outnumbered the combined forces of 
both the British regular army units and the white ones raised by the company itself.291 In 
1757, Calcutta had been captured by Sir Robert Clive with a force comprised of a majority 
of sepoy troops, using similar units to those that had existed in the Indian subcontinent 
for 250 years.292 
 The geographical rotation system of service for members of the British Army 
during the eighteenth century meant that many of the officers serving in the Caribbean 
in 1795 would have had previous experience commanding sepoy troops in India. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, the British officials in London were apprised of every 
movement in their nation’s Indian enterprise and so knew the worth of using native 
troops to bolster their own ranks. It is thus likely that the history of the sepoy troops in 
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India helped to sway their opinions when it came to creating the West India Regiments in 
1795.  
  In January 1795, the French sent a large military force to prop up their failing 
colonial possessions in the Caribbean, and to try to counterattack the British forces. Again, 
Vaughan beseeched Dundas to let him raise black regiments and, in the face of the 
possible collapse of the British West Indian Empire, the latter finally relented. On April 17, 
Dundas gave Vaughan permission to raise two full, black infantry line regiments. 
Vaughan’s victory was a hollow one, however, for within a month of finding out that he 
had been successful, he succumbed to a fever and died.293 Ensuring his legacy, however, 
was the creation of the first two West India Regiments that had already begun recruiting 
as he lay dying. 
 While it was not the Carolina Corps alone who ensured the success of Vaughan’s 
plan, they were incredibly important to it. Had it not been for their excellent service, from 
which all proponents of the venture could draw a virtuous example, it is unlikely that 
Dundas would have permitted the creation of entire black regiments. For the British to 
have done this, without the previous service Carolina Corps to act as a model, would have 
been a massive leap into the dark. The Carolina Corps had showed the usefulness of black 
units, a usefulness that both complied with British racial ideas of climatology, and that 
degraded the strict racial divisions in the region. Men who held the same views as the 
Jamaican agent Fuller had their ideas on race destabilized by the ways the men of Corps 
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could ingratiate themselves within the fluid racial categories in West Indian society. At a 
time when the planters needed red coats, it did not matter the color of the skin of the 
men inside them, and their previous experience with the Carolina Corps made this mental 
transition easier.  
 There is no doubt that a mixture of paternalism and ego helped persuade the 
Mathew and his fellow officers of the Carolina Corps to keep the unit intact. They no 
doubt felt that if they could be so successful with one group, they could replicate their 
success on a wider scale. It would equally have been an insult to their abilities to disband 
a group they had spent so much time “molding” them into a military unit. After April 1795, 
the only query lingering in the minds of these officers was what was to become of them 
and their unit with the raising of the West India Regiments? It would not take long for 
them to find out. 
**** 
 As soon as he received approval from London for the creation of the West Indian 
regiments, John Vaughan set to work to try and bring the plan to fruition. The main focus 
of opposition towards the regiments now shifted away from London, to the white 
minority populations on the British Caribbean islands. Where the West India lobby in 
Parliament failed, the white inhabitants of the West Indies determined to succeed. Thus, 
British military commanders spent much of the next year trying to win over the very 
planters who they needed support from, particularly in the appropriation of slaves to 
serve in the new units.  
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 The first orders to the legislatures and governors of British islands to begin 
preparations for the raising of the West India Regiments arrived in the summer of 1795. 
One representative order, to the governor of Barbados, read: “One of the main points of 
these Instructions is the procuring…a sufficient number of Negroes to act as Pioneers, & 
to perform other duties of labour & fatigue in the important Command entrusted to 
Major General Abercromby.”294 After Vaughan’s sudden death in 1795, it was Ralph 
Abercromby who assumed command of the British forces in the West Indies, and thus the 
need to recruit black troops now fell to him.  
 The British planters in the Caribbean perceived a threat to their property from 
external, or internal enemies, and it was this fear that the British officers exploited when 
pleading the necessity of the new black units. Barbados, the British choice for the new 
main garrison in the Windward Islands, was one of the most critical regions to the new 
black units, as this was to be the base for many of the enslaved soldiers. John Knox, a 
British officer in garrison, used the strategic necessity argument for the units in a letter to 
the island’s governor, George Ricketts, in 1795. Arguing black attrition would be much 
lower than that of white British troops, he wrote that he hoped that he “cannot doubt of 
meeting every support from the Gentlemen of Barbados in carrying the measure 
recommended by the Secretary of State into execution.”295 Unfortunately, such appeals 
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for common sense military reforms failed, with planters more willing to resort to base 
fears to guide them than the ideas of politicians thousands of miles distant.  
 The basest of all fears for planters was the threat of servile insurrection, a threat 
stoked by the rebellion led by Fédon on Grenada, and not alleviated by the British 
government’s new idea to place arms in the hands of slaves. John Alleyne, speaker of the 
Barbados House of Assembly, gave voice to the fears of many West Indians relating to the 
new push to create the West India Regiments, stating that instead of defending the 
islands the new units would “rather endanger the Lives and Fortunes of the Inhabitants, 
if not overturning the very Dominion of the Country into that of a foreign Power by the 
Event.”296 A similar fate had befallen Saint Vincent during the American Revolutionary 
War, when the Black Caribs worked with the French to overthrow British rule on the 
island. The assembly also worried about what enslaved individuals the planters of 
Barbados would be willing to sell for service within the regiments. They concluded that 
the best slaves, those hardest working and loyal, would be retained by planters, while 
those who would be sold for military service would, “be those of the worst characters, 
villains hardened in Acts of Plunder and such as are become reprobate, without hope of 
their being reformed to labour or a life of Honesty, and rife for any species or degree of 
mischief, which when formed into a regular Corps and disciplined with fire arms in their 
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Hands they can the more effectually perpetrate.”297 As well as their fear of armed blacks, 
unlike most British West Indian possessions, Barbados had never been captured by a 
foreign power and thus their ideas of necessary protection differed greatly from those 
populations on less fortunate islands.  
 The military officers in the region knew the fears of the planters towards black 
units but reasoned against them in letters to Whitehall. In 1796, an officer serving on 
Martinique observed, “I know the English Planters are averse to it, because, they say 
these Corps may turn against them, but I see no more reason for that, than for the Soldiers 
of England turning in favour of the Mob.”298 Such arguments, often written by men who 
had fought alongside black troops earlier, were frequently sent to the Home Office at this 
crucial stage in the development of the West India Regiments, providing a useful tool for 
the government to use against the prolonged resistance of the planters in the West Indies.  
 The Carolina Corps themselves became the major foil to white resistance to the 
plans to create the West India Regiments. Unlike most of the other islands in the 
Windwards, Barbados had very little experience with black troops during times of peace. 
Still facing strong opposition in 1797, two years after his plans were first approved, 
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Abercromby drew the attention of the dissident West Indian legislatures to “the conduct 
of the Black Corps serving at St Lucia,” which he described as being “exemplary.”299  
 By 1797, the formation of the units had begun to take place and white minds 
began to change towards support for the new units. The Carolina Corps were at the 
forefront of this shift. After serving on Saint Lucia, the unit removed to Barbados. As late 
as January, the Barbados Assembly had passed a resolution that forbade the support of 
any black troops stationed on the island.300 Such a move was a searing indictment against 
the entire West India Regiment enterprise, as the island was to be one of the chief bases 
for the new units. However, by April the legislature consented to the stationing of the 
black troops on the island.301  
 There were many reasons why the Barbados assembly changed its opinion on the 
stationing of black troops on the island. The changing military situation was one, as was 
the greater impetus placed on the recruitment of blacks by Abercromby for his new units, 
which would have made the Barbadian’s resistance seem futile as their sister colonies 
began complying with the Home Office’s demands. Also, the pro-Parliament governor and 
his royal council had been open to the idea from the start, in direct opposition to the 
                                                          
299 Ralph Abercromby, open letter to West Indian legislatures, 11 April 1797, Minutes of the Barbados House 
of Assembly, HA3/21.  
300 The resolution stated: “that upon the Several serious Considerations before mentioned, this Committee 
cannot consent to give their sanction or support to the raising and establishing any Corps whatever of the 
Black Troops to be quartered in this Island.” Resolution of the Barbados House of Assembly, 17 January 
1797, Minutes of the Barbados House of Assembly, HA3/21. 
301 Minutes of Barbados Royal Council, 11 April 1797, Minutes of the Barbados Royal Council, Vol. 32. 
189 
assembly, and there is a chance that this political situation had become unsustainable by 
spring 1797.  
The impact of the black troops initially stationed on Barbados also had a concerted 
effect in changing hearts and minds. In early 1796, when the first black troops arrived on 
the island, the legislature had considered creating a white unit to stand guard over them. 
Within only a few months the hostile assembly was reporting that is was “unnecessary to 
renew the Act of raising a body of men at the public expence for securing the tranquillity 
of the Inhabitants of this Island during the residence here of the Pioneers lately brought 
into this Island.”302 Part of the reason why the assembly was so quick to change their mind 
was the influx of white regiments that also came to the Barbados garrison. The pioneers 
mentioned were likely a contingent from the Carolina Corps and also seemed to have 
made a good impression. The lack of negative news stories in local newspapers, the 
absence of any court-martial documents relating to these 1796 troops, and the lack of 
specificity in angry claims about black units on Barbados by the assembly suggest that the 
unit performed its role in a thoroughly unobtrusive way. Thus, the Carolina Corps not only 
proved a rhetorical weapon for Abercromby, but also served as a physical foil to the racial 
negativity espoused by the Barbados assembly during this period.  
**** 
 By the time the West Indian Regiments were finally raised to something like full 
strength, in 1797, the Carolina Corps had ceased to exist as a functional unit. 
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Nevertheless, the tattered remains of the unit still contained some men of military age 
who were too young to receive a pension and healthy enough to remain in the British 
service. The commanders of the new units were eager to incorporate of these 
experienced troops into them to act as a veteran backbone in what would be a green 
regiment.303 The Carolina Corps, as the most veteran black unit then serving in the West 
Indies, became a base that the British constructed their new regiments upon.304  
 The parallels between enslavement and service in the British Army are evident 
again based on the experience of the Corps at this late stage of their existence. While 
those deemed too old or infirm gained pensions from the military, it was of course their 
commanding officers who made that judgment call. A close reading of the unit rolls 
through the year’s show that many more members of the unit died in service than 
collected their pension. At this late stage, as the British desperately attempted to find 
experienced men to build their new black regiments around, the chances of older 
members of the Corps receiving a discharge and pension diminished once more. In this 
way, the army, like the planters in the West Indies, remained eager to squeeze every 
available service from the humans under their control, regardless of their physical 
condition.  
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 The British government and military high command encountered a complex 
situation when it came to the Carolina Corps and their incorporation into the new 
regiments due to their unique position as free men. The British wish to use slave troops 
meant that they began purchasing slaves from West Indian planters and traders in Africa 
to such a great extent that by 1800, the government was the largest slaveholder in the 
British Caribbean. The Carolina Corps did not fit the slave-centered mold of the new 
regiments, and Abercromby worried about what the effects of mixing free black and 
enslaved soldiers would be. In November 1797, he recommended to Whitehall that the 
Carolina Corps “now serving in the Windward Islands, ought not to be broken, or 
incorporated during the War—Such a Measure would be highly prejudicial at present.”305 
Instead, the British high command came up with a simple solution that would keep the 
men of the Carolina Corps in service, but separated from the main body of new enslaved 
troops.  
The few surviving members of the Corps who met the requirements of the new 
regiments as dictated by the Home Office joined the newly formed First West India 
Regiment.306 They were united in the new regiment with the men of several other veteran 
black companies from the region, including some of the ranger companies created on the 
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Carolina Corps model.307 With such experience within its ranks, it is no surprise that the 
unit was given numerical primacy over the rest of the new black British units. Many of the 
men in the unit were either free or had actively served alongside free men during their 
military careers, lowering the chance for resentment among the men of the regiment. At 
its creation, the First West India Regiment was the most “free” of all the new regiments. 
While the addition of some slaves was needed to boost the regimental rolls, the unit 
remained comprised mostly of free men throughout its early existence, making it unique 
among the new force.    
While the British were finalizing plans for the First West India Regiment, the 
remaining ninety-five men of the Corps, referred to in British returns as the “Carolina 
Invalids,” gained a welcome reprieve.308 As part of Abercromby’s 1796 expedition to 
relieve Grenada after the brutal rebellion led by Fédon, the men of the unit returned to 
the island that they had called home for more than a decade. It is likely that the troops, 
many of whom were too old or infirm for strenuous military duties, would have had ample 
time to reacquaint themselves with the families they had left a few years before. The fact 
that their commanders now considered them “invalids,” yet retained them in the 
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Grenada garrison shows again how desperate the British were to keep the veteran unit 
for their new military experiment. It also shows that service for members of the Corps, as 
for other British Army units, was often a lifelong agreement. By September 1797, still as 
an independent unit, the Corps, through death and retirement, had dropped in strength 
to only 79, losing 15 percent of their remaining strength in only a year. 
 In 1798, the Carolina Corps ceased to exist as a unit. After this date, the men of 
the Corps who continued to serve the British did so under the guise of the First West 
Indian Regiment, a unit that was based on their military example. It is unlikely that the 
men of the unit served in the new regiment for very long, and by 1805, none of the men 
of the Corps remained among its ranks. The troops served faithfully for over 15 years in 
the British Caribbean, and many for years before that during the Revolutionary War. Most 
were more Caribbean by the end of their service than they were Carolinian, yet the 
moniker stayed with them until the last, differentiating the men from those around them. 
After 1798, the men would experience a totally different type of military environment 
than they had previously had in the Caribbean. Their unique history and experience is 
what stood the men of the Carolina Corps apart from the rest of the British military units 
in the Caribbean, and it was this experience that its surviving members took into their 
next chapter of life, as foundational members of the First West India Regiment. The British 
recognized the vital contribution of the Carolina Corps to the creation of these later units 
by placing the Carolina laurel on the crest of the First West India Regiment. For over a 
century, the men of the regiment would only have to look at their arm patch or cap badge 
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to know the importance that a group of runaway slaves had had on the army of an 
empire.309 
 
Fig. 4.1) The crest of the First West India Regiment (left) and the later British West India Regiment. 
Both carry the Carolina laurel as a tribute to the Carolina Corps and its role in the creation of the 
West India Regiments. 
**** 
While it is highly likely that the British military would have followed their European 
rivals by employing black units in the West Indies, due to the military necessity to do so, 
the existence of the Carolina Corps hastened the process. Not only did the unit provide a 
practical example of how black troops could be utilized in the region, but they also 
provided a model for the leadership structure employed in the West India Regiment 
throughout its early existence.310 That structure, of white commissioned officers and 
                                                          
309 Voelz, “Slave and Soldier,” 283. 
310 The Carolina Corps set such a good example of being a labor unit, one which not coincidentally fell into 
white British ideas regarding the use of blacks in a military context, which the West India Regiments became 
such upon their creation. It was only after the mutiny of black troops on Dominica in 1802 that the units 
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black NCOs, was unique in the peacetime Caribbean to anything other than militia units 
and thus was critically important to showing the British high command in London how a 
regular unit with a similar composition could function.  
 The Carolina Corps was more than just a model for the black units created in its 
wake. It paved the way also through their interactions with the white populations that 
they protected. It is noticeable that while planters on all the islands in the West Indies 
were loath to create the West Indian Regiments, there was less resistance on islands that 
had already had experience with black troops. Even on these islands, it was the idea of 
arming slaves, rather than free men, which caused the most resistance. On Barbados, one 
of the most politically powerful of the British territories in the Caribbean, resistance was 
especially strong because black troops had never been used there and because the island 
had a high number of absentee planters, who rallied against the arming of black troops. 
However, there was no such resistance on Grenada, Saint Vincent or Dominica, islands 
where the Carolina Corps had been a fixture of the military establishment for years.311 It 
is telling that these islanders were much more open to the arming of any blacks, including 
slaves, than those on Barbados. 
                                                          
began to function, and to be treated, as real soldiers within the British military. Tyson, “Black Carolina 
Corps,” 664; Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 129.  
311 In fact, on these islands, the British governors began to create their own black units for defense during 
the period between the authorization for the WIR and the plan going into action. This was particularly true 
on Dominican, where the British commander Cochrane Johnstone created his own black corps from the 
existing slave population on the island. Cochrane Johnstone to Abercromby, 14 April 1796, WO 1-82.  
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 While the impact of the Carolina Corps on the warming of planters towards the 
use of black troops was critical to the creation of the West India Regiments, their impact 
on the white officers of the British Army was no less important. Through a mixture of 
paternalism and ego, men like Edward Mathew could point with pride to the units that 
they felt were the products of their labor and discipline. Indeed, mentally removing the 
agency of the men themselves, their officers saw the excellent service of the units as mere 
reflections of their own military prowess. This did have the benefit, however, of ensuring 
that the officers of the Carolina Corps became some of the loudest proponents for the 
creation of the West India Regiments. Their fellow officers also had no problem using the 
unit to advance their cause, even if their only knowledge of the unit was through boasts 
and hearsay.  
 Many of the factors that led to the creation of the West India Regiments were the 
products of time and chance. If the British had not cut back so sharply on the number of 
white troops in the Caribbean after the American Revolutionary War, if the French 
Revolution had not occurred, or if the British had been able to recruit more soldiers from 
the British lower classes, there simply would not have been a need for the units. And 
when the situation warranted the creation of black regiments on a large scale, the 
Carolina Corps were critically important to their successful implementation. The Carolina 
Corps proved indispensable to the British high command, so much so that it’s remaining 
men, even as “invalids,” were mustered into one of the new units. It must have been with 
mixed feelings that those men partook in this new enterprise, a venture that secured their 
legacy in the annals of British history while also robbing them of their retirement. 
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Whatever their feelings, the new members of the West India Regiments had come a long 
way since their decision to run to the British lines during the Revolutionary War, a decision 









“I have always considered them as freemen.” 
In 1807, the British Parliament passed the Slave Trade Act, ending more than 200 
years of British trafficking in human beings. As momentous as this piece of legislation was, 
a second act had an equally powerful impact on the men in the British Atlantic already 
held in bondage. The British Parliament passed mutiny acts every year, to fund the Army, 
stipulate changes in policy and reevaluate the codes of conduct for those serving within 
its ranks. As such, most have disappeared from the pages of history. The Mutiny Act of 
1807, however, ingrained itself in the history of the British military forever as it was the 
statute that freed the thousands of men serving in the nation’s West India Regiments.  
 The mutiny act emancipated all slaves who were currently fighting for the British, 
some 8000 men in 1807, solidifying their legal status as free men.312 The Act orchestrated 
by far the single biggest emancipation of black slaves in British history up to that point.  
As it had been for the men of the Carolina Corps during the Revolutionary War, fighting 
for the British Army now became a pathway to freedom for male blacks throughout the 
British Caribbean.  
                                                          
312 In August 1807, the West India Regiments contained some 7950 men in its effective fighting force. 
Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 130; Buckley, British Army in the West Indies, 123.  
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 There were various reasons for the passage of the act, with many interconnected 
with the passage of the larger slave trade abolition bill. One of the biggest factors in the 
passage of the mutiny act was the fact that the slave trade, which provided the majority 
of slaves who constituted the fighting force of the West India Regiments, was being 
banned.313 It is important to note that the British government, while closing the slave 
trade, did allow the military to impress any slaves captured by the Royal Navy from illegal 
traders into military service.314 Also, while the act gave legal freedom to slaves serving in 
the regiments, the same document also maintained lifelong terms of service for black 
troops, compared to seven years of service mandated for new white recruits.315 
Nonetheless, the act rang the death knell of the original conceptions of the West India 
Regiments, with the number of troops declining significantly in the ensuing years.  
 Some roots of the Mutiny Act of 1807 are traceable to the service of the Carolina 
Corps, and thus the unit was at least partially responsible for gaining the freedom of their 
brethren a decade after the regiment ceased to exist. It was Lord Grenville, the very same 
man who Edward Mathew had convinced to allow the expansion of the Corps in 1791, 
who was Prime Minister when the new mutiny act passed through Parliament. In his own 
words regarding the troops of the West Indian Regiment, Grenville “always considered 
                                                          
313 Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 130.  
314 It is estimated that some 1600 “liberated” Africans, being those slaves captured by the Royal Navy from 
traders off Africa, were placed in West India Regiments for lifetime service between 1808 and 1815. 
Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, 131.  
315 The same act also exempted the black troops from the Chelsea pension scheme, meaning there was no 
security for the men as they reached the end of their military careers. Claudius Fergus, “Emancipation and 
‘military necessity’,” in Free at Last, 32.  
200 
them as freemen,” and these thoughts long predated the situation in 1807.316 Grenville 
had been the man who had approved the Corps for pensions. It is thus probable that the 
early exposure of Grenville to the use of black troops through the Carolina Corps, with 
whose history he had an intimate connection, affected his later opinions and helped sway 
his judgment when it came to the passage of the Mutiny Act.  
 Indeed, the freedoms granted to the men of the West India Regiment were similar 
to those that had been applied to the Carolina Corps previously. Except for the lack of 
pensions, few of which were ever issued, the basic structure of the emancipation of the 
West Indian soldiers was a carbon copy of that granted to the Carolina Corps. The newly 
freed men gained the same rights to pay, legal recourse through court-martial, and 
freedom of movement (albeit limited) that the men of the Corps received throughout 
their service in the West Indies. The two groups also shared many of the same restrictions 
based on their race, including harsher punishments, increased fatigue duty, and lifelong 
enlistments in the British Army.  
 The impact of the Carolina Corps on the history of the British military expands well 
beyond their limited term of service in British North America and West Indies. It also 
transcends the normal racial boundaries, showing the British Caribbean, often 
characterized as being racially rigid when compared to other European colonies in the 
Caribbean, to have shared the same cultural fluidity found in these settlements. Within 
this fluidity, the military status of the Carolina Corps allowed it to create a niche for itself 
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in British society that would create cultural ripples for thousands of other blacks, both 
free and enslaved, in the West Indies.  
 Returning to the arguments laid out in the introduction, the impact of the Carolina 
Corps on whites in the British establishment is evident throughout their existence. In 
Moral Capital, Brown argues that “it was not difficult for British officers to think of blacks, 
in some contexts, as British subjects, as more than simply labor or the property of British 
colonists.”317 While this predisposition by some officers certainly helped the Carolina 
Corps to survive throughout many crisis points, the actions of the soldiers themselves also 
forced whites in the Caribbean to confront their rigid views on race. Men such as John 
Orde, the governor of Dominica, completely changed their stance on the use of the unit 
once they had seen its service to the crown. Meanwhile the population at large had grown 
so dependent on the Corps that the British high command used the regiment as an 
example to dampen criticism of the plan to create the West India Regiments between 
1795 and 1797. Indeed, whatever feelings Lord Grenville had towards black soldiers 
before 1782, his experience with the Corps thereafter affected him so much that he 
helped to pass the Mutiny Act of 1807 based on principles of freedom first tested through 
the Carolina Corps. In this regard, the interactions between white British officials and the 
Carolina Corps produced a positive reciprocal relationship for both sides.  
 The men in charge of the Carolina Corps, whether military or political, were 
products of their time, however, and thus the lens of race influenced all their interactions 
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with the troops. In the history of the Carolina Corps, misunderstandings over the biology 
of black bodies, and ideas about climatology were both a blessing and a curse for the unit. 
In South Carolina, fears of smallpox almost destroyed the unit before climatological 
beliefs saved them as Charlestown fell. Mischaracterizations about slave cultures also 
meant that the Corps were used extensively to dissuade other black groups from revolt, 
events that created perceptions of loyalty in the minds of white officers. It is also 
important to note that the honor codes, paternalism and egotism that white officers in 
the West Indies showed towards black troops also colored the entirety of this group’s 
interactions with the Carolina Corps.  
The Corps was fortunate to enter the British Atlantic at a moment when 
opposition to racial tropes was on the rise due to the push for abolition. At another place 
or another time, the unit might never have come into existence. White attitudes and the 
moment of imperial crisis that affected the British military during the Revolutionary era 
in the West Indies allowed for not only the creation of the unit, but also established the 
conditions needed for it to thrive. Within this unique period of British history, it was the 
actions of the men themselves that helped to further their own cause and undermine the 
rigid racial divides within the British military at the time.  
 Regarding the socio-cultural interactions with the people of the West Indies, the 
unique position of the men in West Indian society allowed for them to engage in complex 
interactions with members of every race. Being members of the British military 
establishment gave the men access to money and legal status, elevating them above most 
blacks in the regions where they served, including, after the outbreak of the Haitian 
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Revolution, free blacks. The freedom of movement, no matter how limited, allowed for 
interactions with members of the white community that other blacks could only engage 
with peripherally. This was especially true when it came to their interactions with white 
members of the British military. With blacks, particularly enslaved individuals, the 
position of the Carolina Corps in the army affected interactions with the group in 
disparate ways. Despite the negativity felt towards the group by some slaves after the 
Corps policed the enslaved population, the men of the unit formed kinship ties on 
plantations. Also, it was their position as soldiers that allowed the men of the Corps to 
form one of their most interesting relationships, with the Caribs of Saint Vincent. Thus, 
their exceptional status allowed the group to interact with the different groups of the 
British West Indies, partaking in unique contacts that reveal the ways the Corps used the 
fluidity of British Caribbean society to their own advantage.  
 Finally, the impact of the Carolina Corps on the overall British military 
establishment is plain to see throughout this study. At every juncture of their career in 
the British Army, the Corps were breaking new ground. In South Carolina, the units of 
black pioneers and dragoons became the first black land-based units employed in the 
region by the British during the Revolutionary War. They were the only black unit 
evacuated from the British mainland colonies at the end of the conflict that the army 
maintained as a military force, and thus became the first free all-black unit in the British 
Army in the West Indies. Throughout their service, they used their positions to create a 
blueprint for freedom that became widespread in 1807 with the passage of the mutiny 
act. The importance of the unit on the creation of the West India Regiments was 
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unquestioned, even by the officers of the British military who placed the Carolina Laurel 
on the regimental emblem of the First West India Regiment as a testament to the Corps’ 
influence. The Carolina Corps exist as not only one of the most under-studied black units 
in British military history, but also as one of the most important overall.  
 There were no parades for the men of the Carolina Corps. No tombstone survives 
to any individual soldier of the unit. Most Caribbean historians recognize the contribution 
of the unit in simple footnotes or passing remarks. Nevertheless, the shadow cast by the 
unit is long, and it survived in the form of the West India Regiments until their disbanding 
in the twentieth century. This study has attempted to place the unit back into the 
narrative of British military history, bringing the crucial contributions of the Carolina Corps 
to the fore in a way that has never been attempted before. Hopefully it will spur further 
projects that will shed more light on both the Corps and other forgotten units that were 
so fundamental to British policy and strategy during the Revolutionary era in the West 
Indies. If the contributions of Carolina Corps are forgotten, there must be countless more 
stories to be told. This study thus stands as a testament for 300 former slaves who 
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Anon, “Of the Carolina, or Black Corps, serving in the Leeward Islands,” ca. 
December 1791 
 
“When His Majesty’s Army was in Carolina, a number of Negroes left their 
masters, and attached themselves to it. When the Army was evacuating that province, 
several of the Negroes were returned to their masters, but many of them, which had 
taken an active part, had made themselves so obnoxious to their former owners, that 
dreading the severest punishment, they prayed for protection, and to be permitted to 
follow the Army. Their prayer was granted, and some of them were sent to St. Lucia, 
where they were employed about the Troops, during the remainder of the war. At the 
peace, they were sent with our new garrison to Grenada , where the commander in chief 
employed them, some on the Kings works and buildings, some in the Quarter Master 
Generals department, a proportion was attached to each Regt. to assist in doing the 
laborious duties, and some were kept for Guards, for Orderly’s &c &c &c—they were 
taught the use of arms, and on many occasions employed, and in some instances found 
more useful, than the other Troops, from being better able to bear fatigue in that climate. 
Experience having shewn General Mathew, of what essential service a Corps of that kind 
could be made in the West Indies, either in peace or war, under proper regulations, has 
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proposed their being augmented, and put under one Officer, as a Regt, and has thought 
fit to recommend Lieutenant Colonel Nicolls of the 45th: Regt: as well qualified for that 
command.  
 The Black Corps at present consists of above Two hundred men, under Three 
Captains, with Subaltern & Non Comn officers in proportion. The augmenting of which, in 
time of peace, may at first sight appear extraordinary, but when it is considered, that 
some of the colonies will not give Negro labour, and others only in equal proportions with 
what government furnishes, and that so long as it is necessary to keep a military force in 
the West Indies, works and buildings must constantly be carrying on, and that Negroes, 
who are Soldiers, work at least as well, as any that can be hired, and at a much less 
expence; it is therefore presumed the measure on examination, will prove to be founded 
on principles of real utility and Economy. The price of a hired Negro labourer in Grenada 
is Three Shillings currency a day, which is about One Shilling and nine pence Stlg. and he 
is fed besides.  
 An objection may be made to the arming of blacks as soldiers, but it has no weight; 
as experience shews they are not only to be depended upon, but are more inveterate 
against people of their own colour, than any other Troops, and they may always be as 
much confided in, if properly commanded, as any part of the Army.  
 The loss of soldiers in the West Indies, by death, or rendered useless to the service 
by the climate, may be moderately Stated at Ten P Ct. P. An: and the expence of one 
Recruit is nearly as follows.  
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Levy money £3.13.6 




 Every year there are members obliged to be sent home for the recovery of their 
health, whose passage home and back to their Regt. is Twenty pounds for each man, 
besides the loss of their Military service while absent for their duty; no such expence could 
occur for the black corps, and of any part of this waste of men could be prevented, by an 
increase of that establishment, it would seem to be, not only a measure of prudence, but 
of humanity, for which our government is so remarkable.  
 The loss of Seasoned Negroes is not estimated at Three P Ct. P. An: and they are 
known to be capable of doing more work for a continuance, than Europeans in that 
climate.  
 It is conceived that some Negroes could be Inlisted in Nova Scotia; their passage 
from thence to the West Indies, would be attended with a trifling expence, but employing 
one of the Island Government Brigs for that purpose. But admitting none could be raised 
in that way, and you paid Fifty pounds for each able and Seasoned Negro, for the purpose 
of augmenting the Black corps, to double its present member, the difference of saving 
between employing them & hiring Negroes to labour, would soon repay their first cost. 
And when the Advantage of the great increase of Military ^force from the black corps, if 
properly formed, is considered, either in peace or war, and that they are known to be 
more useful in many cases, than an equal number of any other species of Troops in the 
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West Indies, these reasons and their various uses taken together, would seem to out 
weigh any objections that can be made to their being augmented, and put on a footing 
that General Mathew recommends.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
